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ABSTRACT 
This thesis documents a qualitative research study of twenty postmodern therapy 
practitioners in Aotearoa New Zealand, focusing on their experiences in the wider 
field of therapy. The participants were aligned in their subscribing to postmodern 
critiques of therapy as a instrument of power, and in their interest in, and use of, 
therapy techniques and approaches that have grown out of those critiques – including 
narrative therapy, critical psychology, “Just Therapy”, and feminist poststructuralist 
therapy approaches. I argue that these practitioners represent a social movement 
within the field of therapy. The thesis examines the nature of the wider therapy field 
in Aotearoa New Zealand, analysing the perspectives of the participants. I 
demonstrate how this field has become increasingly dominated by the twin forces of 
neoliberalism and bio-science, making postmodern therapy work difficult, particularly 
within public sector services. In the final substantive part of the thesis, I critically 
examine and appraise the strategies used by participants to negotiate and resist these 
forces. This discussion is divided into two main chapters, dealing first with the 
participants who have difficulty in engaging in official politics and who consequently 
attempt to operate “under the radar” of management surveillance: these participants 
are characterised as “battlers”, “burn-outs” and “blow-outs”. Then, I turn my attention 
to the second group of participants – “infiltrators”, “outsiders” and “accepters” – who 
strategically utilise symbolic capital to pose resistance, or simply leave the public 
system. I also consider the professed abilities of this second group to cultivate a 
postmodern sensibility and to tolerate contradiction and compromise. I conclude this 
investigation of the possibilites for resistance to neoliberal and bio-scientific 
discourses by recommending greater strengthening of this local postmodern therapy 
movement. 
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PART 1 
1. Introduction 
Starting points 
At the start of his book Acts of Resistance (1998), Pierre Bourdieu reflects on the 
contradictions of the social world that are often experienced by public sector “social 
workers” as personal dramas. He describes a project leader, responsible for 
coordinating all the work on a “difficult [housing] estate” in a small town in northern 
France:  
He is faced with contradictions which are the extreme case of those currently 
experienced by all those who are called “social workers”: family counsellors, 
youth leaders, rank-and-file magistrates, and also, increasingly, secondary and 
primary teachers. They constitute what I call the left hand of the state, the set of 
agents of the so-called spending ministries which are the trace, within the state, of 
the social struggles of the past. They are opposed to the right hand of the state, the 
technocrats of the Ministry of Finance, the public and private banks and the 
ministerial cabinets”. (pp.1-2) 
Bourdieu goes on to declare: 
I think that the left hand of the state has the sense that the right hand no longer 
knows, or, worse, no longer really wants to know what the left hand does. In any 
case, it does not want to pay for it. (p. 2) 
Bourdieu’s comments politicise the personal and everyday struggles of various social 
– in this broad sense – workers. Rather than simply personal dramas, these struggles 
represent and result from the relationship between these left and right hands of the 
state: the remains and traces of what might be termed a “welfare state”, and the 
modern ministries and financial bodies and leaders that direct state interests and 
activities. For Bourdieu, this is a relationship of tension and opposition, where the left 
hand opposes the right, while the right hand, oblivious, does not actually know what 
the left hand does, but is opposed to paying for it. 
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In this book, Bourdieu analyses 1990s European social and economic life, exposing 
and challenging the ideology of neoliberalism – which has seen the retraction of the 
state from social life – and defending the public interest. While this thesis is based in 
Aotearoa New Zealand and has taken its final shape more than a decade after 
Bourdieu’s work, his depiction of the relationship between the left and right hands of 
the state serves as a useful introduction to my subject. This research began as – and 
very much remains – an investigation into the working lives of a very specific group 
of practitioners within the generalised field of therapy (including counselling, social 
work, psychology, and psychiatry) in Aotearoa New Zealand. These practitioners 
were chosen because they broadly identified with a postmodern approach to their 
therapy work.1 This involved conceptualising clients’/patients’ problems as arising 
out of, and inextricable from, their social and political contexts; assuming that 
language and discourse are implicated in the construction of experience and perceived 
reality; and actively reflecting on and responding to the power differential between 
therapist and client/patient in their work. This postmodern position encompassed a 
general scepticism towards exclusively bio-medical explanations and treatments for 
problems.  
As I came to analyse my data, I found that Bourdieu’s left/right hand metaphor was in 
many respects an apt descriptor for the ways in which my participants characterised 
their perceptions of their place within the field in which they operated. Their 
descriptions of how they endeavoured to practise therapy in ways that they perceived 
as ethically and professionally appropriate highlighted a schism between their 
interests as “social workers” and the management outlook and official discourses that 
directed their workplaces, particularly within the public sector. Therapists in this 
study described witnessing throughout the 1990s greater and greater cleavage and 
separation between the left hand – practitioners providing public sector therapy 
                                                
1 I use “postmodern therapy” as a generalised term throughout this thesis to describe the ways of 
working that I argue – particularly in chapter 4 – characterise my participants’ self-descriptions, 
notwithstanding the great variety of roles that they occupied as a group. It is my term, not my 
participants’, who instead tended to refer to such interests as narrative therapy, “Just Therapy”, critical 
psychology, feminist theories, social constructionism, and specifically to the ideas of Johnella Bird, 
Michael White and others. 
As for the term “postmodern” itself, again this is used in a relatively general sense to refer to a critical 
mode of thought that subscribes broadly to poststructuralist and deconstructionist understandings of 
knowledge; social constructionism; the roles of language, discourse and power in shaping society; and 
scepticism towards “grand narratives,” including entrenched belief in the scientific method as a 
universal tool in the search for understanding. 
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services – and the right – state ministries (especially as influenced by the New 
Zealand Treasury), policy-makers, bureaucrats and public sector managers. The 
language and practices of the right hand became dominant and far-reaching over this 
period, playing an increasingly influential role in both the organisation and 
conceptualisation of therapy services. This influence was largely one-way, directed by 
right hand representatives with little interest in conversing or collaborating with the 
left hand: the right hand seemed not to know – nor want to know – what the left hand 
was actually doing, but was increasingly reluctant to pay for it. While my original 
intention in undertaking this research was to learn about the possibilities for doing 
postmodern therapy at all, as I came to analyse my data, the focus became 
increasingly on the possibilities for doing it in this environment. The neoliberal 
context became an unavoidable, and major, player in my analysis. 
The thesis, then, using qualitative research methods, critically examines the 
postmodern therapy movement in Aotearoa New Zealand from this context of tension 
and alienation. It focuses on the interview texts of a group of postmodern therapy 
practitioners working during the 2000s, using these texts to analyse the mobilisation 
of postmodern therapy approaches within the wider field of therapy.2 My analysis 
highlights particular tensions and obstacles that face postmodern practitioners as they 
try to practise these therapy approaches: doing postmodern-inspired therapies in 
Aotearoa New Zealand proves a difficult task. In particular, difficulties arise as 
therapists clash with the dominant forces that currently structure the therapy field, 
namely neoliberal/managerialist and medical/scientific discourses. The thesis 
examines both the competition between rival forces and discourses within the therapy 
field – the postmodern therapy movement’s struggles with the official, endorsed 
“right hand” discourses and forms of capital – and the strategies and practices used by 
postmodern therapy practitioners to negotiate and, where possible, resist the 
hegemony of the field.  
The thesis highlights significant tensions between different realms of social activity, 
in particular emphasising disjunctions between the spaces of theory and practice. In 
                                                
2 The thesis focuses on therapists’ self-reports and descriptions of their professional practices. My 
analysis of the postmodern therapy movement in Aotearoa New Zealand is necessarily partial: the 
thesis does not attempt to consider the efficacy or effects of these practices and does not include the 
accounts of clients/patients who are the recipients of postmodern therapies.  
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Aotearoa New Zealand, postmodern approaches to therapy theories and practices are 
a strong feature of many counselling and social work training programmes. Trainee 
therapists are taught to consider how the narratives and difficulties of clients/patients 
are socially constructed in particular ways, to be alert to the operation of power in 
both these narratives and in the processes of therapy, and to avoid imposing meaning 
or explanations on clients’/patients’ experiences. As is discussed in this thesis, these 
approaches focus on client/patient knowledge and skills, rather than those of the 
therapist, and take an anti-pathologising stance. Yet, as is also demonstrated 
throughout the thesis, applying and practising these therapy approaches within actual 
therapy work proves to be profoundly difficult. Within the relevant institutions in 
Aotearoa New Zealand, the directives for therapy practice are often contrary to the 
expectations and assumptions of therapists themselves: indeed, it appears that there is 
a fundamental language gap between postmodern therapy practitioners and the 
systems in which they operate. My research identifies and explores this conflict of 
meaning, as well as the effects it has on postmodern therapy practitioners and their 
work, and the actions they take to negotiate it. The thesis lays bare a picture of a 
social movement that is at once burgeoning and active but also – particularly in the 
public sector – fraught with disheartenment, compromise, and difficulty. 
More broadly, the thesis touches upon a concerning general phenomenon. Critical 
postmodern ideas, influenced by poststructuralism, feminism, cultural studies, and the 
“linguistic turn” in epistemic analysis, are largely commonplace in a liberal arts or (to 
an extent) social science tertiary education today. While these ideas and ways of 
thinking stem from and relate to progressive social movements, modern neoliberal 
workplaces offer limited opportunities for their expression or practice. This thesis is 
confined to the area of therapy in Aotearoa New Zealand, but it points to a wider field 
of potential research and questioning. It is worth asking whether the relationship 
between theory and the workplace needs to be given greater critical attention, 
focusing on the pragmatic skills of negotiation that are required to take classroom 
theory into the realms of professional practice. 
Theoretical approaches 
By referring to Bourdieu at the outset, I also wish to foreground his influence on how 
I have approached my analysis of the research data. This thesis involves investigation 
!&)!!
of both the postmodern therapy movement in Aotearoa New Zealand and the wider 
institutions, workplaces, spaces and relationships of therapy in which the therapists’ 
participate, and analysis of the interactions between these two entities. In undertaking 
this research, I utilise Bourdieu’s concepts of the “field” and “capital”. I talk about 
my subject as a struggle over the meaning and workings of the therapy field in 
Aotearoa New Zealand, as rival forces seek to shape and define it in particular ways, 
with varying degrees of success. Bourdieu describes fields as “networks of social 
relations, structured systems of social positions within which struggles or maneuvers 
take place over resources, stakes and access” (Everett, 2002, p. 60). Fields are spaces 
in which particular resources are prized and sought – have “currency” – and are 
characterised by struggle, as the meanings of a field and the terms of its operations 
shift and change in response to various forces. Jeffery Everett (2002), drawing on 
Bourdieu, explains the struggles that take place within fields, illustrating their shifting 
and dynamic nature: “Fields are occupied by the dominant and the dominated, two 
sets of actors who attempt to usurp, exclude, and establish monopoly over the 
mechanisms of the field’s reproduction and the type of power effective in it” (p. 60). 
Fields, then, are born from and structured and reconstructed by specific forms of 
power relations. This thesis examines the power relations of the field of therapy, 
exposing the relationships between the dominant and dominated and the struggles 
over the mechanisms of the field and the types of power effective within it. 
The power relations at play within fields and the nature of the struggles that take place 
on their terrain are concerned with the possession, display and deployment of 
different forms of capital. Indeed, Bourdieu stresses that the concepts of field and 
capital are interconnected and dependent on each other, explaining that, “[i]n 
empirical work, it is one and the same thing to determine what the field is, where its 
limits lie, etc., and to determine what species of capital are active in it, within what 
limits, and so on” (Bourdieu & Wacquant, 1992, p. 98-99). Fields are constituted by 
particular species of capital, and species of capital obtain meaning and accrue 
currency through their existence within the bounds of specific fields. For Bourdieu, 
the struggles that take place within fields over resources, stakes and access are all, in 
fact, struggles over capital. Species of capital, according to Bourdieu, include 
economic capital (in its different forms), but also “cultural capital, social capital and 
symbolic capital, which is the form that the various species of capital assume when 
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they are perceived and recognized as legitimate” (Bourdieu, 1989, p. 17).3 Within a 
field, different species of capital will operate and form alliances, or compete for 
authority with symbolic capital – “found in the form of prestige, renown, reputation, 
and personal authority” (Everett, 2002, p. 63) – and will thereby construct and 
organise the hierarchies and power relations of the field. The people who belong to 
and participate within particular social fields are  
bearers of capitals and, depending on their trajectory and on the position they 
occupy in the field by virtue of their endowment (volume and stretch) in capital, 
they have a propensity to orient themselves actively either toward the 
preservation of the distribution of capital or toward the subversion of this 
distribution. (Bourdieu & Wacquant, 1992, p. 108-109) 
To use Bourdieu’s oft-cited metaphor of the field as a game, forms and volumes of 
capital influence how individuals play the game and their chances within it, but they 
can also work to “transform, partially or completely, the immanent rules of the game” 
(Bourdieu & Wacquant, 1992, p. 99). 
This thesis examines the “players” within the therapy field as “bearers of capital”. 
Throughout, I conceptualise the struggles between the research participants and other 
actors, forces and institutions within the field as a struggle over the symbolic power of 
particular species of capital; players vie for authority and legitimacy within the field 
and for the ability to define and direct the nature of therapy work. I use Bourdieu’s 
concepts to demonstrate how competing forces have sought to, on one side, maintain, 
and on the other, usurp and establish, monopoly over the mechanisms of the therapy 
field’s reproduction and the type of power that is effective within this field. The state 
of the “game” within the therapy field, and the positions held by postmodern therapy 
practitioners, influence their “relative force in the game, [their] position[s] in the 
space of play, and also [their] strategic orientation toward the game” (Bourdieu & 
Wacquant, 1992, p. 99) (italics in original). 
                                                
3 Bourdieu and others expand this taxonomy, identifying other forms of capital, such as “political 
capital or recognized titles or credentials in institutional contexts” (Prosise, Miller, & Mills, 1996, p. 
121); “religious capital” (Swartz (citing Bourdieu), 1996, p. 75); “gendered capital” (Huppatz, 2009); 
“emotional capital” (Reay, 2000); and others. Bourdieu himself renames cultural capital “informational 
capital to give the notion of its full generality” (Bourdieu & Wacquant, 1992, p. 119) (italics in 
original). Each species of capital, in turn, can be made up of a variety of subsets; for instance, Everett 
describes “linguistic capital” as a subset of cultural capital (2002, p. 63). 
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I use Bourdieu’s approach to analysing social fields as a means of organising and 
discussing the power relations that structure the postmodern therapy movement and 
the therapy spaces that my participants engage with and work in. Bourdieu conceives 
of the power relations of the field as fluid and changeable, as participants potentially 
deploy their capital with the aim of transforming the rules of the game: the game and 
its rules are not set or intractable; hierarchies are continually contested and resistance 
is ever-present. This conception of both domination and resistance coheres with the 
other sources I draw on to develop the various facets of my analysis of the research 
data. 
In examining both the postmodern therapy movement within the therapy field in 
Aotearoa New Zealand – as represented by my study participants – and its 
relationship to and interactions with the wider therapy field, I necessarily engage in an 
analysis of the power relations that are at work within these spaces. In addition to 
Bourdieu, I utilise other theoretical ideas to undertake this analysis. The early 
chapters of the thesis focus on describing the features and assumptions of this 
postmodern therapy movement, and then examining the therapy field from a macro-
political perspective, grounding my analysis of the operation of dominant discourses 
by drawing on the perspectives of my participants. In doing so, I utilise a general 
cultural studies orientation, critically examining the forces and discourses at play in 
an attempt to reveal the nature and shape of activity in terms of power, agency and 
resistance. This analysis draws on a variety of interdisciplinary writings addressing 
relevant areas of cultural investigation: theories of social movements, Foucauldian-
influenced critiques of neoliberalism, Bourdieu’s concept of official discourse, 
medical sociology, and the postmodern critique of the “psy” disciplines. 
The last part of the thesis focuses specifically on the possibilities and practices of 
resistance to the hegemonic discourses and forces within the field. This discussion 
draws on the ideas of Michel Foucault, as well as other theorists writing from the 
perspective of critical organisation studies. With an intensifying focus on the 
narratives told by my participants, as the thesis progresses I take an increasingly 
micropolitical view, examining the possibilities for acts of resistance in the 
negotiations enacted by therapists working in the field. Throughout, I focus on the 
partiality of both hegemony and resistance, and on the ways in which the two are 
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mutually involved in each other’s reproduction: in the act of resisting, participants 
may draw on and reproduce other hegemonic discourses; likewise, hegemony itself 
tends to contain within it the space and resources for incipient resistance. 
Outline of the thesis 
My discussion and analysis is organised into different parts. Part 1 comprises this 
introduction and my methodology discussion (chapter 2), where I position myself as 
the researcher, introduce the research participants, and describe the process of data 
collection and analysis. I discuss how I take a postmodern, social constructionist 
approach to qualitative research, presenting the knowledge produced in this thesis as 
tentative, partial, and necessarily influenced by research decisions and the contexts 
and positions of both the participants and me. 
Part 2 – comprising chapters 3 and 4 – provides essential background and contextual 
information. It is concerned with situating and describing the postmodern therapy 
movement within the generalised field of therapy, both theoretically and as a peopled 
movement represented by the research participants. Chapter 3 examines the 
philosophical and theoretical critiques and ideas of proponents of postmodern therapy 
approaches. In doing so, it establishes a context for understanding the ideas and 
assumptions that guide my participants. The first section of the chapter reviews the 
problems postmodern-inspired critics have identified with traditional therapy 
approaches and practices. The second section considers how these critiques of therapy 
have led to the development of a variety of therapy practices that seek to apply the 
critiques in positive and efficacious ways. 
Chapter 4 brings the research participants into focus by examining their self-reports of 
doing therapy in ways that are informed by the postmodern critique. That is, this 
chapter grounds the theoretical perspectives of chapter 3 in the working lives of my 
research participants. It also offers an insight into the mobilisation of therapy ideas 
from the previous chapter. At the same time, it examines how the participants 
described and positioned themselves as a distinct group with common objectives and 
purposes. The chapter reviews how this social movement functions as a collective and 
how its objectives and purposes become manifest.
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Part 3 – comprising chapters 5 and 6 – examines the broad context of the therapy field 
in Aotearoa New Zealand, in which members of the postmodern therapy movement 
work and interact. In Bourdieu’s terms, the therapy field is seen throughout as a site 
of struggle, where competing forms of capital are deployed to achieve strategic gains. 
Chapter 5 describes the arrival of neoliberalism into the therapy field in the late 1980s 
and the 1990s and the transformation of the public sector that ensued. Participants’ 
transcripts provide accounts of the conflict and tension arising out of the impact of 
this transformation. The chapter describes some of the key changes that took place in 
public sector therapy provision from the perspectives of my participants, in particular 
focusing on the impact of the rhetoric of fiscal restraint and austerity; managerialism 
and the authority of business practices and knowledge; the imposition of a market 
model of operations, with attendant demands for measurable outputs and outcomes; 
increased surveillance and bureaucratic demands; and the loss of professional 
autonomy in therapists’ decision-making. The chapter highlights the difficulties faced 
by the study’s postmodern therapy practitioners in their attempts to practise as they 
saw fit within the context of a neoliberalised public sector (or, under the new public 
management, a contract-based quasi public sector). 
Chapter 6 ties that discussion to another struggle taking place across the therapy field 
over the same period, which for the postmodern therapy movement again involved 
contestation over the meaning and nature of therapy. The chapter describes how, in 
concert with neoliberal bureaucracy, medical and scientific knowledges have come to 
enjoy increased authority, to the extent that they represent the official discourse and 
point of view of the field as a whole. It outlines the expansion of medical and 
scientific discourses generally within the therapy field, describing the rise of a “new 
biologism” and scientific methods, and the increasingly dominant role played by the 
Diagnostic and Statistical Manual of Mental Disorders (DSM). The postmodern 
therapy practitioners in this study, being avowedly sceptical of such discourses, 
described the increasing prominence of medical and scientific discourses in therapy 
during the 1990s as a “takeover”. I draw on their interview texts to examine the 
implications of this for postmodern therapy practitioners, focusing on diagnosis and 
the concept of “evidence-based practice”. I also demonstrate how therapy professions 
are stratified hierarchically in relation to medical qualifications and expertise. Again, 
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the chapter examines this aspect of the power relations of the therapy field through 
the use of the concept of capital. 
Part 4 – comprising chapters 7, 8 and 9 – examines how the postmodern therapy 
practitioners in this study described themselves as negotiating their workplaces and 
professional roles, given the hegemony of neoliberal/managerialist and 
medical/scientific discourses within the therapy field. It begins with an introductory 
chapter (chapter 7), which re-caps the course of the thesis thus far, highlighting the 
clash between the discourses and forms of capital prized by the postmodern therapy 
movement and those that reign within the wider therapy field. The chapter introduces 
the theoretical approach I take to my analysis, in the following two chapters, of how 
the postmodern therapy practitioners negotiated and attempted to resist the 
oppositional, and often hostile, forces of the therapy field. Despite the seeming 
inescapability of neoliberalism and the medicalised regimes of therapy, these 
discourses are not fixed or monolithic, and are open to contestation and subversion. I 
explain that the following two chapters analyse points of resistance within the therapy 
field and the discursive strategies used by postmodern therapy practitioners to “play 
the game” and move between the boundaries of their own self-positions and those 
prescribed by the field. 
Chapter 8 is the first of two chapters that closely examine the “boundary-riding” and 
resistance strategies of postmodern therapy practitioners. The chapter focuses on 
“Battlers”, “Burn-Outs” and “Blow-Outs”, the group of research participants whose 
experiences of negotiating and resisting the forces of the therapy field involved 
struggle, tension and disillusionment. It analyses the strategies deployed by these 
therapists to resist the hegemony of the therapy field and to practise their preferred 
therapy approaches, and it considers the efficacy and consequences of these strategies. 
Part A examines therapists’ engagement with official discourses and politics and their 
assertions of professional selfhood as methods of resistance. Part B focuses on the 
“hidden transcript” of these therapists, which takes shape when there is little space for 
official resistance within workplaces. Within the informal spaces of their workplaces, 
therapists exploited the incomplete surveillance of management, or developed 
ingenious methods to avoid surveillance. They cultivated the appearance of 
conformity, made strategic use of silence, and played the game and worked the 
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systems of their workplaces, making strategic use of their tools and discourses. The 
chapter also discusses the example of one therapist “beating the system” of his 
workplace. In my analysis of these discursive strategies, I highlight their toll on the 
personal and professional lives of these therapists. 
Chapter 9 examines the second group of postmodern therapy practitioners, whose 
narratives of boundary-riding and resistance lacked the personal struggle or pain 
described in the previous chapter and involved greater ease and satisfaction. This 
group of therapists are labelled as “Infiltrators”, “Outsiders” and “Accepters”. The 
chapter analyses several resistance strategies used by members of this group, 
including the successful use of official politics, the infiltration of mainstream therapy 
spaces and systems, and the tactic of leaving the public sector for community or 
private sector work opportunities. I examine how therapists’ positions within the 
medicalised hierarchy of therapy professions influenced how they used these 
strategies and the success of their application. In addition to my analysis of these 
resistance strategies, the chapter contains an addendum that considers a number of the 
therapists’ professed abilities to accept and tolerate the partial nature of their 
resistances and the compromises they made in order to have relatively peaceful 
working lives. I discuss several cultural discourses that supported therapists to take up 
deliberate positions of tolerance for contradiction in their working lives, and I suggest 
that these positions supported these therapists to make boundary-riding both 
personally and professional sustainable. 
I conclude the thesis by considering the significance of the research in terms of the 
postmodern therapy movement, the general field of therapy in Aotearoa New Zealand, 
and the wider fields of public sector services. I also position this research in relation 
to debates about the impact of neoliberalism/managerialism in specific organisational 
settings. I argue that the trends revealed by my research indicate a situation marked by 
fractiousness and difficulty alongside pockets of harmoniousness and professional 
freedom. My emphasis is on the need for mentors and teachers of postmodern therapy 
approaches to engage more closely with the realities that confront practitioners in the 
field.
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2. Methodology 
Introduction 
This chapter discusses the theoretical assumptions that guide my research methods. It 
also introduces me, the researcher/writer, and my study participants, foregrounding 
our respective social positions in relation to this research. First, I review my approach 
to the knowledge presented in this thesis, emphasising a social constructionist 
perspective. Next, I examine how I have “contaminated” the research process, 
discussing my own narrative in order to indicate some of the positions I occupy as the 
interpreter and author. I then introduce the participants, explaining the means by 
which they came to take part in this project, as well as acknowledging those who were 
not included. I discuss the participants’ interests and connections as a group, their 
demographic details, the professional roles that they occupy, and the impact upon 
them of their positions within professional hierarchies. I then go on to examine the 
shifting, multiple degrees and kinds of power wielded by these postmodern therapy 
practitioners. Following this, I direct attention to the context of the interviews, 
including descriptions of the actual settings in which the interviews took place. 
Finally, I outline the technical process of obtaining and organising the research data, 
describing the functions of interview questions and field notes, and the process for 
coding interview themes. This chapter should remind the reader of the 
constructedness of this research and the selectiveness of my narrative. In it, I place 
myself in the research to draw attention at this early stage to the writing subject, who 
may otherwise risk being lost from view. 
Theoretical approach to knowledge 
This thesis is a close examination of how various therapy practitioners attempted to 
“do” therapy work in new ways and with political awareness within varied 
workplaces and institutions in Aotearoa New Zealand in the mid-2000s. While I am 
interested in such big themes as resistance, the critique of psychological models and 
traditions, and the possibilities of postmodern therapy practices, I am aware of the 
limitations of this research. The situatedness of the research, including the 
specificities of context and variations among my participants, betray the possibility of 
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making grand or all-encompassing statements. My statements and conclusions are 
partial and shaped and influenced by my participants’ and my own social positions, 
interests, agendas, oversights, shortcomings, and subjective worldviews. In beginning 
my discussion of the methodology used in this research project in this way, I am 
acknowledging what is generally unacknowledged in more traditional, modernist and 
scientific research methodologies, where the “god-trick of seeing everything from 
nowhere” (Haraway, 1991, p. 189) provides an illusion of transparent, self-evident 
and absolute knowledge. All knowledge is tentative, subjective and partial; and it is 
produced – rather than revealed – by its authors: the god-trick is just that, a sleight of 
voice and words. 
My methodological orientation in this thesis is influenced by postmodern, 
poststructuralist and feminist critiques of qualitative research and the production of 
knowledge, and by the research practices that have evolved in response to these 
critiques. These critiques and practices have problematised and raised questions about 
the possibilities of collecting data and developing knowledge. In varied ways, as 
Holstein and Gubrium explain, “these alternative perspectives4 hold that meaning is 
socially constructed; all knowledge is created from the actions undertaken to obtain 
it” (2002, p. 112). Knowledge is not absolute, transcendent or fixed; it is not simply 
waiting to be discovered or revealed. As Patti Lather explains, quoting James 
Clifford, “there is no final knowledge; ‘the contingency and historical moment of all 
readings’ ensures that, whatever the object of our gaze, it ‘is contested, temporal, and 
emergent’” (Lather 1991, p. 14). Knowledge is situated, contextual and always 
partial. And it is created and formed through the endeavours, interests and positions of 
the researcher and, in the case of qualitative research, her subjects. 
The social construction of knowledge is particularly apparent when a critical gaze 
turns toward the traditions of qualitative research. The quest for objective, 
transparent, definitive accounts of “real world” subjects is rife with problems. As 
Holstein and Gubrium stress in their discussion of knowledge produced from 
qualitative methods: 
                                                
4 Holstein and Gubrium refer to poststructuralist, postmodern, constructionist, and 
ethnomethodological approaches to qualitative research (2002, p. 112). 
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Any interview situation – no matter how formalized, restricted or standardized – 
relies upon the interaction between participants. Because meaning construction is 
unavoidably collaborative (Garfinkel, 1967; Sacks et al., 1974), it is virtually 
impossible to free any interaction from those factors that could be construed as 
contaminants. All participants in an interview are inevitably implicated in making 
meaning. (2002, p. 123-124) 
It is mythical that a social research process may discover pure, objective, and 
“uncontaminated” knowledge that is free from unaccounted-for variables. Rather than 
suggesting a weakness or lack of academic rigour, the collaborative meaning 
construction that takes place within interviews, which is necessarily particular and 
partial, is the knowledge – is the subject under investigation. It is therefore vital to 
consider how the knowledge presented within this thesis is socially constructed 
alongside whatever claims and arguments I put forward about postmodern therapy 
practices: the two are inextricable (Holstein & Gubrium, 2002, p. 124; Fontana, 2003, 
p. 56). 
Laurel Richardson (1994) makes clear the possibilities, invitations and freedoms that 
poststructuralism offers qualitative researchers, reinforcing the importance of 
understanding the subjective production of knowledge and highlighting a new agenda 
(in the early 1990s) for writing. She explains that 
poststructuralism suggests two important things to qualitative writers: First, it 
directs us to understand ourselves reflexively as persons writing from particular 
positions at specific times; and second, it frees us from trying to write a single 
text in which everything is said to everyone. Nurturing our own voices releases 
the censorious hold of “science writing” on our consciousness, as well as the 
arrogance it fosters in our psyche. (p. 518) 
Richardson’s condensation of what poststructuralism means for qualitative writers 
informs and steers my own research and writing. By being reflexive and considering 
the nature of this knowledge production and my place and role in it, I am able to 
avoid some of the pressures and dangers of traditional qualitative writing. Likewise, 
in favouring a personal, partial and situated narrative, I am relieved from the pursuit 
of a complete, authoritative text. This poststructuralist approach encourages a 
continual questioning and doubtfulness over my own (and others’) knowledge claims. 
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The “contaminating” researcher: a story about me in this thesis 
The “contamination” feared by believers in pure science methods is present in part in 
this thesis because I am neither a detached, neutral observer, nor a mechanical, 
faultless recorder of information (nor, for that matter, are my participants sterile 
conduits for information). As the reader and analyser of interview transcripts, and as 
the writer of this text, I am present throughout this thesis. In concert with numerous 
other postmodern/poststructuralist researchers (Bola, 1995; Denzin & Lincoln, 1998, 
2002; Heenan, 1996; Lather, 1991; Mauthner & Doucet, 2003; Richardson, 1994; 
Surtees, 2003), Nicola Gavey stresses that: 
Because the reading process is constructive and not neutral, it is important to 
identify one’s positions as a reader in relation to this text (even though such 
identification is unlikely to capture the nuances and complexity of these 
positions). (1989, p. 468) 
Situating myself in relation to this text reveals some of my agendas and interests. This 
offers some “understanding of what is influencing … [this] knowledge production and 
how this is occurring” (Mauthner & Doucet, 2003, p. 419), and alerts readers to 
potential tensions in relation to my assertions about my research participants. My 
voice in this thesis is neither authoritative nor innocent and who I am is integral to 
how I construct knowledge. By situating the writing subject (me), I allow both readers 
and myself openings to question and engage critically with the claims that I make. 
This research process and creation has produced more books or stories than will be 
written within these pages. There are many possible strands and pathways among the 
webs of knowledge shaped by the interview conversations, drafted in notes that were 
abandoned, told to others in stories outside or around this text, or simply formed, or 
malformed, in my mind but never spoken or written. A whole story could be my 
autobiography, a rich, layered expose of the germination, growth and development of 
this research in my life. I could describe, somewhat poetically perhaps, grim rainy 
weekend days in my fifth floor university office, my head and body filled with tension 
and questioning about the meaning and purpose of this project. Or how warm 
conversations over cups of tea with my aunt spurred on my ideas, pointed me in 
different directions, and then swung back into my professional life. The starting and 
stopping and starting of the research, what I did in between these times, and the 
inherently fluid overflow of this project from the confines and “study days” of the 
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University’s PhD programme could all be described and analysed in great detail. This 
narrative shaped, melded and prompted the questions I posed to the people 
interviewed for this project, the questions that struck me after the interviews, and the 
questions that formed the basis for my analysis of the research materials.  
While the fullness of this story will not be written or contained here, it will be woven, 
openly at times but also not so openly or consciously, throughout this document. 
However, I will also give some highlights here, creating some semblance of a plot, 
and in the process offer some insight into my multiple positions in relation to this 
research and to my participants. 
The research process began for me in 2004, when I was 28 years old. I began the 
study with critical questions about the possibilities of therapy as a viable, ethical, 
socially worthy and desirable activity. I was profoundly uncertain and uneasy about 
the practices and endeavours of therapy/therapists. My university training encouraged 
critique of institutions and dominant knowledge systems, such as psychology. I was 
concerned about the seemingly irresolvable power imbalances in the relationship 
between therapists and clients, and the critique of therapy as an instrument of social 
control filled my head and fuelled my scepticism.  
My academic concerns both influenced, and were influenced by, my “second job” as a 
support worker – and later counsellor and manager – at a local, community-based, 
non-governmental organisation that provided support to people with eating and body 
image difficulties.5 I had been involved with this organisation, as both a worker and 
volunteer, since 2000. In my job, I stood on the cusp of the therapy profession, aware 
both of the therapy-like work I was stumbling into with clients, and of the 
professional legitimacy I could gain by “signing up” to counselling/therapy training 
and becoming an accredited practitioner. Yet I held back, feeling ambivalent. My 
scepticism of therapy, and my critical awareness of the workings of power within the 
therapy profession, kept me wary and uneasy about the activities and potentials of the 
professional life of my “second job”. 
                                                
5 I have been involved with this organisation throughout the course of developing and writing this 
thesis, doing part-time work alongside part-time study. I resigned from my counselling and 
management roles in September 2011, but remain involved in the governance of the organisation. 
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So I began researching this thesis and talking with my first research participants from 
this position of ambivalence and scepticism. I presented and introduced myself to 
participants as someone with both an identity as a university graduate student with 
particular disciplinary interests and alliances, and as a possible peer, a professional 
from within the area of mental health work in Aotearoa New Zealand who was 
shifting and shuffling in and out of the role of therapist/counsellor. From the outset, I 
very obviously occupied multiple subjective positions, and, as the interviews 
progressed, the emphasis on these positions would vary, both in response to the 
rapport I built with participants as points of contact and similarity were highlighted, 
and as my own sense of these positions shifted and changed over time. 
My initial introductions with participants also had bearing on my subjective 
positioning. I met some participants at training courses, where I attended primarily as 
a student and novice counsellor in my work role, but where I simultaneously 
maintained interest and curiosity as a researcher. My conversations in these spaces 
and with potential participants involved revealing some of my opinions about therapy 
and my views in relation to what we were learning on the training course. I had warm, 
sparky conversations, where commonality and mutuality was emphasised, with people 
whom I later sought out to interview. Some of my other participants were suggested 
to me by my research supervisor and were her friends and associates. I introduced 
myself with reference to my supervisor and in correspondence and on meeting we 
invariably discussed her. This link undoubtedly influenced these participants’ 
positioning of me, with assumptions perhaps made about the style and orientation of 
my research because of my supervisory relationship. Other participants were found 
from within my own professional interest networks, which again positioned our 
interview relationship in particular ways, possibly creating assumptions from the 
outset of commonality and alliance. 
In between the first thirteen interviews and the last six, I suspended my studies for 
twelve months and undertook a Masters of Education with a Certificate in 
Counselling, beginning in 2006. In February 2007, I became an applicant member of 
the New Zealand Association of Counsellors (and became a full member in 2009). 
Deciding to suspend my PhD, then, also encompassed a decision to become a 
counsellor myself, to more decisively, deliberately and professionally do what the 
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people I had interviewed were doing. I increased my workload at my “second job” 
and began to call myself a counsellor. I shifted positions, although not in the sudden 
or drastic way that the suspension and subsequent counselling training might suggest. 
Throughout this entire research project, I have existed at the edge of the therapy 
world, sometimes stepping in and nodding along knowingly as my interviewees 
described aspects of their work or experiences; at other times, I have felt distant, on 
the outside, not understanding terminology or being able to connect personally with 
participants' comments. Over the two years of interviewing, I shifted to occupy a 
more concrete position as a counsellor and fellow to some of my participants. In 
doing so, I shifted in my own sense of the possibilities and problems of therapy and 
counselling. Influenced to a large extent in fact by many of my conversations with 
therapy professionals as part of this research, I came to see therapy as more viable. I 
tempered my critique, at times railing against it, and embraced a kind of pragmatism 
for myself. I wanted to do something, however tricky and problematic, in my work 
with clients. (I was, in fact, already doing something anyway in my work, despite my 
protests and my suspicions of therapy). And I heard and saw how the people I 
interviewed did things, how they negotiated tensions, or, at times, carried on in 
concert with tensions and self-critique. I learned from them, sometimes scribbling 
down notes or examples of their counselling methods after interviews so that I could 
take ideas back to my own work with clients. I saw worth in what they were doing, 
and I wanted to work more competently, effectively, and ethically with my clients. 
In the later stages of this writing, as I developed and worked on the second half of the 
thesis, I noticed a growing relationship between my analysis of my participants’ work 
cultures and my own contemporaneous organisational experiences. As I became more 
involved in the management of a community organisation in Aotearoa New Zealand, 
receiving District Health Board (DHB) funding to deliver a mental health service, I 
became more alert to the impact of external institutional and political forces. Over my 
ten years of involvement, the contractual obligations accompanying DHB funding 
grew enormously – while the actual funding itself remained insufficient, from my 
perspective. Accountability for this funding became a large and detailed project, with 
the agency needing to demonstrate comprehensively its compliance with growing 
policies and directives, and there was an increased emphasis on measurable outcomes. 
I was frequently anxious at the prospect of being audited, which was an ever-present 
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possibility. I became cynically convinced that the government was content to receive 
a high-quality, effective service – which was needing to devote more and more of its 
resources to manage its funding contract – for a minimal cost. Along with the increase 
in bureaucracy, the contract became increasingly medicalised. We were required to 
use and engage with psychiatric diagnoses, and to focus the counselling and support 
services on the single health issue for which we received funding. These requirements 
forced the organisation to act in ways that were increasingly out of line with its 
original objectives as a feminist, holistic and politically engaged service. 
My own observations and experiences of a publicly funded community therapy 
organisation in Aotearoa New Zealand over the 2000s piqued my interest in the 
workplaces and cultures of my research participants. I found similarities in our 
experiences, and their stories gave me a greater sense of the history and trajectory of 
the changes I had noticed at my own workplace. As I learned more about the history 
and theories of neoliberalism and managerialism, applying this to my research 
material, I also developed an understanding of their application to my own working 
life. My research enabled me to develop a political analysis of the bureaucratic and 
institutional forces shaping my work, while my own experiences of struggle and 
frustration in reaction to the impact of these forces fuelled my interest in certain 
aspects of my interview transcripts and, to some extent, guided the direction of this 
thesis. 
This story tells of a shift in my positioning over the time of this research and of the 
multiple positions I occupy both in my relationships with participants and as I write 
this text. I am variously positioned, as an academic researcher, counselling colleague, 
community worker, novice, cynic, friend, and stranger. I am an observer on the 
outside of the research, but also highly involved as a mostly silent subject of the 
study. I am also P!keh!,6 highly educated, of middle class background, rather poor, 
currently 36 years old, and female. Like Ruth Surtees as she describes her own 
position in relation to her research on midwifery in Aotearoa New Zealand, I hold a 
“multiply positioned, transient and always mobile perspective” (2003, p. 84). And I 
acknowledge, as Michelle Fine encourages, that “Self and Other are knottily 
                                                
6 P!keh! is a M!ori language term for New Zealanders who are of European descent (“P!keh!”, 2012, 
para. 1). 
!($!!
entangled” in this research (1994, p. 72). In her discussion of “working the hyphen” 
between self and other, Fine states: “If poststructuralism has taught us anything, it is 
to beware the frozen identities and the presumption that the hyphen is real, to suspect 
the binary, to worry the clear distinctions” (p. 80). There are no fixed or total, clear 
distinctions between my participants and myself. The experience of interviewing and 
analysing involves continual movement between self and other positions – moments 
of estrangement and difference, moments of connection and similarity, and the messy, 
fluctuating space in-between that exposes the fiction of the hyphen. 
The participants 
This research is concerned with the accounts of therapy practitioners, working in 
Aotearoa New Zealand, who engage with political and postmodern ideas about 
therapy. I commenced the research process by formulating an information sheet about 
my project, entitled “Therapy as Resistance?” (Appendix A). I was interested in 
talking with people who had been trained in and/or had an interest in modes and 
theories of therapy that stem from postmodern, poststructuralist and feminist critiques 
of the field – such as, narrative therapy, solution focused counselling, other so-called 
discursive therapies, critical psychology, “Just Therapy”, and feminist therapies. I 
wanted to know about how these people posed resistance, how they did therapy 
differently, and I held assumptions that these were rebellious, “different”, critically 
minded practitioners. Through word of mouth, my own contacts, the resultant 
snowball effect, and guidance from supervisors, I sought out and approached 
practitioners whom I thought might be appropriate participants in the project, and 
requested a one-to-one, in-depth interview. 
My information sheet conveyed an agenda of interest in “resistance” to “dominant 
cultural values, structures and power arrangements”, “alternatives” to “mainstream” 
therapy and psychology, and “critiques” of therapy (Appendix B). In both verbal and 
email conversations with some potential interviewees, I became aware of the mutable, 
varied meanings of these words and ideas. Some people expressed strong interest in 
my project and deemed themselves to be appropriate participants. They expressed 
misgivings about the counselling/therapy fraternity, critiquing certain apparent 
dogmatic tendencies, the rise of specialisation and a particular vision of 
professionalism, and the abundance of different “modalities” and “labels”. Yet often, 
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as we conversed, I felt their ideas and agendas for therapy, despite their critiques, 
reproduced psychotherapeutic assumptions about “the therapy process” – for instance, 
“going deep”, getting to the “underneath issues”, or working solely at the level of the 
individual with little regard for political and social structural issues. Likewise, I 
realised that they were unknowing of the particular critical ideas and perspectives that 
I was interested in. Their view of themselves as “alternative” or “resistant” did not fit 
with my understandings of these terms and I chose not to include them in the project – 
which once again highlights the shaping force of the researcher, the narrowing and 
limiting of meaning and knowledge that takes place as I investigate and undertake this 
research, reminding us how “all knowledge is created from the actions undertaken to 
obtain it” (Holstein & Gubrium, 2002, p. 112). 
As I sought out potential interviewees, I encountered numerous people who declined 
my request for them to participate in the research project. For some this was a matter 
of time and workloads, feeling unable or unwilling to incorporate an in-depth 
interview into their schedules. However, others had more specific oppositions to 
participating, which are suggestive of interesting research and methodological 
concerns that are not taken up here – paths of inquiry that are significant but 
unyielding or stray too far from my main concerns. For instance, some people spoke 
of being more interested in “getting on with the job” than reflecting on theoretical 
issues. Another explained that, while sharing its political stance, “narrative [therapy] 
jargon still gives me a bad allergic reaction”. Such comments were intriguing and 
stimulated questions that were, however, made difficult to investigate by these 
people’s decisions not to participate. A further reason given by one person for not 
participating was previous experience of being a subject of qualitative research. This 
person spoke of feeling alienated and annoyed by the researcher’s use of her words, 
explaining that this made her unwilling to offer her words to research again. Inquiry 
into this person’s experience could yield significant knowledge for the field of 
qualitative research that, again, is not pursued here. These untaken, unexplored paths 
of inquiry are reminders of the partiality and sculptural nature of the knowledge 
produced in and by this thesis. 
While five people clearly declined to take part in my research, many others responded 
warmly and expressed strong interest in the topic, both suggesting and openly stating 
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at times a feeling of connection and alliance with my interests. I conducted eighteen 
recorded, one-to-one interviews over the course of my research. The interviewees 
consisted of nine women and nine men, ranging in age from late twenties to early 
sixties. Interviews took place in numerous cities throughout Aotearoa New Zealand. 
The majority of the interviewees were P!keh!/New Zealand Europeans. Two 
indicated that they were migrants from European countries, one was from Asia, and 
one self-identified as Jewish. No participants self-identified as having M!ori or 
Pacific Island background. All of the interviewees had undertaken tertiary education 
of some form and had professional careers in the fields of counselling, social work, 
psychology and psychiatry. They encompassed a wide range of professional roles, 
including counsellors, counsellor/social workers, counsellor/nurses, registered 
psychologists, clinical psychologists, educational psychologists, and psychiatrists. 
Most of the interviewees (eleven of them) had current or previous experiences of 
working in the public sector for District Health Board mental health services. Two 
were involved in counselling/therapy work within medical services within the public 
sector. Three worked as counsellors within educational institutions. Three worked in 
non-governmental, community-based counselling and support services. One worked 
in the public sector as an educational psychologist. Five worked in full- or part-time 
private practice. Roughly half of the participants had worked as therapists for over ten 
years, with several being close to twenty years of professional practice. The 
remaining participants ranged between two and nine years of employment in therapist 
roles. 
All of these people were familiar with the critiques of therapy and psychology that 
have stemmed from postmodern, poststructuralist and feminist thought. All had a 
concern about the power relations that operate within therapy settings and activities, 
and consciously sought to attend to and negotiate these power relations in their own 
work. All also had an awareness of the inherent interplay between individuals and the 
social and political contexts of their lives, seeing the problems and distress 
experienced by clients/patients as discursive, systemic, and political, rather than 
solely as evidence of individual pathology. Most of the participants had undertaken 
training courses or attended workshops and conferences focused on the ideas of 
narrative therapy and/or critical psychology, and many had been supervised or 
mentored by proponents of these sorts of critical, postmodern therapy ideas. 
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While all of the interviewees were connected by their interest in critiques of 
traditional therapy and their involvement and participation in critical, alternative 
therapy practices, they were stratified and distinguished by both professional 
hierarchies and by work roles and settings. The hierarchy of professional roles within 
therapy and mental health work, particularly within Aotearoa New Zealand’s public 
mental health sector, was commented on by all interviewees and had significant 
bearing on the work that they did (as will be discussed more fully later). Social 
workers/counsellors within mental health services explained their lowly status on the 
professional ladder: one man described how his supervisor had said to him, “Cal, you 
realise when you go there [to a DHB mental health service] your role will be 
handmaiden?” Clinical psychologists referred to the psychiatrist within clinical teams 
as being “top dog” and “like a benevolent dictator”. Counselling and psychology 
professionals working within medical health settings spoke of the need for 
“validation” and to “market psychology” to medical colleagues who perhaps saw 
psychologists as “some kind of out-there threat”. And psychiatrists acknowledged the 
power accorded to them within clinical teams, with one man explaining, “you’ve got a 
bit of mana from just being a doctor”. The participants in this project spoke from 
multiple locations within a hierarchy of therapy professionals. Their different roles 
within therapy work, and the various settings for their work, also resulted in varied 
perspectives on and experiences of doing therapy in critical and political ways.  
This project is not concerned with a uniform group of therapy practitioners. The 
interviewees were united by their interests, ideals, and approaches to therapy work, 
and were constitutive of a significant subculture and social movement within therapy 
work in Aotearoa New Zealand during the mid-2000s (as will be discussed in chapter 
4). They differed, however, in many respects but particularly and most obviously in 
terms of their professional roles and work/institutional settings. These differences and 
divergences are significant for the insights they provide about the operations of power 
within institutions governing therapy and mental health work in Aotearoa New 
Zealand, and about the possibilities and potentials for deploying postmodern therapy 
practices in those contexts. Different roles and positions within institutions, and 
employment within different kinds of institutions, correlate with different accounts 
and experiences of “working out” how to practise therapy in preferred ways. These 
differences – along with similarities of accounts and experiences – have significant 
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implications for the mobilisation of postmodern therapy ideas in Aotearoa New 
Zealand. 
The issue of “power-fulness” and “power-lessness” 
As discussed earlier, I am aware, in conducting this research – in writing about this 
subject, the interviewees, and myself – that I am trying to “work the hyphen” between 
self and other. Michelle Fine, as she considers the meanings of “working the hyphen” 
for qualitative researchers, explains how poststructuralism teaches us to “suspect the 
binary, to worry the clear distinctions” (1994, p. 80). This suspicion and worry is also 
relevant to my consideration of power and the positions occupied by the participants 
in this research. While Fine makes clear the “knottily entangled” (p. 72) relationship 
between self and other, her article seems limited in regard to who the “others” in 
qualitative research are, and their relationship to and experiences of power. She 
describes and critiques qualitative essays that position “subjugated Others as if they 
were a homogeneous mass (of vice or virtue)” (p. 74). Later she mentions the fear she 
feels when researchers describe their aim as wanting to “help” “Them” (p. 79). And 
she commends new research agendas (in the early 1990s), where “qualitative 
researchers have begun to interrupt Othering by forcing subjugated voices in context 
to the front of our texts and by exploiting privileged voices to scrutinise the 
technologies of Othering” (p. 79). Fine rightfully targets the othering that takes place 
within qualitative research and its alliance with the subjugation and oppression 
experienced in daily life by those who are deemed other. However, her article seems 
to offer only two positions for the subjects of qualitative research: they are either 
“subjugated voices” or elite, “privileged voices” who benefit from the technologies of 
othering. When I consider these positions in relation to my own research participants, 
I struggle to make them wholly fit. Instead, I find myself concerned with the in-
between of these two positions, with the messy blurring of ideas and experiences of 
power and lack of power, privilege and subjugation. 
The voices and positions occupied by the participants in this research project are 
neither simply “privileged” nor “subjugated”; they fluctuate and shift in and out of the 
categories of self and other, legitimate and illegitimate, powerful and powerless. The 
group of people interviewed for this project shared connections through their interest 
in therapy approaches that diverged from – and opposed – many of the traditional 
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assumptions of mainstream therapy and psychology. For many, these interests marked 
them as different, renegade, illegitimate and “odd”, and measures were taken by 
others (and, self-protectively, by themselves) to contain, silence or discipline them (as 
will be discussed in detail later). Such experiences were particularly common for 
those who occupied lower positions in the hierarchy of mental health professions: the 
psychiatrist at the head of a clinical mental health team occupied a different position, 
accruing and exercising more power and having greater freedoms over actions and 
words than his social worker colleague. To varying degrees, depending on 
institutional environments and professional roles, many of the participants in this 
project experienced othering and censure for their “unconventional” therapy ideas and 
practices. 
And yet, in other moments, these people were elite professionals with formidable 
power. This was particularly the case in their relationships with clients/patients, who 
much more easily and obviously occupied positions of subjugation and social 
marginalisation: as others, who were “mentally ill”, troubled, distressed, and either 
seeking professional “help” or engaging in therapy under compulsion. The 
participants were predominantly P!keh!, educated, white-collar professionals with 
skills, knowledge and mandates to “help” clients/patients obtain or regain “normality” 
– become less mad, sad, or socially disruptive, be more productive, functional, 
acceptable. Their professional identities, regardless of hierarchy, provided levels of 
comfort and social authority not experienced by many. However, at the same time 
their powerfulness was complicated by other, simultaneous subject positions. Half of 
the interviewees were women, one was Asian living and working in Aotearoa New 
Zealand, some were homosexual, some were men deliberately working against the 
ideals of hegemonic masculinity, and some had long histories of involvement in social 
justice movements and led “alternative” lifestyles. While I am most interested in the 
professional roles of the interviewees, their subject positions were multiple and spoke 
of shifting, changeable relations to power. 
A simplistic binary of powerful/powerless does not work to characterise or analyse 
the positions and experiences of my research participants. While they might have 
occupied professional positions of power, they were aware of the unconventionality 
of their therapy philosophies and practices, particularly within public sector services, 
!)*!!
and closely managed their self-presentations in their work settings, aware of potential 
censure or exclusion. And their professional roles also intersected and interacted with 
other subject positions, leading to complicated experiences and relations of power. 
For the participants of this thesis, power was not a simple, innate or fixed possession; 
instead, power and experiences of oppression and dominance were relative, 
changeable, and context dependent. Attention to context and the ways in which power 
and privilege shift depending on the stance and situation of the participant are crucial 
to the analysis of power relations in this thesis. 
Consideration of context 
In outlining the participants of this research – their professional roles, work 
environments, positions within professional hierarchies, and demographics – and in 
discussing their relations of and to power, I am highlighting the crucial importance of 
the consideration of context to this research. In their exploration of workplace 
subjectivities within the British NHS, and the effects of managerialist discourse, 
Halford and Leonard (2006) stress that attention to “context contributes to a 
deepening of our understanding of the nature of work subjectivities” (p. 671). They 
focus particularly on both organisational contexts and the shifting contexts of 
individuals’ everyday lives, revealing the complex and varied relationships between 
organisation, discourse and individual subjectivity (pp. 670, 671). While my study has 
not involved close ethnographic explorations of my participants’ workplaces, the 
organisational settings and experiences of my participants, the contexts of their 
everyday lives, and the contexts of our meetings and conversations are inextricable 
from the content of our talk. As Halford and Leonard explain, quoting numerous other 
qualitative scholars, 
interview narratives are not free-floating, constructed in “any old way” (Cameron, 
2001, p.174), they are not fabricated at will (Somers & Gibson, 1994) but are “cut 
from the same kinds of cloth as the lives they tell about” (Denzin, 1989, p. 86). In 
other words, interviews are “talk and text in context” (van Dijk, 1997a, p. 3), 
influenced by both the broad and specific contexts in which they are set. (2006, p. 
662) 
The talk that takes place in these interviews is always referring to, interacting with, or 
being influenced by the contexts of our talk. 
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The interview conversations gave hints to the many and different factors that 
informed or influenced my participants’ therapy work experiences and subjectivities. 
While this thesis pays particular attention to identifying and analysing the dominant 
forces and discourses that shape the field of therapy in Aotearoa New Zealand, these 
therapists, as actors in this field, are not simple or passive recipients, existing within a 
single context. Halford and Leonard point out that “the shifting contexts of 
individuals’ everyday lives provide alternative and competing resources for the 
construction of self” (2006, p. 670). Throughout the interviews, participants 
referenced, emphasised, and revealed how the shifting contexts of their lives provided 
them with resources for their work selves and influenced how they negotiated 
dominant discourses and did critical, postmodern therapy work. All of the interviews 
commenced with participants telling me stories of how they had come to do the work 
that they did, and of the development of their views on therapy. In telling these 
stories, people foregrounded numerous factors that went beyond their professional 
training and work experiences. The interviews included talk about parents, overseas 
travel, Buddhism, Christianity, Quakerism, meditation practices, sexual identity, 
involvement in social movements (anti-Springbok tour, homosexual rights, Treaty of 
Waitangi education and activism, feminist groups, men’s groups), school experiences, 
ideas about social justice, books, movies, friends, previous careers, raising children, 
moving countries, engagement with M!ori and Pacific cultures, experiences of 
medicine, their own mental health issues, partners/spouses, gardening, and more. 
Therapists’ narratives of their work roles and practices, and of their attempts to “do” 
therapy differently, were interwoven with many extra-work stories and experiences. 
These demonstrated the breadth of participants’ self-construction and the inextricable 
involvement of the shifting contexts of their everyday lives, both historically and 
currently, in their work practices. This thesis constructs one particular story from the 
texts of the participants, paying attention to certain aspects of these shifting contexts 
as a means of analysing the complex relationships between organisations, discourse 
and individual subjectivity, and the possibilities of postmodern therapy work in 
Aotearoa New Zealand. Other stories and threads, involving other resources and 
discourses, form an undiscussed backdrop to my particular story and could have taken 
shape if this thesis had taken a different path. 
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I wish to briefly consider the specific temporal and spatial experiences of these 
interview conversations, the immediate particularities of this “talk and text in context” 
(Halford & Leonard, 2006, p. 662). In doing so, I offer brief descriptions and suggest 
a sense of the feelings of the conversations – the constraints and freedoms of time, the 
impact of setting on the conversation, insights into the nature of organisations and 
work culture. These conversations about critical and political therapy practices, and 
the experiences of practitioners, took place across a range of contexts that had bearing 
on our talk. Some people met with me in work time at their workplaces. Their 
workplaces included large-scale institutions (mental health services, hospitals, other 
public-sector organisations), school and university counselling service rooms, and 
suburban and urban private practice rooms. These meeting places gave me insight into 
the environmental and organisational context of the practitioners’ work. I sat in the 
waiting rooms of hospitals and other clinical mental health services, often alongside 
clients or patients, before being led through to the practitioner’s room, sometimes 
introduced to colleagues along the way. In large-scale organisations, the environments 
were often institutional (office buildings with front desks overseen by an 
administrator, offices, corridors, meeting rooms, tea rooms, and signs of numerous 
other staff) and/or medical (hospitals, or services signposted with the words “mental 
health”, housed in well-known medical sites). Visiting a school, I made my way 
through throngs of students, seeking directions from visible authority figures, and sat 
in a counselling suite, with beanbags on the floor and youth-targeted health messages 
on posters on the walls. University counselling services were accessed through health 
clinics, where again I sat with other waiting clients/patients. And I found other 
interviewees in high-rise, glass-encased urban private practice rooms, or in homely 
suburban houses-cum-counselling practices with garden views. 
I was able to experience the organisational settings for these participants’ work, and 
gauge the pace and feel of these systems. Participants often engaged with their work 
settings as we talked – rifling through their files to show me copies of official 
paperwork, commenting on the experience of doing therapy in a clinical examination 
room or the cold of their old institutional building, showing me whiteboard diagrams 
that they used with clients/patients, lowering their voices during parts of their talk to 
ensure not being overheard. Within these spaces, time was often limited, as other 
work duties, including counselling appointments, were scheduled after the interview. 
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In discussing the increasing “efficiencies” and monitoring imposed by management, 
one man revealed that he would have to find a way to account for the time spent on 
our interview.  For other participants, I arranged to meet during the early morning, so 
that their workdays were not interrupted. 
Interviews conducted outside of work environments were, understandably, 
significantly different, denying me an embodied and observed experience of 
participants’ work contexts and making their comments about their organisations less 
immediate and more descriptive, reliant on recall and retelling. I met with people for 
interviews in cafés, their own houses, and, in one instance, my house. While time 
parameters for the interviews were often specified, frequently there was less urgency 
around time and some interviews were able to continue for much longer than those 
that took place in work environments. One interview took place at the kitchen table of 
a family home, cups of tea in hand and signs of family life around us. Another was in 
a woman’s home with her new baby; the interview involved many starts and stops, 
with baby noise, feedings, and talk, and much laughter between the participant and 
me. In a café, one participant carved up her muffin to illustrate the carving up of her 
previous public sector workplace. At my house, the interview took place in my 
lounge, with noise from my flatmate in the background, and then shared dinner at the 
end. Interviews outside workspaces were often more lively and broader in their focus 
than workplace interviews: less pressure on time was also no doubt a factor in this. 
Participants spoke freely of past experiences working in institutions, voicing 
criticisms and revealing subversive strategies that perhaps would not have been 
spoken from inside a current workplace. 
The research process 
Before commencing the interview process with these participants, I developed a range 
of questions to orient the focus of the interviews, which matched my initial research 
interests (see Appendix B). These questions formed a loose structure to the 
interviews: not every question was always asked, nor did interviews necessarily 
follow the order of the written questions. The questions often served as starters to 
areas of conversation, and were followed with a more spontaneous questioning 
process, sparked by the content of the participants’ talk. Numerous questions were 
encompassed and answered in the course of the conversation, without requiring 
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deliberate attention. At the start of the interviews I administered a consent form, 
where participants granted approval for their interviews to be used for research 
purposes and included in publications, on the basis that anonymity would be assured. 
Accordingly, in the thesis, the names and identifying details of the research 
participants have been changed. 
After interviews were completed, I wrote “field notes”, where I recorded the specific 
details of the meetings – locations, times of day, the participants’ job titles and roles, 
demographic information – and any other details of note. I wrote my reflections on 
meetings, including how the interviews “felt”, particular things that I had observed or 
wondered about, how they compared with other interviews, and the feelings that I 
experienced during and after interviews. In these field notes I also highlighted initial 
areas of research interest, noting the presence of possible discourses and particular 
concepts raised by the participants’ talk. The interviews largely took place in three 
time periods: late-2004, mid-2005, and – after I had suspended the study for the 2006 
year while I undertook my counselling training – mid-2007. I transcribed the tape-
recorded interviews, taking notes of interesting features and issues and developing a 
rough system for categorising participants’ use of discourses. Between the first and 
second periods of interviewing I focused on developing a coding system for the 
themes of the interviews; this system grew and developed over the full course of the 
interview process. I utilised NVivo software7 for organising and sorting the 
qualitative data and for developing the coding system. As I developed my analysis of 
the data, I made connections between the qualitative material and theoretical concepts 
and literature, shaping the research themes into the current thesis structure and 
developing my ideas and investigations through the writing process. 
My voice as the writer of this thesis – particularly throughout Part 3 – at times shifts 
from analysis of my participants’ texts and talk to a more naïve reading of their 
words: that is, my narrative involves an interplay between an interpretive reading of 
their texts and acceptance of contextual information – facts, situations, personal and 
professional histories – as given. I use this contextual information, from my own 
position as researcher, to construct and interpret an account of my participants’ self-
                                                
7 NVivo is the name for qualitative research software produced by QSR International. 
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descriptions. This information, as this methodology chapter makes clear, is shaped by 
the perspectives, situations and evaluations of the research participants. 
Conclusion 
This first part of my thesis has introduced the subject of the research and my 
methodological approach. My intention in this particular chapter has been to furnish 
my reader with vital contextual information that should be held on to and remembered 
throughout the reading experience of the thesis. I have sought to describe the “behind-
the-scenes” reality that has informed the construction of the researched narrative that 
will ensue. This seems important to me because without such a close insight into 
some of the vagaries and uncertainties that I have experienced as a researcher and 
writer, it may be possible to view my finished product as more polished and assured 
than I intend. Some of the issues touched on in this chapter have not been pursued as 
lines of inquiry in the remaining body of the thesis; others (as will become clear) have 
been of great importance to the research and lead to detailed analyses. Such 
distinctions point to particular judgements that I have made and to preferences that I 
consequently exhibit. 
Part 2, which follows, comprises two chapters that together situate and describe the 
participants of this research as members of a broadly defined social movement 
characterised by a commitment to postmodern therapy practices. Chapter 3 outlines 
the growth of the postmodern, critical reaction to the traditions and politics of therapy, 
and describes approaches to therapy that have grown out of this critique. Chapter 4 
brings my participants to the fore, using their words to show how the theories 
explained in chapter 3 have been mobilised in the shape of a particular social 
movement in the field of therapy in Aotearoa New Zealand. 
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PART 2 
3. Critical Therapy: A Review of Postmodern 
Approaches 
Introduction 
The purpose of this chapter is to situate and contextualise my research. This thesis is 
concerned with the field of therapy in Aotearoa New Zealand, with a particular focus 
on the experiences of a group of postmodern therapy practitioners. The first part of 
this chapter describes, through reference to appropriate literature, the critique of 
traditional therapy inspired by postmodern perspectives, including Foucauldian, 
feminist and critical psychology theories. I canvass some of the key arguments that 
have been levelled against therapy over the last forty years. The chapter then 
considers how this critique has engendered new and innovative approaches to therapy 
that offer means of practising that potentially lessen some the ethical difficulties 
highlighted by the postmodern critical perspective. For therapists who subscribe to 
that perspective, these approaches offer more ethically viable ways of doing therapy. 
Thus, this chapter sets up a context for understanding the philosophies and theoretical 
assumptions that guide and influence the participants in this research. As such, it 
constitutes a backdrop for the discussion in later chapters where I will analyse these 
practitioners’ experiences of pursuing their postmodern practices in the context of 
health and social services in Aotearoa New Zealand. 
“So what’s the problem with therapy?” Critiquing the traditions of 
therapy and resisting the experts 
Over the last forty years, developments in cultural theory and criticism have 
profoundly problematized the traditions, theories and practices of therapy. 
Poststructuralist, postmodern, and deconstructive ideas, coupled with feminist 
theories and critiques, when focused on therapy, have produced the claim from critics 
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that therapy functions as an instrument of social control. These theoretical 
orientations call into question the supposedly neutral and objective psychological 
science of the “self”, exposing it instead as a cultural invention that enables and 
perpetuates oppressive power relations. While the term “therapy” encompasses many 
forms and theories of therapeutic engagement between therapist and client/patient – 
psychiatry, various psychologies, many different counselling and psychotherapy 
modalities, social work, nursing – most have relied on and reinforced the liberal 
humanist construction of the “self”. Adherence to the liberal humanist self, from the 
point of view of therapy critics, results in the de-contextualisation and de-
politicisation of people’s (clients’/patients’) problems, and the promotion of 
pathological explanations and individual responsibility for such problems. Therapy 
has also been accused of modelling “normality” on the image of white, heterosexual, 
middle class men, and either ignoring gender, class, ethnicity, and sexuality 
differences, or conceiving such differences as pathological. The growing body of 
critical studies of therapy calls into question the viability of therapy as an ethical and 
non-oppressive practice and means of advancing political and liberating goals.8 
Therapy as an instrument of social control 
For many writers on and practitioners of therapy, the idea that therapy may function 
as an instrument of social control has become a significant concern (Bird, 2000, p. xx; 
Cecchin, 1993, p. ix, as cited in Kaye, 1999, p. 20; Hare-Mustin, 1997, p. 555; 
Kitzinger & Perkins, 1993; Parker, 1999, p. 2). The works of Michel Foucault have 
been particularly important for suggesting this idea and have been picked up and 
extended by many people reflecting on the project of therapy. In this section, I review 
the arguments of Foucault and his followers in relation to therapy. In an interview in 
Technologies of the Self (Martin, 1988), Foucault reflected on his work over twenty-
five years. He explained that his objective had been to show that, “through these 
                                                
8This discussion of critiques of therapy is general and refers to therapy, psychology and the “psy” 
disciplines interchangeably and without great attention to the differences among therapies. My 
intention here is to present the key ideas that form the basis for questioning therapy in general as a 
social good and a helpful service for individuals. Aspects of these ideas may fit more appropriately 
with some specific therapies over others: for instance, the discussion of science may resonate most 
closely with psychology practices, while the liberal humanist conception of “self” may be most 
apparent in the “growth” therapies, like Gestalt psychotherapy. However, these distinctions are not a 
strong focus of the discussion as I am more interested in constructing an overall picture of therapy as 
problematic through the eyes of critics and then considering how these problems form the basis for 
critical, postmodern-inspired therapy theories and practices. 
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different practices – psychological, medical, penitential, educational – a certain idea 
or model of humanity was developed, and now this idea of man [sic.] has become 
normative, self-evident, and is supposed to be universal” (p. 15). In his work, 
Foucault examined the high-ranking knowledges produced by the human sciences and 
other authoritative institutions – including, specifically and by extension, the “psy” 
disciplines. He called for these knowledges to not be taken at face value, but rather to 
be analysed as specific “truth games” that are inextricably linked to the workings of 
power (p. 18). For Foucault, the development of normative, self-evident, and 
supposedly universal understandings of humanity became ways of deploying and 
exercising disciplinary power and producing individuals who, in turn, regulate 
themselves. 
Foucault contends that this system of disciplinary power is achieved through the 
objectification of individuals: through their division, classification and 
subjectification (Rabinow, 1984, p. 12). Individuals are divided both internally and 
from each other, subject to categorization and scientific classification, and organized 
around definitions of normality and abnormality. These processes are disciplinary and 
have bearing on how individuals conceive of, and discipline, themselves. Jana 
Sawicki (1991) elaborates on Foucault’s theories: 
Disciplinary practices create the divisions healthy/ill, sane/mad, legal/delinquent, 
which, by virtue of their authoritative status, can be used as effective means of 
normalization and social control. They may involve the literal dividing off of 
segments of the population through incarceration or institutionalization. Usually 
the divisions are experienced in the society at large in more subtle ways, such as 
in the practice of labelling one another or ourselves as different or abnormal. (p. 
22) 
Psychological theories and practices can be seen to illustrate Foucault’s analysis. 
They involve the division, classification and categorization of individuals – as 
sane/mad, ordered/disordered, functional/dysfunctional, adjusted/maladjusted, 
healthy/ill. The authoritative, expert status of the psychologist or therapist – who is 
involved and invested in this “truth game” – legitimises these categories and their 
application. The categories are disciplinary as they separate individuals from one 
another (literally and figuratively), regulating and labelling those deemed abnormal 
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and teaching others how to practise, or recover, normality – to discipline and regulate 
themselves. 
Viewing psychology and therapy through Foucault’s lens draws attention to numerous 
specific disciplinary and normalising techniques, which operate in cumulative ways. 
Disciplinary writing and documentation, for instance, play an integral part in the 
traditions and practices of psychology and therapy – assessments, formulations, 
psychometric tests, intake forms, reviews, the assignment of diagnoses, therapy notes, 
case-files, statistics, and reports to institutional bodies are all features of therapeutic 
encounters. While the requirements for documentation and writing vary, depending 
on therapy role and institutional location, case-files and note-taking, in some form, are 
ubiquitous across the field of therapy. Foucault describes how documentation shifted 
from the eighteenth century, from heroised chronicles of powerful men to new 
subjects of description – the child, the patient, the madman, the prisoner (1984, p. 
203). Such writing and documentation makes each individual into a “case”: 
a case which at one and the same time constitutes an object for a branch of 
knowledge and a hold for a branch of power. The case is no longer, as in casuistry 
or jurisprudence, a set of circumstances defining an act and capable of modifying 
the application of a rule; it is the individual as he may be described, judged, 
measured, compared with others, in his very individuality; and it is also the 
individual who has to be trained or corrected, classified, normalized, excluded, 
etc. [sic.] (p. 203) 
From Foucault’s perspective, these methods of documentation and writing involve 
therapists in the objectification of individuals, as they separate them and examine 
them closely, with a professional gaze and pen. As therapists collect and collate 
certain forms of information, they identify and isolate abnormality and produce 
authoritative written accounts of individuals, justifying discipline and normalisation. 
This view of therapists’ writing and documentation is reinforced by Michael White 
when he critiques “the modern instrument of power that we call the ‘file’ or the 
‘casenote’” because of the central role that it has played in the facilitation of social 
control and subjugation (1995, p. 46). Therapeutic writing and documentation, from 
this critical perspective, make therapists agents within power relations that work to 
discipline and normalise individuals in specific ways, reinforcing a supposedly fixed, 
universal model of humanity. 
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The Diagnostic and Statistical Manual of Mental Disorders (DSM) of the American 
Psychiatric Association is often considered the example par excellence of the 
disciplining and normalising technology of psychology and therapy. Originally a 
medical-psychiatric textbook for diagnosing mental disorders, the DSM is 
omnipresent within the institutions of therapy and psychology. With each edition, 
more disorders are “discovered”, diagnoses are revised, and medical-psychiatric-
psychotherapeutic professionals are provided with a more thorough guide to the signs 
and symptoms of mental disorders. It is the key diagnostic tool within psychiatric, 
psychological, and psychotherapeutic services. The DSM has come under the critical 
attention of many scholars and critics of therapy (Ivey and Ivey, 1998; Kaye, 1999; 
Marecek, 1997; Simon, 1994; Ussher, 2000; Wood, 2004). Marie Crowe, for instance, 
uses Foucauldian methods of analysis to reveal how the DSM, fourth edition (DSM-
IV) (American Psychiatric Association, 1994), as it defines mental disorders, also 
defines and constructs normality. Crowe explains, citing Foucault, that the DSM-IV 
“is basically a classificatory system which aims to see, to isolate features, to recognize 
those that are identical and those that are different, to regroup them, to classify them 
by species or families” (2000, p. 69). The DSM provides practitioners with the ability 
to isolate, examine and classify people who are deemed “abnormal” and, in concert, 
define and reify features, behaviours, attributes and ideas that constitute “normality”. 
As they use and apply the DSM, therapists operate this disciplinary technology, 
privileging psychiatric discourse as they frame and interpret clients’/patients’ mental 
distress. Therapists engage in the exercise of a disciplinary power over individuals, 
bestowed with the authority of the DSM. 
Crowe goes on to discuss how psychiatric discourse results in the individualisation of 
people’s mental distress: 
A key premise in the definition of mental disorder is that a syndrome occurs in 
the individual which suggests that it is caused by some fault within the individual. 
It excludes the possibility that it may be a response to external events. (p. 72) 
Numerous writers reinforce this claim that the DSM individualises and 
decontextualises people’s problems, ignoring and erasing the impact of social 
positioning and the experiences of people’s everyday lives and assigning individual 
responsibility for abnormality (Marecek, 1997, p. 546; Simon, 1994, p. 131; Ussher, 
2000, p. 210). The “normality” that is constructed by the DSM, wielded by many 
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therapy practitioners, and deemed the responsibility of individuals to attain and 
possess, is revealed by Crowe to be consistent with dominant, western cultural values. 
Crowe explains that the parameters set for “normal” and “abnormal” in the DSM are 
“set in relation to the following behavioural attributes: productivity, unity, moderation 
and rationality” (2000, p. 72). Individuals are expected to play a productive role 
within society, to conduct themselves with moderation and self-control, and to 
perceive reality in ways that are consistent with the conventions of rationality (pp. 72, 
74), regardless of social circumstances or cultural backgrounds and beliefs. As an 
instrument of discipline and normalisation, the DSM utilises expert examination and 
classification of individuals and views problems or distress as individual defects 
requiring individual self-control and correction. Individuals are guided to direct their 
energies and their gaze inwards, regulating and disciplining themselves to redeem or 
avoid the stigma of “abnormality”. Again, this analysis holds that as administrators 
and practitioners of the DSM, therapists are complicit and active in the 
individualisation of mental distress and the reproduction of dominant, western cultural 
values. 
Writing, documenting, and gathering information for the formulation of classification 
and expert opinion take place within a particular, ritualised relationship and exchange 
between therapist and client/patient. The ritual of this relationship and exchange, 
according to therapy critics, again works to discipline and normalise individuals and 
to arrange particular relations of power, where the therapist occupies a position of 
power and the client/patient is subordinated. More specifically, the therapy ritual has 
been analysed and exposed as taking the form of a modern confession. Over the last 
one hundred and fifty years, “[t]he act of confession was reformulated as a therapeutic 
exercise rather than penance, as was the case with the secular confession; the truths of 
the confession were categorized as normal or pathological” (Lupton, 2003, p. 31). 
Foucault describes this therapeutic exercise as  
a ritual that unfolds within a power relationship, for one does not confess without 
the presence (or virtual presence) of a partner who is not simply the interlocutor 
but the authority who requires the confession, prescribes and appreciates it, and 
intervenes in order to judge, punish, forgive, console, and reconcile; a ritual in 
which the truth is corroborated by the obstacles and resistances it has had to 
surmount in order to be formulated. (1990, pp. 61-62) 
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This format for “therapy” produces a power relationship where the dominance and 
authority of the therapist are reinforced. From the position of expert, confidante and 
hearer of secrets, the therapist formulates meaning, categorises the client/patient’s 
talk, and brings forth the “truth” of their confession. The client/patient’s new-found 
self-knowledge, as interpreted by the therapist/expert, can then become a “technology 
of the self”, a means by which they effect operations on their “own bodies, souls, 
thoughts, conduct, and way of being so as to transform themselves” (Martin, 1988, p. 
18) – the aim being the production of self-regulating, docile individuals. For Foucault, 
the obligation to confess is “so deeply ingrained in us, that we no longer perceive it as 
the effect of a power that constrains us” (1990, p. 60). Therapy, as an institutionalised 
site and practice of the confession, from this perspective, creates power relations that 
privilege and authorise therapy experts while constraining individuals receiving 
therapeutic “help”. 
Ian Parker comments that “Foucault’s (1977, 1981) work has been valuable … in 
showing how the twin tendencies of discipline and confession lock people together in 
such a way that the discipline of psychology becomes seen as a necessity, and is then 
able to pose as a solution” (1999, p. 9). Psychological and therapeutic explanations of 
the self have become “commonsense”, and the disciplinary and normalising practices 
of therapy – such as disciplinary writing and documentation, the use of the DSM, and 
the dynamics of confession – are widely presented as logical, necessary and benign.  
Nikolas Rose explains that: 
The apostles of these techniques proffer images of what we could become, and 
we are urged to seek them out, to help fulfil the dream of realigning what we are 
with what we want to be. Our selves are defined and constructed and governed in 
psychological terms, constantly subject to psychologically inspired techniques of 
self-inspection and self-examination. And the problems of defining and living a 
good life have been transposed from an ethical to a psychological register”. 
(1990, p. xiii) 
The processes that have been examined in this section work on the behaviours, 
experiences, dreams and aspirations of individuals, as therapists – as the “apostles” – 
use psychological discourse and disciplinary techniques to explain and treat the 
problems of living a good life. Self-inspection, self-discipline and regulation, and 
psychological forms of self-knowledge are demanded of individuals for the 
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achievement and maintenance of “normality”. Psychological/therapeutic knowledges 
and practices are “intimately bound up with programmes, calculations, and techniques 
for the government of the soul” (Rose, 1990, p. 9), encouraging, consequently, the 
social control of populations. 
Critiquing the science of therapy 
While the previous section reviewed the claims that therapy functions as an 
instrument of social control, numerous critics have focused their attention more 
closely on analysing the scientific knowledge that informs or influences many therapy 
theories, approaches and interventions. From a poststructuralist/postmodern 
perspective, the science of therapy is viewed as a social construction and cultural 
paradigm, rather than as objective, “discoverable”, authoritative knowledge. Critics 
have observed that scientific knowledge of the human body – biomedical accounts of 
mental distress, bio-physiological language – now dominates the field of therapy and 
directs approaches for understanding and treating “madness” and people’s mental 
distress. They critique the centrality of scientific and biomedical discourses in therapy 
for its perceived limitations, effects and implications: the science informing therapy is 
considered narrow, reductionist, individualising, and affirming of social exclusions. 
The positivism and hypothetico-deductive methodologies of the “psy” disciplines, and 
the implied claims of objectivity and reliability, are also exposed as social constructs, 
which constrain individuals receiving therapy. Much critical attention has also been 
given to the relationship between the scientific methods and approaches of therapy 
and the “psy” disciplines and commercial and corporate interests, revealing an 
alliance between bio-medical accounts of people’s mental distress and medical and 
pharmaceutical interventions.  
The earlier discussion of the DSM put forward the argument that, instead of being a 
benign, “helpful” handbook, the DSM is in fact instrumental in bringing about the 
social control of populations. Other writers from the fields of critical psychology, 
cultural studies and feminist criticism have focused their attention on the science of 
the DSM, questioning its authority and revealing its social construction. Jeanne 
Marecek (1997), for instance, explains that “[t]he ebb and flow, fads and fashions, in 
the history of disorder suggests that diagnoses are inventions, not discoveries” (p. 
546). The production of new editions of the DSM involves the collaboration of 
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eminent psychological experts, the prestigious scientist-practitioners of therapy. New 
editions produce new mental disorders, new formulations and descriptions of existing 
mental disorders, and, occasionally, the removal of some mental disorders (such as 
“homosexuality”). This process is commonly regarded and heralded as evidence of 
“medical progress” and increased knowledge and precision over time.  
However, as Mary Wood, in reference to schizophrenia, explains,  
if we step back and take a wider historical perspective, it becomes clear that the 
discussion of symptoms involved in diagnosis, as well as the symptoms 
themselves, have changed over time depending upon changing frames of 
reference within the field of psychiatry as well as in the larger society. What 
looks like progress in psychiatry only makes sense within the particular contexts 
of contemporary beliefs and institutions. (2004, p. 199) 
Wood highlights the fundamental relationship between diagnosis and 
symptomatology, and social and political contexts, reinforcing John Kaye’s claim that 
“the changes in DSM categories over the years … follow changes in socially 
constructed attitudes and mores” (1999, p. 22). In their critique of the DSM and the 
categories of “normal” and “deviant”, writers like Marecek, Wood and Kaye 
unground the fixed, stable scientific status of these concepts, revealing instead how 
this science is shaped and influenced by prevailing sociocultural ideas and beliefs. 
This critique undermines the linear, progressive narrative of neutral, discovered 
scientific truths about the minds, feelings and behaviours of humans and opens 
therapy and the “psy” disciplines up to analyses of cultural biases and assumptions.  
Many therapy critics have discussed and analysed the privileging of biomedical 
knowledge and scientific methods within the “psy” disciplines and therapies. Dwight 
Fee (2000), for instance, explains how “this is a time when biomedical and otherwise 
reductionist explanations and understandings of mental disorder are dominant in 
scholarly, scientific, and psychotherapeutic worldviews and practices” (p. 1). Fee 
goes on to stress that  
the pervasive viewpoint is that the only way that mental illnesses can be 
recognized as “real” – and hence worthy of funded research, insurance coverage, 
[and] rigorous study … – is when they are anchored in the language of bio-
physiology or possibly some other deep-seated individual factor. (p. 1) 
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The DSM has been enshrined within dominant therapy theories and practices and 
within institutions with interests in mental health. At the same time, scientific 
discourse has currency – both literal and figurative – and individualising accounts of 
human phenomena dominate the discussion and treatment of psychological problems. 
This means that biomedical explanations for and approaches to mental distress are 
often regarded as the most legitimate and have a profound and pervasive impact on 
the nature of therapy services. 
The dominance and privilege of biomedical explanations and the authority of the 
discourse of bio-physiology are critiqued and lamented by many critics. Fee’s 
statement suggests that such explanations and approaches focus intently on the bodies 
and minds of individuals, excluding the social and political contexts and realities of 
their lives (see also Ussher, 2000, p. 208; Read, 2005). Jeanne Marecek regards the 
language of bio-physiology and the scientific knowledge base of psychology, when 
compared to other forms of knowledge, as wanting – “its depictions of psychic life 
mechanistic, lifeless, piecemeal, reductionist, thin, even implausible” (Marecek, 1997, 
p. 550). The discourse of bio-physiology is only one means of describing and making 
sense of people’s minds, bodies, behaviours, and psychic lives; its dominance results 
in the exclusion of other forms of description and sense-making and the reification of 
particular dominant cultural ideas and values. Specifically, Fee describes how these 
ideas and values take shape in binary terms:  
psychiatric discourse is one of the scientific networks that has contrived its view 
of mental disorder through opposites and contrasts – health/pathology, 
normal/abnormal, rational/irrational – which serve to justify conceptual binaries 
and real-world exclusions. (2000, p. 11) 
For Fee, the science of the “psy” disciplines, in its governing structure of opposites 
and contrasts, is implicated in the perpetuation of binary meaning systems within 
western culture. Such meaning systems fix and totalise ideas, experiences or 
identities, relying on the contrast between a privileged, legitimate, “normal” concept 
and its denigrated, illegitimate, “abnormal” other. Fee sees these systems as 
instrumental to the operation of power relations, including and bestowing power on 
some, while excluding and denying power to others. 
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Echoing the sentiments of Fee and Marecek, but focusing more closely on the 
positivist paradigm of the science that supports the “psy” disciplines and mainstream 
therapy, Jane Ussher compounds the critique of this science. Ussher explains that the 
commitment to scientific objectivity underpins the whole of the positivist/realist 
endeavour (2000, p. 215). Much of the prowess and authority of the science that 
informs both the research and clinical practices of the “psy” disciplines results from 
practitioners’ claims of rigour, neutrality, impartiality, and, consequently, the 
discovery of unmediated “truths”. However, Ussher explains, in reference to the 
psychological research that informs many therapy assumptions and practices: 
The fact that women’s accounts of mental health problems are considered to be 
biased or “subjective” – yet researchers’ are not – illustrates the absence of 
reflexivity in positivist/realist research. Yet, as has been argued elsewhere (e.g. 
Billig, 1991; Harding, 1987; Hollway, 1989), the ideological stance of researchers 
affects the research questions they ask, the epistemological stance and 
methodologies they adopt, and the interpretations of the data collected. (2000, p. 
215) 
The privileging of the scientific knowledge of the psychology or therapy “expert” 
over women’s (and men’s) own knowledge or accounts of phenomena – or over other 
forms of knowledge – is in large part enabled by the professed objectivity of these 
experts. Ussher claims, however, drawing on the works of other science critics, that 
such objectivity is a fallacy, a myth that sustains the perceived authority of science 
and its practitioners. The research informing the “psy” disciplines is shaped and 
influenced by the researcher her/himself – by her/his worldview and orientation and 
approach to the subjects of the research. Marecek puts it succinctly when she says that 
it is a myth that, “as a science, psychology stands apart from the culture in which it is 
embedded” (1997, p. 549). Awareness of or reflection on the subjectivity of the 
researcher is absent from most psychological research. The critique of the objectivity 
proclaimed by scientific endeavours problematises and ungrounds both the research 
produced by the “psy” disciplines and the treatments and interventions born from this 
research. 
Poststructuralist, postmodern and feminist critics have analysed the scientific 
knowledge and assumptions that shape the theories and practices of the “psy” 
disciplines and much therapy as social constructs, which have specific effects – 
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creating and legitimising the concept of “mental illness” through the discourse of bio-
physiology; focusing on the bodies, minds and behaviours of individuals and 
excluding their social worlds; offering only one, privileged, explanation for 
phenomena; reinforcing binary oppositions and legitimising social exclusions; and 
accruing authority and legitimacy through the “objectivity” of science, while hiding 
researchers’ subjectivities. Despite these critiques, bio-medical accounts of mental 
illness still dominate, and the “psy” disciplines assume authority and expert status 
because of their scientific standards and methods. Consequently, critics argue that 
bio-medical accounts dominate the fields of therapy and mental health work – as will 
be discussed in detail in Chapter 6 – and “provide the basis for the widespread use of 
medical interventions, in particular psychotropic drug use” (Ussher, 2000, p. 213). 
Defining and perceiving mental illness as a phenomenon born from within individual, 
context-less bodies suggests that treatment should operate also on these individual 
bodies. 
The scientific knowledge of therapy research and interventions has produced a merger 
with medicine and commercial and corporate interests that seems both reasonable and 
inevitable. Fee explains the effects of this merger: 
As bio-technological and psychopharmaceutical machineries propagate, bodies 
and subjective life (disproportionately women’s) become new sites of economic 
interchange and pharmaceutical investment, creating new relationships between 
“symptomology” and the flows of electronic and capitalist exchange vested in 
that very distress. (2000, p. 5) 
Fee argues that the mental distress experienced by individuals receiving therapeutic 
treatment or services – more often women – is vied for by bio-technology and 
pharmaceutical companies as a means of profit-making. John Read reinforces this 
argument, noting the huge presence of the drug industry at psychiatry conferences 
(2005, p. 596). The process of identifying mental disorders and illnesses, and their 
classification in bio-physiological terms, lend themselves to the “solutions” (paid for 
by individuals, insurance companies, or state health care services) produced by these 
giant commercial industries. The profusion of commercial, corporate and bio-medical 
interests in people’s mental distress in turn reifies (and, arguably, exploits) bio-
medical explanations and accounts of this distress, occluding other meanings or forms 
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of knowledge and drawing individual bodies and subjectivities into a network of 
capitalist exchange. Therapists, then, become actors in this process. 
Constructing the “self” in therapy 
Critical attention has also been directed at how the “self” figures and is understood 
and talked about within therapy, and on the effects and implications of such ideas; 
feminist and poststructuralist critics writing in the 1980s and early 1990s, in 
particular, took aim at therapy’s treatment of the “self”. Therapy and the “psy” 
disciplines are understood to “fall within the liberal humanist tradition, which is so 
pervasive in Western society” (Kitzinger, 1987, as cited in Gavey, 1989, p. 461, 
italics in original). This tradition, and its discourse, “instantiates the notion of people 
as rational autonomous individuals possessing a fixed identity, an essential self vested 
with agency and a consciousness which is the cause of their beliefs and actions” 
(Kaye, 1999, p. 22). The liberal humanist self is regarded as the unique core of a 
person, free from outside influence, and as a consistent, coherent entity that is “central 
to the production of meaning” (Bird, 2000, p. 27). Therapy – comprising 
psychotherapy, psychologies, and, most obviously, the “growth therapies” initiated by 
Carl Rogers – is seen to adhere to and reinforce this understanding of the self. 
Feminist writers Miriam Greenspan (1983) and Celia Kitzinger (1991a; 1991b) 
explain that the liberal humanist ideology and conception of the self shapes the idea 
of “personal growth through therapy” (Greenspan, 1983, p. 122). Therapy supports 
the autonomous, responsible individual to “grow” and transform her/his self; for 
Greenspan, the message of humanist therapies is this: “You can change social reality 
by transforming yourself; you can transform yourself by being in therapy; you can 
pull yourself up by your own bootstraps and fly, fly, fly” (p. 140). The individual is 
the agent of change within such therapy and, through self-development with the aid of 
the therapy, can change how they conduct themselves within, and experience, the 
world, relieving themselves of problems or mental distress. Kitzinger echoes this idea 
when she explains how therapy, including feminist therapies, “asserts the autonomy 
of the individual and his or her rights to equality, freedom of choice and personal self-
fulfilment” (1991a, p. 52). 
The way in which the “self” is constructed and discussed within therapy – as rational, 
essential, autonomous, consistent, and remedied through personal development and 
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transformation – is critiqued by many for being instrumental in sustaining oppressive 
power relations: individuals are blamed for their suffering and held responsible for 
changing their circumstances, while the social, political and cultural contexts of their 
lives are ignored. Celia Kitzinger and Rachel Perkins claim that, in “[t]urning the 
spotlight on the “self”, psychology plunges the world out there into darkness” (1993, 
p. 114). When the world out there is in darkness, the internal, personal world, mind 
and body of the individual becomes the focus. John Kaye points out that, just as 
psychological and psychiatric discourses treat the individual as the locus of 
pathology, “humanistic discursive repertoires make the individual the locus of 
responsibility” (1999, p. 22). Consequently, therapy has been accused of “victim-
blaming” (Allwood, 1996, p. 20; Kitzinger, 1991b): if the individual self is 
autonomous and the source of change and power in one’s life, then “victimization … 
[is] seen as evidence of collusion” (Kitzinger, 1991b, p. 123). Kitzinger goes on, 
critiquing therapy’s victim-blaming of women and lesbians in particular, to declare 
that “[t]he notion of the free, autonomous, self-fulfilled and authentic woman 
possessed of a personal power innocent of coercion … is simply an individualist myth 
which actively obscures the operation of power” (p. 124). The liberal-humanist self 
within therapy is viewed by critics like Kitzinger as a construct that obscures the 
power relations of the “outside world” and their relationship to individuals, and 
instead demands that individuals “heal” and change themselves to achieve relief from 
problems or distress. Nicola Gavey concludes that, although “liberal humanist values 
are not unworthy, the absence of metatheoretical concerns about power render them 
insufficient” (1989, p. 461). 
Therapy is accused not only of ignoring “the world out there” and therefore 
depoliticising and individualising people’s problems, but also of redefining political 
terms and co-opting political language, and making it, instead, a language of the 
“self”. The therapy concerns of “rights to equality”, “freedom of choice”, “liberation” 
and “empowerment” are seen as making the language and ideas of political social 
movements into a therapeutic language, operating at the level of the individual. 
Kitzinger and Perkins describe this as “psychology’s colonization of our political 
terrain” (1993, p. 72). They give the example of the word “power”, which in therapy 
is reformulated as an awareness, an affirmation, a belief that you already have 
power, albeit power that the culture does not recognize. All that is necessary is to 
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pursue psychological programs that enable us to “feel more comfortable about 
being powerful”. (p. 41) 
For Kitzinger and Perkins, there is a distinction between the “feeling” of power at a 
personal level, and the exercise and experience of power at a social level and within 
the systems and institutions of everyday life. They accuse therapy – and therapists – 
of ignoring this distinction. According to them, individualising and privatising power 
– making it a psychic phenomenon – while simultaneously evoking the words and 
spirit of political rebellions, offers a vision of power that is both limited and limiting. 
Therapy’s vision of power is fundamental to Kitzinger and Perkins’ claim in 
Changing Our Minds that therapy is “bad for women”, taking women away from 
public, political action to a private, therapeutic engagement with their solitary selves 
(and the therapist) instead. 
Critics of therapy, inspired by postmodern, poststructuralist and feminist theories 
dispute mainstream therapy’s figuration of the self and offer an alternative 
understanding of selfhood. The liberal humanist self of therapy, with its 
individualising, decontextualising and depoliticising tendencies, is depicted as an 
invention, rather than the truth of human identity. Gavey explains that, in “contrast to 
the humanist assumptions of a unified, rational self, poststructuralism proposes a 
subject that is fragmentary, inconsistent, and contradictory” (1989, p. 465, italics in 
original). Such an approach dispels the idea of a unique and “true” “core” to each 
individual, both untouched by social and cultural forces and wholly coherent. Instead, 
identity is fluid and multiple, and created in relationship to social contexts. Kitzinger 
and Perkins echo these ideas and further deny the humanist self of therapy: 
We are simply unable to believe in this autonomous free-floating “self,” for the 
“self” only comes into existence within a context. Individual and society are not 
formed and defined apart from one another, “interacting” as though each 
constitutes and inhabits the very core of what passes for personhood. There is no 
core “real self” lurking beneath layers of social experience. There are only stories 
we tell about who we are, who we have been, and who we might become – stories 
that are structured by the culture in which we live. (1993, p. 111) 
Finding therapy’s language of the self unconvincing and essentially problematic, 
Kitzinger and Perkins instead put forward a view of the self, or subject, as culturally 
and socially constructed and understood. The therapeutic quest to dig beneath the 
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layers of an individual to uncover, know and re-form their “true” self is regarded as 
an enterprise grounded in a fiction. Such discussions and analyses challenge the 
liberal humanist assumptions of therapy and its discourse of selfhood. 
Therapy and othering 
In subscribing to the critiques of therapy detailed above, many theorists and critics 
argue that psychological and therapeutic practices depoliticise and decontextualise 
people’s problems. They view this as effecting the reproduction of hegemonic power 
relations, reinforcing dominant cultural hierarchies and values. Critics have paid 
particular attention to the ways that the institutions and practices of psychology and 
therapy have treated those who are traditionally socially marginalized – women, non-
whites, gays, lesbians, transgendered people, the poor, people from non-western 
cultures, and other “others”. Therapy has been accused of being complicit with the 
continued oppression of marginalised groups and, further, of creating new forms of 
oppression that focus specifically on the bodies and mental health of individuals. 
While research and practices on the margins of mainstream therapy have been 
growing and taking form over the last few decades – feminist therapies, for instance – 
some still see the perpetuation of dominant cultural biases within therapy. This 
section firstly considers the development of the feminist critique of therapy over the 
past forty years, and then uses this to introduce a discussion of therapy’s involvement 
in othering more generally. While the feminist critique exemplifies broad patterns, it 
also reveals the dynamism of exclusions and inclusions: the section concludes with a 
more recent critique of feminist therapy as itself perpetuating othering based on class, 
race and socio-economic standing. 
Writing in the early 1980s, Miriam Greenspan, in A New Approach to Women and 
Therapy (1983), articulated a critical feminist analysis of therapy traditions. 
Following from her analysis of statistics detailing psychiatric treatments in the United 
States, she made the claim that “it is largely men who label the variety of 
psychological problems of those who seek therapeutic help and largely women who 
are seeking help” (p. 6). She went on to describe the picture of the then mental health 
system as one of “Man as Expert and Woman as Patient” (p. 6). For Greenspan, the 
male expert in mental health wielded power as he treated women: “His judgements 
are impeccable. His rare spoken words are highly expensive. He is smoothly 
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authoritarian and aloof as a god” (p. 40). Such an arrangement within the arena of 
mental health seemed to replicate neatly many “commonsense” patterns of patriarchal 
culture of the time: women occupied the passive and pathologised position of patient, 
while male mental health experts, who had accrued knowledge, qualifications, and 
professional status and power, occupied a superior vantage point from which they 
categorised, classified, and treated their women patients. Throughout her book, 
Greenspan argued that the “problem” of female mental illness, and its seeming 
widespread prevalence, was not in fact about pathology: the symptoms of such  
illness … are, for the most part, the systematically socially produced symptoms of 
sexual inequality. The problem is a matter of how women are seen and treated 
both inside the mental health system and in the surrounding society that it 
mirrors. (p. 7) 
According to Greenspan’s argument, the mental health system of her time was 
implicated in the perpetuation of patriarchal gender relations.  
Many other feminist critics have described a relationship between therapy and 
oppressive gender relations, explaining female mental illness as a consequence of 
social oppression and condemning what they see as therapy’s wilful ignorance of this 
as complicit in maintaining the status quo. Jane Ussher, in her book Women’s 
Madness (1991), catalogued the perspectives of numerous feminist critics. For 
example, Juliet Mitchell argued in her book Psychoanalysis and Feminism (1974) 
that, 
there seems overwhelming justification for the charge that the many 
psychotherapeutic practices, including those that by the formal definition are 
within psychoanalysis, have done much to re-adapt discontented women to a 
conservative feminine status quo, to an inferiorized psychology and to a 
contentment with serving and servicing men and children. (As cited in Ussher, 
1991, p. 170) 
According to this feminist argument, women deemed “mad” or “abnormal” – and 
therefore outside the norms of acceptable femininity – and who seek or are compelled 
to receive therapy, have tended to be subject to interventions that are designed to 
return them to a normative, submissive, traditionally feminine position within society. 
Jeanne Marecek (1997) critiques historical psychiatric diagnoses – such as 
nymphomania, hysteria, and masochism – for enforcing “conformity to norms of 
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female domesticity, subordination, and subservience to men’s sexual needs” (p. 544). 
However, such specifically “female” diagnoses are not confined to history: Marecek 
also examines the more recent growth in diagnostic categories for premenstrual 
difficulties – such as premenstrual syndrome, late luteal dysphoric disorder, and 
premenstrual dysphoric disorder. She comments, in relation to these diagnoses, that 
“if women’s anger, depression, and discontent come to be interpreted as medical or 
psychiatric symptoms, difficult and distressing life experiences may be disregarded” 
(p. 544). When viewed from a critical feminist perspective, therapy may work to 
pathologise women by disregarding the social significance of their symptoms and 
operating in ways that enforce hegemonic gender norms. 
Many critics have argued that therapy, in addition to reinforcing gender biases, 
reproduces other social biases. For instance, Weatherall, Gavey and Potts (2002) 
highlight how conventional psychology has been critiqued for its “androcentric and 
ethnocentric biases” (p. 531). Therapeutic resources in most post-industrial societies 
have been largely designed by white, middle class intellectuals and practitioners. 
Charles Waldegrave, from the Family Therapy Centre in Lower Hutt, Aotearoa New 
Zealand,9 explains that these resources 
probably work well for like people, who have reasonable access to resources and 
place great stress on individual freedom. They have not been successful however, 
in substantially transforming the lives and lot of those whose cultures are 
marginalised, poor and, until recently, women. (Waldegrave, 2003a, p. 64) 
The biases of conventional psychology and therapy, and the delivery of inappropriate 
therapeutic resources to non-white, non-middle class, non-male clients, so critics such 
as Wilkinson and Kitzinger argue, mean that psychology and therapy have 
participated “in constructing and perpetuating Otherness” (1996, p. 160).  
Therapy’s involvement in the construction and perpetuation of otherness is 
demonstrated persuasively by Michelle Fine in her article “Coping with rape” (1989). 
In examining the clash between psychological models for coping with injustice and 
the coping methods employed by a poor, urban, sole-parent, African-American 
                                                
9 The “Just Therapy” approach was developed and instituted at the Family Therapy Centre in Lower 
Hutt, Aotearoa New Zealand.  The centre offers an alternative form and practice of therapy that 
addresses issues of social justice and “takes into account the gender, social and economic context of the 
persons seeking help” (Waldegrave, 2003b, p. 4). 
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woman in response to being raped, Fine reveals how “our [psychology’s] literature 
legitimates existing power asymmetries” (p. 189). Her analysis demonstrates how, in 
adhering to psychological literature and models, psychologists end up prescribing “as 
optimal those ways of coping which are effective for high power persons” (p. 190, 
italics in original). Consequently, she argues, psychology reinforces “the recipient’s 
lower power position”, denigrates their own coping methods, and derogates them if 
they dismiss psychological methods of coping as inappropriate or ineffective (p. 194). 
The criticisms posed by Fine and others expose the gender, class and racial biases 
(among others) that are entwined with the science of psychology and benevolent, 
helpful practices of therapy. Therapy, from this critical perspective, perpetuates social 
othering and is implicated in the reproduction and reification of dominant cultural 
hierarchies and exclusions. 
It is not just mainstream therapy and psychology that have been accused of 
constructing and perpetuating otherness. Critics have also turned the spotlight onto 
feminist therapies, which have evolved since the 1970s in response to mainstream 
therapy’s treatment of women. Kitzinger has been a particularly vocal critic of 
feminist therapy and psychology. She and Perkins argue in Changing Our Minds 
(1993) that feminist therapy is unable to escape the problems posed by the power 
difference between therapist and client, where the therapist occupies a superior 
position with the potential to manipulate clients in accordance with her own view (pp. 
97, 98). In Kitzinger’s mind, feminist therapies have not escaped the tradition of 
othering that is seen in more mainstream therapy. For instance, she claims that 
feminist psychology’s assumptions about women reveal ethnocentrism, noting that 
the “supposedly generic women of most feminist psychological theorizing turn out, in 
fact, to be white, western, middle-class, able-bodied and heterosexual” (1991, p. 52). 
The tendency for women to be treated as a homogeneous category within feminist 
therapy, and for this category to be theorised by academic feminists who are 
predominantly white, middle class, and western (Wilkinson & Kitzinger, 1996, p. 12) 
has led to critiques of feminist therapy as continuing to utilise and engage in 
processes of othering. It seems that the dominance of processes and practices of 
othering within the tradition of therapy impacts even on seemingly alternative and 
socially aware forms of therapy. 
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Turning critique into practice: the growth of political, postmodern 
therapies 
As the previous discussion detailed at some length, therapy has been extensively 
criticised and problematised by critics over the last four decades. Their claims and 
charges question the authority but also the viability of therapeutic endeavours. In the 
face of these accusations, therapy seems largely untenable. Critics have persuasively 
argued that therapy works as an instrument of social control, harnessing both 
scientific discourse and the humanist concept of the self to depoliticise and 
decontextualise people’s mental health problems and to individualise responsibility 
for having and changing such problems. Therapy and the “psy” disciplines are seen, 
through the lens of critical theory, as disciplinary institutions, working to produce 
self-disciplining, self-regulating individuals who conform to normative values and 
ideals. These disciplines thus maintain the status quo – or that at least is their social 
objective according to this Foucauldian perspective – reproducing dominant cultural 
power relations, and in turn perpetuating social othering. These lines of argument 
suggest an antithetical relationship between therapy and political goals or aspirations; 
therapy appears incompatible with the pursuit of social justice, the redress of 
oppressive power relations, and the inclusion within “normal” cultural life of those 
who are socially marginalized and excluded. Indeed, critics like Kitzinger and Perkins 
(1993) – both trained psychologists – condemn therapy across the board, asserting its 
“badness” for women, and conclude that politics and therapy are irreconcilable. 
Likewise, Jeffrey Moussaieff Masson (1994), an ex-psychoanalyst and fervent critic 
of therapy, in his polemic Against Therapy, documents the multitude of abuses 
conducted in the name of therapy and asserts that the entire profession of therapy is 
corrupt (p. 296). Such arguments undoubtedly promote discomfort and doubt about 
the politics and ethics of doing therapy work and could, understandably, lead many 
politically minded theorists and therapists to conclude that involvement in therapy is 
futile and untenable. Indeed, these arguments informed my own ambivalence and 
uncertainty about the uses and ethics of therapy. 
Throughout her career, Jane Ussher has voiced and reinforced feminist and social 
constructionist critiques of therapy/psychology as pathologising, depoliticising and 
disciplinary. Yet she has also consistently highlighted the limitations of such critiques 
as a form of practice and as, on their own, adequate responses to the lived experiences 
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of distress expressed by women who seek therapeutic help. In a 2000 article she 
explained her relationship to critical theories and analyses of mental health and 
women’s madness, and reflected on the development of her own position: 
I felt that I could only take part in critical analysis or deconstructionist debate. 
However, I no longer believe that this is enough, for myself at least. Critical 
thinking is essential; deconstruction of madness as a concept must be done. Yet 
we cannot ignore the pain and suffering experienced by women – and men – who 
are deemed mad. We cannot dismiss mental health problems as linguistic 
constructions or mere justifications for regulatory control; we need to offer 
something more concrete than critique for women who come forward for help. At 
the same time, we need to address the fact that postmodern and feminist thinking 
is not having the impact it should on mainstream research and clinical practice; 
the fact that it is invariably dismissed or ignored. Rather than wringing our hands 
at the injustice of this situation, we need to offer a way forward. (2000, pp. 208-
209, italics added) 
Rather than discarding therapy outright, Ussher’s political and pragmatic concern for 
the women and men who seek help from therapists informs her continued investment 
in theories and practices of therapy and psychology. Ussher calls for a way forward, 
from within therapy and psychology, that responds to both critical and feminist 
thinking about the political meanings and power relations of therapy and the lived 
experiences of women and men with the development of modes of practice and, to 
quote Mary Parlee, “doable alternatives” (Ussher, 2000, p. 216); critique, in itself, is 
not sufficient. 
Ussher’s description of the tensions she experiences in relation to the critique of 
therapy would, I imagine, resonate with many of the therapists and theorists who have 
grappled with these issues and yet have not been able to dismiss or discard therapy – 
which includes the therapists examined in this thesis, as well as its author. A 
significant number of theorists and therapists, in response to – or in spite of – these 
charges, have persisted with therapy but have developed and innovated the discipline 
in ways that address the charges and attempt to do things differently. Such therapists 
and theorists resist the either/or bind – therapy or political engagement and critique – 
and instead propose and enact “doable alternatives”, offering a way forward from 
within therapy. Over the last four decades – often in concert with the critique of 
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therapy – a growing body of therapy practices and ideas has evolved, offering 
alternatives to mainstream and traditional therapy assumptions and practices. These 
practices and ideas are born from poststructuralist, postmodern, feminist and social 
justice theories and operate from the premise that both mental health problems and 
selfhood are socially constructed and that therapy requires engagement with the social 
and political contexts of clients. While they are diverse and varied, and some have 
taken shape as specific modalities – for example, narrative therapy, solution-focused 
therapy, discursive therapies, critical psychology, “Just Therapy”, and feminist 
therapies – my discussion is less focused on the differences among these alternative 
approaches and more on how, in general, they re-form therapy in response to critiques 
and find ways to engage with political concerns and agendas. 
Many of these new therapies, inspired by critical theory and concern for social justice, 
consciously and concertedly work against the individualising, pathologising and 
depoliticising traditions of therapy. They respond to a demand, articulated here by 
Kaye (1999), that therapists view people’s mental health problems as inherently 
connected to their social and political contexts: 
While it would be somewhat utopian to expect psychotherapy to attempt to find 
solutions to the injustices of the world, it is surely not too much to ask that 
therapists engage with issues of social context, together with the role of social 
inequities in the causation of psychological distress. It would also be remiss for 
therapists not to take these issues into account in their own work, for as Judith 
Cross (1994) points out, if we ignore the role played by social inequity, we may 
inadvertently be acting to ask our troubled consultees to adjust to the unjust. (p. 
20) 
Recognition and exploration of the role played by social context and inequity in a 
person’s mental health problems is required of therapists if they are to work as 
something other than agents of social control. From the point of view of politically 
oriented and critical therapies, mental health problems are not individual possessions 
or discrete pathological states: they involve an interaction of social, cultural, and 
political factors and forces with the bodies and minds of individuals. 
Practitioners of these alternative and reflexive therapies enact a politicised, contextual 
and de-pathologising view of clients’ mental health problems in numerous ways. For 
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instance, Jane Ussher, in seeking a “doable alternative” to traditional modes of 
therapy, and to the potential paralysis of critique, has developed a material-discursive-
intrapsychic model and methodology (Ussher, 2000; 2002; 2006), which informs her 
therapeutic practice. She explains that a material-discursive-intrapsychic approach to 
mental distress “would recognize the ‘materiality’ of mental health problems as they 
are experienced by women, intrapsychic pain and defenses, and the discursive 
construction of madness and femininity” (2000, p. 208). Other theorists and therapists 
pay similar attention to the interaction of social discourses with material and 
intrapsychic experiences of individuals and consciously seek to de-pathologise in 
their therapy work. Syliva Blood (2005) approaches her clinical work with women 
experiencing body image issues “from the view that women’s anxiety about their 
bodies is a product of social power relations, rather than individual pathology” (p. 
135). And Colleen Heenan (1996) explains that she works “with clients who are 
attempting to understand the interrelationship between the ways in which they are 
socially, culturally, historically and personally positioned in relation to others and 
themselves” (p. 56). These approaches recognise the complexity of the possible 
meanings that are made of people’s mental distress, and attempt to shift the focus 
from individual deviancy or failure to the cultural context of people’s lives and the 
oppressive power relations and discursive arrangements that promote distress.  
For many therapists seeking to undo or move away from therapy’s pathologising, 
individualising and depoliticising traditions and to do therapy differently, the concept 
of deconstruction is integral. Rather than an abstract theory, in therapy deconstruction 
becomes a practice and mode of operation. Johnella Bird explains that the concept of 
“practical deconstruction”10 in her therapy work reflects 
a particular engagement with language and meanings which allows us (therapist 
and client) to attend to politics and power within the therapeutic conversation. … 
We engage with practical deconstruction of everyday ideas and practices when 
the meanings given to commonplace roles, attributes, relationships and words are 
not taken for granted. (2000, p. 70) 
For Bird, therapy involves questioning what has been taken for granted and 
investigating and negotiating meaning with clients. For example, supposedly 
                                                
10 Bird explains that she has taken and adapted this term from Deconstructing Psychopathology (1995), 
by Ian Parker, Eugenie Georgaca, David Harper, Terence McLaughlin and Mark Stockwell-Smith. 
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self-evident and “truthful” diagnoses like “depression” or “anorexia”, roles of 
“man” or “daughter”, or concepts such as “strength” and “weakness”, are 
deconstructed and given critical attention within the therapeutic conversation, 
rather than being taken as givens. 
The concept of deconstruction as a therapeutic practice is reiterated by Ian Parker 
(1999) in his discussion of postmodern-inspired therapies. He explains that  
the task of the deconstructing therapist, and just as much so the deconstructing 
client, is to locate the problem in certain cultural practices, and comprehend the 
role of patterns of power in setting out positions for people which serve to 
reinforce the idea that they can do nothing about it themselves. (p. 3) 
As detailed in the first part of this chapter, critics have argued that the model of 
mental illness that sees problems as the innate, internal, personal, and 
potentially biological possessions of individuals encourages self-blame and a 
belief in the inherence and fixedness of problems. The deconstructing therapist 
works against this model, again questioning taken-for-granteds and assumed 
truths and encouraging exploration of cultural practices so that problems are 
understood and experienced in different ways. Such conversations with 
clients/patients are oriented around undoing the passivity and resignation 
encouraged by pathological accounts of problems. They are intended to support 
clients/patients to experience agency, competency and an active subject 
position, so that they are able to develop a preferable account of themselves and 
their situation: this is described as a “reconstruction stage” by narrative therapy 
innovators Michael White and David Epston (Ussher, 2006, p. 60). 
The narrative therapy strategy of “externalising” represents a particular 
engagement with language and meaning that both attends to politics and power 
within the therapeutic conversation and enables the deconstruction and 
reconstruction of clients’ problems. Narrative therapists encourage clients “to 
objectify and, at times, personify the problems that they experience as 
oppressive”, linguistically shifting the problem from an internal entity or 
possession to something external to the person or relationship that has been 
characterised as the problem (White & Epston, 1990, p. 38). Viewing problems 
objectively and as separate from the client/patient enables conversation about 
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the nature of the problem and the client/patient’s relationship to it – for instance, 
the effects of the problem; its history and context; the people, situations and 
ideas that support or undermine the problem; actions and practices that the 
client may take to transform the problem; and so on. 
Narrative therapy proponents argue that therapists’ externalising conversations 
with clients/patients undermine the dominant cultural practice – both within the 
traditions of therapy and the wider cultural context – of having internalising 
conversations, which individualise responsibility for problems and encourage 
personal feelings of deficit, “abnormality”, and failure. White declares that 
while internalising conversations “de-politicize”, externalising conversations 
“re-politicize” (1995, p. 48). Using the issue of abuse as an example, he 
explains that an objective for a therapist in an externalising conversation is a 
collaborative “renaming of the dominant plot [the client’s story of the problem] 
away from personal culpability and towards ‘domination’, ‘exploitation’, 
‘servitude’, ‘erasure’ and ‘torture’” (p. 48). When problems are renamed and 
reframed, the therapist can invite discussion of the tactics of power involved in 
abuse and people’s frequently concomitant self-abuse, and attempt to re-situate 
problems in local relationship politics (p. 49). The therapist deliberately orients 
conversations towards the goal that the client/patient will develop different 
accounts and understandings of his/her problems and experience freedom “to 
object and to dissent” (p. 49). The therapeutic strategy of externalising is an 
example of innovations within the field of therapy that have been developed in 
reaction to the traditions and practices of conventional therapy. It is a linguistic 
strategy that therapists use to counteract the internalisation of problems. In 
doing so, they seek to both re-politicise and de-pathologise clients’ experiences 
of mental distress, and to reframe the story of problems in ways that are freeing 
and that enable agency and action. 
Therapies developed from critical theory, intent on a project of “practical 
deconstruction”, necessarily extend this deconstructive, questioning approach to the 
concept of the self. Viewing the humanist concept of the self as a mythic construct 
that tyrannises individuals – who are charged with the task of being “authentic”, 
“whole”, “real”, and wholly responsible for all that befalls and redeems them – these 
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therapies offer an alternative conception of the self. For instance, Johnella Bird’s 
theory and practices of therapy are founded on the concept of the “relational I”. The 
“relational I”, says Bird, “is a direct challenge to the Western cultural construction of 
self, which presupposes an autonomous self-regulated self” (2000, p. x). For Bird, 
“the ‘I’ is never singular. The ‘I’ is known and experienced always in relationship” (p. 
7). The “I”, then, exists within a context, in relation to people, history, ideas and 
experiences. This conception of the self means that individuals are neither wholly the 
source of, nor to blame for, mental distress or problems that they experience; there is 
no core, essential self that exists in isolation from the context and relationships of a 
person’s life and that needs to be searched for and “discovered”. “The world out 
there”, from Bird’s perspective, is inextricable from “the self”.  
The concept of the “relational I” informs how Bird uses language in her conversations 
with clients. Inspired by the narrative therapy strategy of externalising, Bird has 
developed a style of talk termed “relational externalising” that avoids and subverts the 
humanist concept of self: 
When we use relational externalising talk we imply through our use of language 
that people (clients) are not totally the identified concern, feeling, life event, or 
diagnosis. This style of talk enables us to research the institutional and other 
supporters of the development of this concern, feeling, life event, or diagnosis. 
The relational externalising conversation thereby challenges the idea that the self 
is the sole regulator of life events and the meanings attributed to these life events. 
(p. 8) 
A conversational style that inquires about and researches the self in relationship to 
concerns, feelings, life events or diagnoses, and pays particular attention to people’s 
relationships to the social, historical and political contexts of their lives, disrupts the 
pathologising habit of therapy/psychology; mental distress or concern is only one 
aspect of a person’s experience and life and is not evidence of a unique, personal 
malady for which they are responsible. The aim of such a conversation is to avoid 
individualising or privatising people’s concerns or problems; instead it encourages 
connections, interactions and an engagement with and awareness of the world, even in 
the private space of therapy. Bird theorises that, in challenging and moving away 
from the conception of “the self” as autonomous, individual and self-directed, new 
possibilities for explanations of both the self and problems or mental distress emerge: 
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“Engaging with the self in relationship creates conceptual space within which 
alternative explanations for life concerns can be explored and considered” (2000, p. 
11, italics in original). 
Sylvia Blood conceives of the self as shifting and inherently contradictory and works 
with clients in ways that introduce an alternative view of selfhood to the humanist self 
that is so naturalised within western cultures. From her research and clinical work 
with women around body image issues, she notes that the “idea of a true self or ‘the 
real me’ informs women’s fantasies about who they will be when ‘thin’” (Blood, 
2005, p. 127). This idea of being inauthentic or not achieving “realness” while their 
bodies are in their current state, fuels women’s distress around body image and 
demonstrates the oppressive potential of the “true self”. Blood explains how,  
[w]hen women are exposed to ways of talking and thinking about themselves and 
their experiences, that attend to the shifting and changing nature of subjectivity, 
they can begin to see that there is no one “true self” or “real me”. Women often 
become curious about how they feel in different social situations and with 
different people. (p. 127) 
Blood’s therapy work encourages women’s awareness of a range of bodily 
experiences and “they begin to notice how their experience of their bodies is 
contradictory, shifting from moment to moment, particularly in different social 
situations” (p. 130). Such an awareness, Blood argues, “makes it possible for women 
to understand and experience their contradictory impulses without judging themselves 
as ‘mad’ or ‘bad’” (p. 134). It also undermines experimental psychology’s 
understanding of body image as a “consistent and stable” construct (p. 131), offering 
an alternative, and seemingly freeing and non-pathologising, model of body image. 
Bird and Blood represent a new approach among some therapies towards conceiving 
of and understanding the self. For therapy practitioners inspired by the critique of 
conventional therapy traditions, the self is multiple, shifting, contradictory and always 
relational, and their therapy practices mobilise this postmodern sensibility. 
The critique of therapy detailed in the first half of this chapter asserts that there is a 
problem with the therapist’s power – and the client/patient’s corresponding lack of 
power – in the therapy exchange. Indeed, for the critic Jeffrey Moussaieff Masson 
(1994) the problem of the therapist’s power is evidence of therapy’s corruptness as an 
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institution and is both inescapable and irreconcilable (pp. 210-211). Issues of power 
and the therapist’s privileged position have been of great concern to theorists and 
practitioners who have sought to challenge therapy traditions and conventions and to 
create and practice politically aware and engaged forms of therapy. The therapist’s 
high-ranking, expert position in a dynamic where s/he acts as confessor – hearing the 
secrets of often socially marginalised people and then appraising, judging and 
categorising their words and minds – is undoubtedly problematic for therapists 
(including both my research particpants and me) with interests in social justice and 
the redress of oppressive power arrangements. 
Numerous theorists and therapists have sought to address this issue and offer therapy 
practices that can potentially prevent or subvert the therapist’s abuse of power. Early 
on in his book Re-authoring Lives (1995), Michael White encourages therapy 
practitioners to read outside the discipline of therapy, suggesting in particular texts 
from the fields of social theory and critical theory. He explains that this reading 
“helps us to consider the various ways that we are, or might be, reproducing dominant 
culture within the therapeutic discipline” (p. 12). Therapists are encouraged to 
consider how they may function as agents of social control and to engage with the 
idea that their therapy work with clients may – or perhaps inevitably will – involve 
the reproduction of dominant cultural values, assumptions and practices. The call for 
therapists to consider their power and their potential to reproduce dominant culture is 
reinforced by Glenn Larner (1999):  
The ethical challenge in psychotherapy is to minimize the therapist’s potential to 
violate the other through therapy, which is an issue for the “post-modern” as 
much as the “modern” therapist. This is the potential violence of theory, 
authority, expertise and technology to override the client’s contribution to their 
life narrative. (p. 48) 
White and Larner’s statements suggest that the power and influence that therapists 
have over their clients’ life narratives must be continually acknowledged and reflected 
on, and actively minimised. 
This kind of reflexivity is lauded as integral to challenging the power dynamics of 
conventional therapy and minimising the therapist’s “potential to violate the other 
through therapy” (Larner, 1999, p. 48). In response to her own questions about how 
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therapists might escape the influence of dominant discourses and question their own 
non-conscious ideology, Rachel Hare-Mustin (1997) suggests that therapists develop 
“self-reflexivity”. She explains that this means  
trying to provide a special vision that can challenge the assumptions of dominant 
discourses rather than merely going along with them. It also means that the 
therapist’s own influence, the therapist’s authority, must be acknowledged rather 
than denied. Some therapists are moving in this direction, questioning their own 
views and questioning why those are the questions they are asking. (p. 570-571) 
Therapists are encouraged to address and acknowledge the authority they inevitably 
wield, rather than ignore it. Instead of reproducing the fiction of the objective, neutral, 
value-less expert practitioner, therapists are incited to continually question and reflect 
on their own views and values, and on their words and actions in their work with 
clients. Ian Parker stresses that “we are always already embedded in a particular set of 
perspectives, operating from within certain positions when we try to understand 
ourselves and others” (1999, p. 4). Rather than finding the “correct” standpoint, being 
a reflexive and critical therapist “means understanding how we come to stand where 
we are” (p. 4).  
Theorists and therapists have developed “new practices of accountability” (Parker, 
1999, p. 8) in order to challenge dominant discourses, minimise their potential to 
violate their clients’ life narratives, and include the therapist “as a reflexive critical 
participating actor” (p. 8). Such practices have been concerned with “opening up 
psychiatric practice [and broader therapy practice] to make it visible” (p. 8). An 
example of these practices can be found in Michael White’s discussion of client case-
notes. Recognising the function of case-notes as a “modern instrument of power” 
(White, 1995, p. 31), White makes suggestions for how therapists might do their 
writing differently and prevent “us from engaging in the sort of practices that make it 
possible for the file to have an independent [from the client] life” (p. 47). He suggests 
numerous possibilities: “we might restrict ourselves to the visible recording of what 
the therapist considers to be particularly significant verbatim comments”; have clients 
write their own notes; compare the therapist and the client’s notes; forward therapy 
notes to the client so that they can engage with them and together the client and 
therapist can confer and correct them; write notes in the form of letters (p. 47). Such 
suggestions represent an attempt by therapists to mitigate the oppressive effects of 
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note-making and record-keeping. They invite participation from clients in the creation 
of the record of their therapy and, crucially, make the therapist more accountable to 
the client in regard to her/his writing by providing opportunities for the client to 
verify or challenge the writing. Such practices are designed to de-mystify therapy and 
provide clients with insight into the therapist’s orientation and the practices and 
purposes of therapy: therapy becomes not simply something done to them by a 
professional with expert and rarefied knowledge. 
Other practices of accountability and attempts to undermine the authority and power 
of therapists can be found in both the use of clients’ own language and descriptions, 
and in the curious, questioning stance of the therapist. Throughout deconstructive, 
postmodern and feminist therapies, in response to extensive critique, psychological 
knowledge and discourses no longer occupy a hallowed position. For instance, Bird 
explains that she holds “psychological theories to one side as one possible explanation 
for life events” (2000, p. 74). Instead, the language used and meanings made by 
clients are of much greater interest to her: “Exploration of people’s (clients’) lived 
experience by using the language of lived experience supports us to move beyond the 
shorthand of diagnosis and categorisation” (p. 8). The language and descriptors 
resonant with and chosen from the client’s own lived experience form the basis for 
Bird’s therapeutic talk, rather than the authoritative, objectifying, expert language of 
the “psy” disciplines.  
As she listens to and utilises the language of her clients, Bird’s primary mode of 
conversation takes the form of questions and wonderings. Questioning and 
wondering, she explains,  
reduces the risk of therapists imposing their meanings on people (clients). … The 
nature of such questions implies that we (therapists) are wondering and exploring 
possibilities. This allows for an acknowledgement of the power relation within 
the therapeutic relationship, while privileging collaboration rather than imposition 
and expert knowing. (Bird, 2000, p. 28) 
Through her attention to and use of the language and meanings utilised by 
clients/patients in the therapy exchange, and her own use of questions rather than 
interpretations or instructions, Bird attempts to revise the practice of therapy. She 
seeks to address the problem of the therapist’s power and attempts to lessen the extent 
!#'!!
of this power by working with clients/patients in ways that are collaborative and 
attentive to their own understandings of their lives and problems. The use of clients’ 
language and the strategy of questioning and wondering are integral to numerous 
other therapeutic approaches – such as narrative therapy, solution-focused 
counselling, and “Just Therapy” – and represent a significant departure from the 
conventions of therapy and the “psy” disciplines. 
The first half of this chapter detailed the postmodern critique of the project and 
practices of therapy; the second half has broadly outlined some of the responses to 
this critique that are embodied in the work or writings of postmodern theorists and 
postmodern therapy practitioners. The therapy practitioners interviewed for this study 
all subscribe to the general postmodern orientation articulated in this chapter. They 
have been inspired by both the postmodern critique, and the response it has generated. 
In my interviews with them, they expressed their desire to find and utilise in their 
practice “doable alternatives” (to use Ussher’s phrase) to traditional therapeutic 
approaches. However, the aim of this chapter is to do more than simply introduce the 
theoretical and methodological concerns of these participants. It also foregrounds the 
ideological conflict that they perceived (to varying degrees) within their working 
contexts as they endeavoured to work in the ways that they believed were appropriate. 
That is, despite the flourishing of postmodern therapy ideas that this chapter has 
canvassed, these ideas and the practices they promote remain generally marginal 
within the wider therapy field. The following chapter will introduce this study’s 
participants, and will describe their postmodern orientations. From there, the thesis 
will analyse the tensions that they perceived between their orientations and those 
predominating in their work environments. Finally, their negotiations of those 
tensions will be discussed. 
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4. Applying Postmodern Therapy in Aotearoa New 
Zealand: Situating the Participants 
Introduction 
In a scene from Richard Kelly’s 2001 film Donnie Darko, Lillian Thurman, played by 
Katherine Ross, sits motionless, expressionless, in her office, looking intently at the 
teenage Donnie. The room is cluttered, with books and numerous pictures on the 
walls, and she sits in an armchair while Donnie sits on a couch. Eventually Donnie 
utters, “I made a new friend”. Lillian responds promptly with the question, “Real or 
imaginary?” Donnie says that the new friend is imaginary. With a sigh and some 
snappiness, she asks, “Would you like to talk about this friend?” As Donnie tells her 
more about his friend she follows his answers with direct, abrupt, inquiring questions, 
requesting more detail. She sits in her seat, legs crossed, hands clasped, her face at 
times frowning. 
Lillian is Donnie’s therapist. And Donnie, the film’s protagonist, is a disturbed, 
apparently hallucinating young man, whom we follow as he experiences reality-
bending phenomena suggesting the imminent end of the world. Donnie’s history of 
strange behaviour has seemingly resulted in his parents’ arranging professional 
psychological treatment for him with Lillian. Lillian, we learn, is also the source of 
the medicine bottle of pills that Donnie is meant to take on a regular basis. In 
subsequent scenes in the film, Lillian probes Donnie’s apparently unconscious mind 
with hypnosis, discovering more about Donnie’s imaginary friend and revealing his 
anguish and distress at the impending demise of the world, as well as inadvertently 
prompting uncomfortable (for us and Lillian) revelations of his thoughts of girls and 
sex. In the two scenes of hypnosis, at the sound of Lillian’s hand-clap, Donnie breaks 
from a trance, disoriented and confused by the physical state and situation he awakes 
to: it seems that Lillian and we as viewers have been privy to the secrets of Donnie’s 
mind without even his knowledge of this. At a later point in the film, Lillian meets 
with Donnie’s parents, without Donnie, and gives them her appraisal of him. She tells 
them that Donnie is experiencing “what is commonly called a daylight hallucination”, 
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explaining that “this is a common occurrence among paranoid schizophrenics”. In 
response to Donnie’s tearful mother’s question, “What can we do?”, Lillian informs 
them that she would like to do more hypnotherapy and increase Donnie’s medication.  
When I met with Cal in his counselling room – a spare, small room, its one window 
shaded by a blind, outfitted with two leather chairs that we occupied – we talked a 
little about representations of therapists in film and television. He explained that while 
he had not seen the therapist from the television show The Sopranos, “I do know that 
Donnie Darko movie gave me the screaming shits when I saw Katherine Ross!” We 
both laughed at his pronouncement and he went on to say: 
Cal: You know, she was my idol, she was the most beautiful woman on the planet 
when I was twenty. 
Kate: Uh huh [laughs]. 
Cal: And suddenly she’s transformed, as an actor of course, into this character 
who is talking to this young man, and I don’t know what it was like for him, but 
watching her working scared the shit out of me. And I kind of wanted to go into 
my work after that with a promise to myself that, whatever I did, I’d try not to do 
that. 
Kate: What was “that”? What was scary about it? 
Cal: I just remember her asking him things that seemed to be so unhelpful, or so 
confirming of this wrongness, and he seemed to be, um, all the time being 
mistakenly identified as being wrong or bad or odd. I just thought Donnie Darko 
was a fabulous fellow and I wished I could have asked him some stuff, you know, 
just to kind of balance what she was asking him. But what she seemed to ask him 
just seemed to intensify the darkness that he lived with. 
Cal went on to explain that he wasn’t sure if he fully understood the movie, and to 
stress that Katherine Ross is “a bloody good actor”, but that 
there was something just deeply scary about the role that she took, which seemed 
to be, I suppose it was probably a bit all knowing, a bit too brilliant. I think she 
acts really well and I think it was just too scarily, brilliantly portraying the 
tradition of therapy that says “therapist knows best”. 
Katherine Ross’s incarnation of a therapist brought out Cal’s feelings of discomfort 
and uneasiness in reaction to some of the traditions of therapy – albeit represented in 
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film – suggesting that his intentions in his own therapy practices differed significantly 
from what Lillian Thurman did in her time with Donnie Darko. He explained that his 
feelings of fear in response to the film’s image of a therapist were sparked by Lillian’s 
style of questioning; her questions, he argued, seemed to identify and confirm 
Donnie’s distress as evidence of him being “wrong or bad or odd”. Cal viewed her 
questioning as unhelpful, as having the effect of intensifying the “darkness” that 
Donnie was already living with. Cal was also troubled by the idea that Lillian 
occupied a position as an “all knowing” and “brilliant” therapist. He found something 
deeply wrong and problematic about the “tradition of therapy that says ‘therapist 
knows best’”, vowing to do his best never to replicate Lillian Thurman’s therapy style 
in his own work. Instead of seeing darkness, pathology, and dysfunction in the 
character Donnie, Cal described him as a “fabulous fellow” and was seemingly 
curious to learn more about him. He suggested that he would embark on a different 
style of questioning in a therapeutic conversation with Donnie – asking questions that 
would seemingly be oriented away from wrongness, badness, or oddness, and from 
the intensification of darkness, and that would not be asked from a position of 
“therapist knows best”. 
Cal’s problems with the therapy represented in Donnie Darko echoed many of the 
arguments put forward by the therapy critics and proponents of postmodern therapy 
approaches and practices discussed in the previous chapter. His fears, discomfort and 
criticisms were also shared by the other therapy practitioners interviewed for this 
study. These therapists all balked at the approach and attitude to therapy work that is 
captured in the representation of Lillian Thurman. They identified themselves in 
opposition to the therapy habits of pathology, context-less individuals, and 
depoliticised conversations, and were troubled by the presumption that “therapist 
knows best”. 
This chapter looks closely at how the therapists interviewed for this study described 
and positioned themselves as a distinct group with particular interests. Despite being a 
relatively loose and diverse group of practitioners, these therapists were all linked 
through their involvement in a social movement within the field of therapy in 
Aotearoa New Zealand. Inspired by both postmodern critiques of therapy and the 
theories and practices proposed by postmodern therapists, this movement challenges 
!#*!!
the canon and traditions of therapy and the “psy” disciplines: therapists actively 
sought to undermine the Donnie Darko model of therapy. Spicer and Böhm (2007), 
quoting Tarrow, broadly define a social movement as “collective challenges by 
people with common purposes and solidarity in sustained interaction with elites, 
opponents and authorities” (p. 1673). Proponents and practitioners of postmodern 
therapy practices in many respects fit this definition. This chapter examines the nature 
and features of the postmodern therapy movement, as represented by the research 
participants. Following the definition above, it first describes how I have linked these 
therapists together as a social group, demonstrating their collective interests and 
shared associations. It then considers the common objectives and purposes articulated 
by the therapists during interviews. The chapter brings to life the postmodern critiques 
and therapy practices discussed in the previous chapter, illustrating how these 
theoretical ideas informed the talk and reported activities of the therapists. The 
following chapters of the thesis will then focus on the final aspect of that definition, 
analysing the interactions of these postmodern therapists with elites, opponents and 
authorities within the wider therapy field in Aotearoa New Zealand. 
Collectivity and group identity 
As detailed in chapter 2, the therapists interviewed for this study all shared a general 
interest in postmodern approaches to therapy. Despite the differences in their 
professional roles and training paths, they had all at some point encountered critiques 
of traditional therapy practices and developed interest in postmodern models, which 
in turn had influenced their political and ethical orientations. In their talk, they 
frequently made references that connected them to a wider social movement and 
illustrated a sense of collectivity, even when this was physically absent from their 
immediate work settings. For instance, across many interviews, therapists referred to 
or invoked therapy theorists and teachers, highlighting both the influence these 
mentors had had on the therapists’ practice and the communal nature of their project. 
The participants mentioned (often with first name familiarity) Michael White, David 
Epston, David Denborough, Johnella Bird, Taimalieutu Kiwi Tamasese, Ken and 
Mary Gergen, among others.11 For example, Harry – a nurse/counsellor working for a 
                                                
11 The late Michael White is often credited as the founder of narrative therapy, and was co-founder of 
The Dulwich Centre in Adelaide, Australia, an independent centre involved in narrative therapy, 
community work, training, publishing, supporting practitioners in different parts of the world and co-
hosting international conferences. 
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DHB mental health service – explained that “Johnella’s been very influential for me 
in terms of trying to move beyond binary thinking”. The theoretical ideas that 
Johnella Bird articulates in her books and teaching influenced Harry’s orientation to 
his work as a therapist; she remained a figure in his consciousness, her ideas brought 
to life as he remembered them. Some therapists had had close contact with 
Australasian theorist-practitioners – such as White, Epston, Bird and Tamasese – and 
indicated that at times they had experienced a mentoring-type relationship: Cal (a 
scoial worker/counsellor) and Danny (a psychiatrist) both recounted instances where 
they had contacted David Epston for advice about their therapy practices within work 
settings where narrative therapy was not the norm. Psychically and physically, these 
therapists remained connected and united with the postmodern therapy movement. 
They also sought out spaces for connection and relationships with other similarly 
oriented therapists, forging and maintaining collectivity and group identity. Group 
identity could be asserted by attending training workshops and conferences where 
presenters discussed critical perspectives on therapy and taught postmodern-inspired 
practices: for instance, when Harriet – a psychologist – attended training courses on 
social constructionist ideas at an international critical psychology conference, she felt 
like she was “coming home”. The talk of many of these therapists also frequently 
referred to more intimate collegial and peer relationships, again illustrating how 
postmodern therapy has taken shape as a movement within the wider therapy field in 
Aotearoa New Zealand. Some therapists were able to find conversation and 
collegiality with other postmodern therapy practitioners in their workplaces. For 
instance, Jac described the orientation of her counselling centre workplace, explaining 
                                                                                                                                      
David Denborough is a teacher, writer and community practitioner at the Dulwich Centre. 
David Epston co-authored several early narrative therapy texts with Michael White, and is a co-director 
of The Family Therapy Centre in Auckland, Aotearoa New Zealand. 
Johnella Bird is a co-director of The Family Therapy Centre, Auckland, and the author of several 
books. She and David Epston developed a comprehensive teaching programme and super-vision 
practice at The Family Therapy Centre. 
Taimalieutu Kiwi Tamasese is the coordinator of the Pacific Section of the Family Centre, Wellington, 
Aotearoa New Zealand. She is one of the founders of “Just Therapy”, and is a writer and presenter.  
Ken Gergen is an American professor of psychology and a major figure in the development of social 
constructionist theory and its applications to practices of social change. He has published extensively 
on this subject throughout his career. 
Mary Gergen is an American professor of psychology. Her academic work originates at the intersection 
of social psychology, feminist theory and social constructionist ideas. She has published extensively 
and has co-authored books with Ken Gergen. 
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that she felt “very fortunate to work in an environment where our team leader is a 
feminist woman who is also very informed by Johnella Bird’s work and post-
structuralist ideas, and that’s pretty much the way that our team works”. For other 
therapists, collegial relationships and participation in the postmodern therapy 
community had to be sought outside of their work setting. Several therapists 
mentioned their involvement in narrative therapy interest groups, which met regularly 
to share ideas and provide collegial support. Others established peer supervision 
groups, which enabled Sam – a clinical psychologist – and interested colleagues to 
discuss the ideas and concepts put forward by theorists in books “using language that 
we’re comfortable with”. Ruth, also a clinical psychologist, maintained a peer 
supervision and support group with colleagues she had trained with ten years earlier, 
which meant she could participate in conversation with people with the same training 
background about “how we’re coping in our different systems that we’re working in 
and dealing with power relations and being effective as an individual practitioner 
still”. The talk that took place during my interviews with individual therapists was 
“peopled” with others who shared their orientations and offered support and 
inspiration. References to teachers, mentors and peer groups gave the impression of 
participants’ involvement in a communal project. 
Common objectives and purposes 
The remainder of this chapter details some of the key ideas and objectives generally 
shared by the research participants. It illustrates their mobilisation of some of the 
theoretical ideas and concepts discussed in the previous chapter – ideas and concepts 
that they have learned from influential teachers and mentors and that are discussed 
and developed in their communal gatherings. While my discussion is condensed and 
does not capture the fullness of these individual practitioners’ ideas about therapy, my 
intention is to highlight their connections to indicate the flavour of the postmodern 
therapy movement in Aotearoa New Zealand. 
Reservations about biological/physiological conceptions of mental health 
In keeping with postmodern approaches to psychological knowledge and 
assumptions, the therapists in this study all expressed uneasiness with – and often 
outright opposition to – genetic and biological explanations for individuals’ mental 
health concerns; similarly, they felt discomfort with the assignation of psychiatric 
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diagnoses. For instance, as a clinical psychologist, Pat explained that he comes across 
“lots of people who have been diagnosed with this supposedly genetic disorder – and 
I say supposedly because I think a lot of the research that makes assumptions about 
the genetic basis of mental illness is really flawed research”. Having explained this 
scepticism, Pat went on to describe his view of the effects and implications of 
diagnosing “lots of people” with genetic disorders: 
So these assumptions about the genetic cause of mental illness I think become so 
strong that once people have got those diagnoses it follows through to: “well it’s 
enormous, so we really want you to use medication”. That’s the thing they can 
hope for, is to manage the illness. There’s no sense that they could ever be 
someone who wouldn’t have that illness, and so a whole lot of possibilities are 
not considered. 
Pat viewed genetic explanations for mental illness as growing the problems 
experienced by people seen by therapists, making them seem monolithic, static, and 
inherent to the individual’s person and body. He echoed Dwight Fee’s claims in the 
previous chapter, linking the bio-medical conception of psychology to the 
management of “illness”, often through the use of pharmaceuticals.  
Frances expanded the critique of biological and pathological conceptions of people’s 
problems by saying,  
if you’re working in mental health, you know, on a disease model then you are 
definitely adjusting people so that they fit into society [that is] unchanged 
[laughs], with all its injustices and lack of valuing of people. That’s never suited 
me.  
From Frances’s critical perspective, a disease model in therapy work narrows the 
therapist’s focus to the individual, returning them to the unexamined and 
“unchanged” social and political contexts that may be the source of their distress. She 
directly implicated therapists operating from this model with the perpetuation of 
social injustice. Frances and Pat’s statements are indicative of the general orientation 
of therapists involved in this study: postmodern critiques of psychological science, 
and therapy’s involvement in perpetuating the status quo, informed their observations 
of the therapy field in Aotearoa New Zealand and their own conceptualisations of 
client/patient issues.  
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Depathologising: externalising problems 
These therapy practitioners proposed and actively pursued an alternative to the 
genetic disease model, taking up postmodern therapy practices aimed at 
depathologising people and their problems. In particular, more than half the therapists 
made specific reference to the narrative therapy practice of externalising (discussed in 
the previous chapter). For Harriet, who encountered narrative therapy in the late 
1980s, there was “relief, with the narrative approach, to be able to externalise rather 
than pathologise”. By externalising people’s problems and difficulties, therapists 
sought to counter and undermine therapy practices that viewed problems as 
“belonging” to individuals and indicative of some sort of pathology. Another 
participant, Kerry, experimented with externalising practices when she and a 
colleague both worked at an alcohol and drug centre in the mid-1980s:  
We were employed to be family therapists and we were interested in developing 
ways of working with people who are struggling with alcohol and drug issues, so 
stepping outside the dominant stories around disease or weakness, or genetics, 
genetic weakness, and looking at externalising the relationship between people 
and alcohol. 
Referring also to alcohol, Sam explained how externalising the relationship between a 
person and a problem involves “creating an alliance with the client against whatever 
they were up against … [and] separating the person from the addiction”. These 
therapists used the practice of externalising as a means to avoid pathologising their 
clients/patients. Harry explained his aim in using externalisations in his conversations 
with clients/patients: to “give folk a little breathing space from the blame, the guilt or 
the shame that they might have internalised around struggling with an issue”. 
Postmodern therapy practitioners used the strategy of externalising to mitigate any 
suggestions that individuals were at fault and to blame for the problems they 
experienced. 
Contextualising problems 
In their project of refusing and actively challenging pathological accounts of 
clients/patients, the therapists in this study were understandably interested in the 
influence of the “outside world” on these people. They objected to therapy practices 
that individualised or depoliticised the concerns of clients/patients. For instance, when 
Jac and I discussed her entry into counselling work, she explained how: 
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I think from the beginning I was very clear that most models of therapy wouldn’t 
suit me at all. Like I wasn’t in the least bit interested in psychodynamic therapy, 
and this idea that, um, well in brief, that the problem is located within the person. 
I think through all of my work [before becoming a counsellor], I think what I 
knew but probably couldn’t articulate was that people’s experiences were located 
within context. 
The idea of focusing deeply on the unconscious content of an individual’s psyche, 
without attention to their context, did not fit with Jac’s view of selfhood as being 
contextual and relational. Like Jac, the other therapists in this study operated from the 
assumption that people’s experiences were located within social and political 
contexts, rather than within individual bodies or minds. Therapists saw the “outside 
world” as being integrally involved both in people’s experiences of psychological 
problems and in the therapy that was aimed at alleviating or finding alternatives to 
problems. 
Depathologising therapy and deconstructing problems 
Implicit in Frances’ earlier comment that adjusting people to fit into an unchanged 
society had never suited her was the suggestion that she had different goals for her 
therapy work. Likewise, therapists’ use of externalising suggested a specific goal of 
doing therapy in a non-detached manner that engaged with political and social 
realities. Therapists described their practice as being informed by an awareness of 
cultural forces that encourage pathologising, self-blaming accounts of individual 
distress, and of therapy’s potential to reproduce such accounts. Pat detailed his sense 
of the impact of pathologising, self-blaming explanations on clients. He also 
described how he responded to and worked with the social and political contexts of 
people’s lives during therapy, attempting to unground dominant explanations for their 
difficulties: 
Most people, in my experience, come to therapy thinking they’ve got problems 
because they’re bad, somehow or other they’re bad, they’re bad people, very bad. 
Bad because they’re genetically flawed. Or more likely they’re bad because 
they’re lazy or stupid or selfish or whatever. And often those understandings of 
themselves, those beliefs about themselves, have been learnt in their 
communities, families, society as a whole in general. And it’s very convenient for 
families and societies that they can blame themselves because then it’s just an 
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individual problem. And so, often in working with people to help them have a 
more okay relationship with themselves, it involves challenging, questioning how 
they got the ideas that they’ve got. 
Pat depicted himself as not taking the ideas and explanations proffered by clients – or 
families, society, science – for granted. By inquiring about how ideas come to be 
held, within the context of people’s communities, families and societies, he sought to 
complicate simple ideas of “wrongness”, “badness” and individual responsibility. The 
therapists in this study, representing the postmodern therapy movement, shared an 
orientation of “practical deconstruction”, with which they attempted to attend to 
politics and power within therapeutic conversations (Bird, 2000, p. 70). By paying 
attention to where the ideas held by clients/patients came from and how they had 
developed, therapists pursued their aims of politicising and depathologising therapy.  
Recognising the problem of power 
Alongside the objective of using therapy to depathologise and politicise 
clients’/patients’ difficulties, postmodern therapy practitioners also perceived the 
traditional power relations of therapy as problematic. They were troubled by – to use 
Cal’s description – the “therapist knows best” traditions and assumptions of therapy, 
and by the powerfulness of the therapist role. Sam’s recollections of his early 
experiences as a clinical psychologist, for instance, illustrated feelings of discomfort 
and unease at the power accrued in his professional role: 
I can still remember the first day I was given the WAIS, which is the Wechsler 
Adult Intelligence Scale, you know, this little suitcase box thing, and I felt so big 
and so strong and powerful that I could do this testing on people. And [for my 
research at the time] I finished up giving hundreds of these things, and realised 
that I actually hated it – sitting administering a psychological test, and getting a 
figure that represented something that I knew about them that they didn’t know, 
and that I could use to influence or make some decision about them, supposedly 
for their good, but it was still an experience of power. And I reflected a lot on 
whether it was actually helpful for them. I realised how alienating it was, how 
alienating a practice it was between me and the client. And, so all of those things 
got me realising how much I didn’t like some of the practices that psychologists 
were meant to be engaged in. 
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Sam went on to explain how, when he looked back on many of the interventions that 
he was trained to do, “they were really coming from positions of me knowing best … 
[and] I guess I became increasingly uncomfortable”. Having command of an 
instrument that tested and measured people’s intelligence, by means unknown to the 
subjects and for the purpose of professional decision-making about their ongoing 
care, suggests a therapy dynamic where the therapist wields significant power over 
clients/patients. This dynamic troubled Sam and, from his observation, alienated his 
clients. He explained that these sorts of experiences in his early career as a clinical 
psychologist “got me wondering about what other ways I could be involved in doing 
therapy that I guess honoured the expertise of the person I was talking with”.  
Other practitioners in this study shared Sam’s self-consciousness and discomfort 
about the powerfulness of the therapist role. They all acknowledged, in varied ways, 
that the power differential between therapist and client/patient was unavoidable. 
Kerry, for instance, declared, “it is a power relationship, of course it’s a power 
relationship”. She explained how,  
for a long time I liked to think that it wasn’t, or that it was a totally equal power 
relationship, but then I had to get a bit more honest with myself and acknowledge 
that actually there is this power relationship there. 
Speaking to Frances, I was posing a question about “the potential for a power 
differential between you and the person who’s sitting with you”, when she interrupted 
me to say “Oh more than potential. It’s a fact. And I do quite a lot of things to 
minimise that, but I never forget that it’s there, because if I forget then I’m likely to 
misuse it”. Both Kerry and Frances represented themselves as practitioners who 
acknowledged and maintained awareness of the power they inevitably experienced or 
were bestowed with in therapy work with people. They regarded this as vital to their 
work.  
Recognition of the powerfulness of the therapy professional was also apparent in 
Alex’s description of his role, as an educational psychologist, in relation to the young 
people who he was called on to work with. He explained that he tried 
to keep in mind “I’m part of the problem”. As soon as I’m linked to this, every 
time I walk into the school, every time the young person has to meet with a 
psychologist, they are defined in a certain way. … And, you know, my ideal 
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practice, one of the beliefs that I guess I hold is, “how do we try to actively work 
against what is the cultural norm?”, which is, you know, school invites a 
psychologist to confirm their knowing, which is this child is bad, mad, or sad. 
In recognising and remembering that “I’m part of the problem”, Alex illustrated in 
more detail the power wielded by therapists. From his critical perspective, simply by 
virtue of his professional role as a psychologist, he was already implicated in defining 
children in pathologising, essentialist ways. In turn, he suggested that institutions – in 
this case, schools – may engage therapy practitioners to regulate cultural norms, as 
arbiters of abnormality and supposed enforcers of normality. Alex expressed his 
ambition to work actively against this power dynamic. Kerry, Frances and Alex 
presented awareness and recognition of the operations of power in therapy work as 
vital elements of their therapy practice. They were, in Frances’ words, intent on doing 
things to minimise that power. 
Negotiating power in practice 
Reflexivity 
As discussed in the previous chapter, the concept of “reflexivity” has been 
foregrounded by many theorists who propose new, postmodern and politically 
motivated therapy practices. Reflexivity calls on practitioners to self-consciously 
address and acknowledge the power they are bestowed with and wield. It requires 
them to continually question and reflect on their own views and values and the 
positions from which they form their perspectives. The above discussion in itself 
indicates how therapists in this study utilised reflexivity, remembering and reflecting 
on the power relationships of therapy. The principle of reflexivity could also be seen 
in their descriptions of the thinking and reflection that they engaged in as they worked 
therapeutically with clients/patients. Several therapists reinforced the importance of 
reflecting on and questioning their own beliefs and values, and the ways in which they 
themselves engaged with dominant cultural discourses. During our conversation, Alex 
told me about his work with a child whose mother had gang involvement. This 
information had been conveyed to him before he had actually met the mother: “Before 
I even got to that case I could feel my own stereotypes about gangs being there. So 
how do I question my own stereotypes?” Alertness to the influence of stereotypes and 
assumptions about gangs motivated Alex to find ways to question these stereotypes 
and assumptions. He described how he deliberately met with people who could 
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inform him more about gangs and therefore help to dispel the preconceptions that he 
had noticed within himself. 
Harry described how reflecting on “P!keh!, male, middle class privilege” was 
an ongoing thing really, isn’t it? I would like to think that I’m continually sort of 
looking at how I come across, and how I operate, and how I act in terms of 
whether I kind of collude and go along with that privilege, or whether I do 
something about it, or whether there are other positions, you know?  
He represented himself as striving to maintain continual awareness about the positions 
of power and privilege that he occupied, not just by virtue of his therapist role, but 
also as a result of class, race and gender. Alex and Harry’s examples suggested a 
continual practice of self-reflection and observation of their thoughts, feelings and 
actions in their therapy work. Pat echoed their examples, and the intentions behind 
them, when he talked about his strong awareness of “the ease with which the mental 
health profession turns a blind eye to the way they are involved in reproducing the 
status quo, and I don’t ever want to forget that”. The practitioners in this study, as 
these examples illustrate, saw themselves as deliberately, concertedly and reflexively  
working against the idea of themselves as agents within a therapeutic hegemony 
merely reproducing the status quo. 
Honouring clients’/patients’ expertise 
Therapists indicated that there were other practices that supported them to attend to 
and attempt to reconfigure the inevitable power relations of therapy. In my earlier 
discussion I described how Sam’s realisation about the power he displayed and 
exercised as a clinical psychologist led him to become curious about ways of doing 
therapy work that “honoured the expertise of the person I was talking with”. 
Throughout my interviews with therapy practitioners, they often referred to the 
expertise and knowledge of the people they worked with. They positioned themselves 
as researchers and inquirers, but not experts in regard to their clients’/patients’ 
difficulties, or as the providers of “answers” to these difficulties. Jac explained that, 
therapy wants to, and tends to, move towards the expertise of the therapist, having 
an idea and knowing, you know, what shape the person’s life should be taking. 
Whereas I don’t have an idea what shape the person’s life should be taking. 
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From this postmodern therapy perspective, the shape of people’s lives is something to 
be directed by individuals themselves, and not defined or directed by a therapist with 
expert knowledge. The non-expert stance adopted by many of the practitioners 
interviewed for this research involved asking questions, as Cal explained, for which “I 
genuinely don’t know the answer”. Curiosity, interest and investigation apparently 
coloured their therapy exchanges. 
Practitioners described various methods by which they sought to prioritise 
clients’/patients’ knowledge and expertise in therapy work, and thereby to undermine 
the assumption that the therapist possesses superior expertise. For many, the way that 
they used language and terminology in regard to people’s problems was particularly 
significant. Using, as Harry put it, “the client’s name for their trouble” – rather than a 
psychiatric description – and “honouring a client’s description of their situation” was 
a strategy for asserting the importance of clients’/patients’ knowledge and expertise in 
therapy. Harry gave the example of using the client-generated term “eating hassles”, 
instead of the clinical terminology of “eating disorders”. Cal talked about a situation 
where he had worked with a family where the child was struggling with what is 
clinically described as “encopresis”. His strategy for resisting the imposition of a 
clinical description – taking his lead from the narrative therapist David Epston – was 
to inquire about “preferred” and “experience-near descriptions”:  
I generally do what I was inspired and encouraged to do by David Epston. And he 
said “well, what I do is I kind of say to them, well, in this conversation that I’m 
having with you which description would you prefer?” Or look for an experience-
near description. And they might say “the shitty thing”. And I’d imagine I’d say 
to a child and their parent: “what are we going to call it? We could call it 
encopresis or we could call it the shitty thing, because encopresis comes out of 
the book and shitty thing comes out of what we’ve been saying”. 
The theory behind these linguistic strategies is focused on evading the imposition of 
clinical, psychiatric labels – labels that “come out of the book” – and instead using 
clients’/patients’ preferred descriptions. Cal portrayed himself as validating and 
utilising his clients’ descriptions, arising from their own experiences, and giving them 
choice over the nature of their conversation. Client expertise and input is sought, 
while some of the apparatuses of therapeutic authority are disabled. 
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Transparency 
In their efforts to negotiate and limit the traditional workings of power in therapy 
relationships, postmodern therapy practitioners emphasised transparency as a goal in 
their therapy work. Previous examples already suggest the operation of degrees of 
transparency in therapy sessions: Cal’s description of himself asking what to name the 
problem indicated a desire to collaborate with clients/patients and be up-front about 
the terms for the conversation. Benjamin spoke about his preference for transparency 
in his therapy work: 
The kinds of therapy that I guess I prefer would be therapy that is transparent, so 
clients know what you’re doing, and can see where you’re coming from and can 
pick up those therapy tools and techniques and stuff and just use them 
themselves. I see that as a lot more empowering. 
Benjamin’s words suggested a strong interest in therapy being “empowering” for 
clients/patients. Empowerment was linked to clients/patients knowing and 
understanding what was happening and the motives behind a therapist’s questions or 
suggestions, and being able to take up skills learned in therapy. Benjamin was intent 
on demystifying therapy and subverting the image of the silent, appraising therapist – 
like Lillian Thurman – who subjects clients to procedures or experiences “for their 
own good” but without their knowing or explicit consent. 
For many, the ideal of transparency also extended into the realm of therapeutic 
writing and file-keeping. Practitioners spoke of the importance of having 
clients/patients know about and participate in what was written about them in therapy. 
Some described sharing their written notes with clients/patients and disclosing and 
discussing other documents linked to the “case”. Alex explained that, if he “had a 
magic wand”, 
I would not document anything without agreement. Well, I get agreement, I mean 
I get consent for documenting what I do, but what I would really love to be able 
to do is say “I’m only going to write things on this file with you either present or 
that you participate in. There will be nothing on those files that has not been 
written with you and that you have not been party to”. 
Alex seemed influenced here by Michael White’s critique of therapy case-notes as “a 
modern instrument of power” (1995, p. 46). He suggested that transparency in regard 
to documentation and the participation of clients in the creation of documents would 
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be his ideal way of working. This ideal undermines professional secrecy and 
discretion and aims to include clients in more of the processes of therapy. Again, it 
opposes the Lillian Thurman image. 
Minimising displays of power 
As the above discussion indicates, acknowledging and trying to lessen the effects of 
professional power was a deep concern of the postmodern therapy practitioners in this 
study; equality was an impossible goal, but they consciously sought to work with and 
where possible reduce the effects of their power. While the examples discussed so far 
detail some deliberate strategies used by therapists, throughout my conversations 
several therapists spoke of their own, more personal efforts to subvert or avoid 
displays of power and authority in their work with clients. For instance, Frances 
described how, 
from the beginning, when I go out to greet someone, I do things like not show up 
with the file and a clipboard [both laugh], and make sure that I am light when I 
meet people, warm, and that I use some self deprecating humour to defuse that 
[client’s experience of her power]. 
Frances consciously performed and conducted herself in particular ways to try to 
soften the inevitable power differential between therapist and client/patient. Her 
description depicted her as deliberately eschewing some of the signs and instruments 
of a traditional therapy professional role – such as the file and clipboard – and 
rejecting the demeanour of a clinical, formal, reserved practitioner. 
Sam described similar personal strategies for addressing power relations within his 
therapy work with clients/patients. He explained how his therapy practices have 
developed over his career as a clinical psychologist, and pointed out that, now,  
one of the things that I make a very clear point of doing is introducing myself and 
something about me first of all. And I ask, I inform them that I’m open to them 
asking me any questions that they’d like to about me, or about how this works or 
why I’m doing it, and I put that out there before we even talk. And my reason for 
that is that if someone’s going to be very open about what’s going on for them, 
one, I want to model that, and show that I can talk about me. But much more it’s 
an attempt to equalise the situation just a tiny bit. The purpose isn’t for me to talk 
about me but in the past I would be almost invisible, I would be just a 
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psychologist and anything about me would be inappropriate, and I think I’ve 
shifted a long way from that now. 
Over his time working as a therapist, Sam had deliberately moved himself from being 
invisible and out of bounds as a subject of inquiry, to being more personally visible in 
his work with clients/patients and available – to an extent – as a subjective person 
with particular life experiences and opinions. His increased visibility was motivated 
by a desire to “equalise the situation just a tiny bit”, to disrupt the one-way model of 
client/patient disclosure and exposure while the listening, appraising therapist’s 
personal world is sealed and barred. Both Frances and Sam’s awareness of the power 
relations inherent to therapy prompted them to formulate practices within their 
therapy work in an effort to lessen – even “just a tiny bit” – the display and extent of 
their power. 
Conclusion 
The purpose of this chapter has been to articulate practical ways in which therapists 
sought to incorporate an understanding of the critques outlined in the previous chapter 
into their work. In looking at these practices as part of a social movement within the 
therapy field in Aotearoa New Zealand, I have introduced the participants in this 
study and described their membership in this movement. In particular, I have 
canvassed some of the key objectives, assumptions and methods that characterise this 
postmodern therapy movement. The chapter presents the aspirations and ideals of 
these therapists but, importantly, does not consider their application in practice: this 
research does not appraise how fully and consistently these approaches were actioned, 
and in combination with what other factors, or the experiences of clients/patients who 
encountered these therapists. The inquiry is restricted to how the therapists present 
and talk about themselves and their therapy practices. 
This chapter both illuminates and grounds the practical implications of the critiques 
described in the preceding chapter; it also forms the backdrop for the remaining 
chapters of the thesis. The next part (chapters 5 and 6) describes the dominant 
discourses and socio-political forces that shape the therapy field in Aotearoa New 
Zealand. This account draws on published research, interwoven with analysis of the 
descriptions given, and observations made, by my study participants as they reflected 
on their experiences of working in that field. 
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PART 3 
5. Neoliberalised Therapy 
Galileo said that the natural world is written in the language of mathematics. The 
neo-liberal ideologues want us to believe that the economic and social world is 
structured by equations. 
Pierre Bourdieu, Acts of Resistance 
Introduction 
This chapter examines the field of therapy in Aotearoa New Zealand through an 
historical and political lens, and then employs this analysis to consider how the 
practitioners gathered in this study were positioned within the field. In particular, I am 
concerned with the interactions between the specific field of therapy and the wider 
forces and forms of state governance that were operationalised in the late 1980s and 
early 1990s, and that have had an enduring impact throughout the 1990s and 2000s on 
all aspects of Aotearoa New Zealand society. The talk of the therapy practitioners 
gathered in this study, and especially those who had had long careers as therapists, 
emphasised upheaval and transformation within the field of therapy as neoliberal 
discourse gained legitimacy and steadily widened its reach. The rise of neoliberalism, 
and the implementation of its attendant practices in Aotearoa New Zealand over the 
late 1980s and the 1990s, profoundly transformed the workplaces and activities of 
therapists, particularly those working directly within the public sector. For therapists 
working within the more recent period of the 2000s, neoliberal discourse is now 
embedded within therapy institutions and informs much of the “commonsense” logic 
of the operations of these institutions. This transformation was a source of conflict 
and tension for many of the participants in this study, revealing the field of therapy to 
be a site of continuous struggle over competing discourses and species of capital. The 
previous chapter introduced these therapists as members of a particular social 
movement within the wider therapy field, aimed at mobilising postmodern and 
politically engaged approaches to therapy work. Yet in practice this aim proved 
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difficult, as this chapter demonstrates. In their work situations they found the terrain 
of therapy within Aotearoa New Zealand conflicted and often, from their positions as 
postmodern therapy practitioners, contradictory and obstructive. For many, 
negotiating the forces at play within the therapy field involved discomfort, tension, 
frustration, and alienation. 
The rise of neoliberalism in Aotearoa New Zealand: a brief history 
Throughout my conversations with therapists, particularly those who were working in 
the 1990s, frequent mention was made of changes and shifts in the public systems and 
institutions involved in the provision of therapy. These changes and shifts seemed to 
be particularly concerned with funding and the activities of services in relation to 
finances. An example of such talk took place in my interview with Kerry, a social 
worker/counsellor who had had a long career working both within the public sector 
and in private practice. During our conversation, Kerry explained to me that, by the 
early 1990s, the options and possibilities for obtaining public funding to develop 
independent services no longer existed. In the early 1990s, Kerry, with a group of 
counselling colleagues, had been interested in establishing a narrative therapy centre 
for women: 
It was still in the days when public funding was more possible, and we wanted to 
have it as a free service for the people who were coming to us and for us to be 
paid salaries. That’s the sort of thing we wanted to do. Unfortunately it was like 
we were just past the wave – by now we’re going into the early 90s and there’s 
been a whole shift. And we talked to lots of existing agencies about how they got 
their funding and all that, and it became clear that we weren’t going to be able to 
do it, set up another agency at that stage historically and to be able to fund the 
work. 
When I mentioned to Kerry that other people I had interviewed had also referred to 
significant social and political changes that took place between the 1980s and the 
1990s, she explained that “it’s like the whole weight came down and, it was almost 
like that backlash stuff”. Kerry’s talk identified a rupture in the agendas that 
structured public counselling and therapy services between the 1980s and the early 
1990s; she described a shift from an era where “public funding was more possible” 
and people could potentially receive state support to establish independent and special 
focus agencies – such as a narrative therapy centre for women – to an era where such 
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funding was restricted. According to Kerry, within the space of only a few years the 
potential shapes and forms of publicly funded therapy services had been curtailed, 
ushering in an era that she likened to a “backlash”. 
The “whole weight” that came down in Aotearoa New Zealand during the late 1980s 
and the 1990s has been the subject of much critical and historical analysis and 
discussion (Barry, 1996; Janiewski & Morris, 2005; Kelsey, 1997; Larner & Craig, 
2005; Larner, Le Heron & Lewis, 2007). The shift that Kerry refers to in respect to 
the funding of therapy and health services was the product of radical economic and 
social reforms that were introduced by the fourth Labour government (1984-1990) 
and pursued by the successive National government (1990-1999). Described as the 
“New Zealand experiment”, the Labour government introduced and applied a model 
of “pure neo-liberal economic theory” that was “continued with equal, if not greater, 
fervour by a National [Party] government thereafter” (Kelsey, 1997, p. 1). The 
reforms of the late 1980s and the 1990s profoundly transformed the economy, 
government activities and operations, state services and institutions, and the social, 
economic and working lives of many New Zealanders. With these reforms, neoliberal 
discourse received official sanction and, through the machinery of state apparatuses, 
was able to be established as a hegemonic discourse.  
In brief, the ethos of the Labour government’s reforms in the latter half of the 1980s 
centred on the belief that Aotearoa New Zealand needed to be opened up to the global 
market-place and that the activities and services of the state sector needed to be 
organised and managed along the lines of corporate business. The overriding 
assumption held by policy-makers in this period, according to Robin Gauld (2001), 
was “that markets are the ‘natural’ place in which services – public or private – 
should be delivered. Driving this was a belief that markets, and the competition and 
incentives they facilitate, are intrinsically efficient and innovative” (p. 43). Market 
creation in the public sector, under this ideology, involves the “corporatising, 
privatising or contracting out of services” (Gauld, 2001, p. 44). In the late 1980s, the 
Labour government began restructuring many state services along these lines, 
commercialising services, instituting business models of operation and 
“entrepreneurial discipline” (Kelsey, 1997, p. 4), and, where possible, selling off 
assets and operations to outside investors. The introduction of market rationality and 
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managerialism12 to the state sector, coupled with both the project of “rolling back” the 
state and the policy of fiscal restraint, foreshadowed inevitable changes to state 
funded social services, and, in turn, to the working environments of many therapy 
practitioners within public systems.  
While the Labour government initiated the neoliberal-inspired economic and social 
reforms, it was not until the election of the National government in 1990 that the 
implications of these reforms for state funded social services took shape. Upon 
election, faced with a fiscal crisis, “the new government announced that substantial 
cuts in public spending would be required, particularly in social services” (Gauld, 
2001, p. 81). This project of fiscal restraint within social services gives context to 
Kerry’s comment about being “past the wave” to receive public funding for a 
narrative therapy centre for women. Financial austerity was the goal of the National 
government, leading to restrictions on funding for social services and the move to 
shut down expensive state operated health and welfare institutions. Jane Kelsey 
describes the effects of the state’s withdrawal from social and welfare services and the 
policy of fiscal restraint in this sector: 
Institutions for the mentally ill, elderly and young closed their doors in the name 
of community care. Women were called upon to perform a traditional role as 
volunteer carers to fill the void left by the state. M!ori were assumed to have 
tribal and family support systems to fall back on. Churches and charities were 
expected to cover the government’s withdrawal from social and income support. 
(1997, p. 5) 
The retreat by the state from social and welfare services, coupled with funding cuts to 
those services that the state continued to provide, profoundly changed the nature of 
Aotearoa New Zealand society. In the early 1990s, options for therapeutic, social and 
welfare support became more and more limited, and increasingly became the domain 
of charities and non-governmental organisations. Over the 1990s, some of these 
charities and non-governmental organisations would formalise their uptake of the 
                                                
12 “Managerialism” refers to workplace technologies that are 
designed to realise the objectives of neo-liberal programmes of government. As a distinctive set of 
technologies and practices, managerialism can be seen as a product of the intersection of neo-liberal 
political rationalities and business management prescriptions for organisational change to meet the 
competitive challenge of a global economy. (MacKinnon, 2000, p. 298) 
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duties and services of the state through the government’s “contracting out” model for 
service provision.13 
The funding cuts and the state’s retraction from social and welfare service delivery 
were compounded by and conjoined with the National government’s proposed health 
reforms, which were announced in 1991. Many therapy practitioners in the public 
sector worked for services that came under the mantle of health – such as mental 
health services, community counselling services, child and family services, and 
alcohol and drug treatment. National’s health reforms “brought to the New Zealand 
health sector more radical change and greater exposure to principles of marketisation 
and managerialism than any other state-funded health system in the world” (Gauld, 
2001, p. 4). The health sector underwent enormous restructuring, which involved the 
institution of various charges for services, the contracting out of services, and 
hospitals being reorganised along business lines, with management positions assigned 
to people with business, rather than health, knowledge and experience. The National 
government’s overarching policy of financial austerity and efficiency fed into all of 
these structural reforms of the health system (Fougere, 2001; Gauld, 2001; Kelsey, 
1997).14 As a consequence of the reforms, professionals working within public health 
services, including numerous therapy practitioners involved in this study, experienced 
processes of restructuring and reorganisation of their services – all with financial 
austerity and efficiency as their key drivers – along with new managerialist modes of 
operation, accountability and organisation. 
                                                
13 The expansion of the “contracting out” model, and the principle of privatisation over the 1990s, 
resulted in the emergence of a wide range of private providers. Barnett and Barnett (2005) note that 
“[t]his has been notable in community support and mental health services and in the development of 
M!ori and Pacific providers” (191). While the impetus for this model of service provision – contracting 
out services to specific groups, including both the not-for-profit and for-profit sectors – was 
undoubtedly about the neoliberalisation of state services, the model also enabled the development and 
legitimacy, for instance, of kaupapa M!ori social services designed and delivered by iwi groups, as 
well as other services developed and led by consumer groups. These sorts of services, born from their 
specific communities and led by community leaders and practitioners, represent considerable 
development in the field of social services in Aotearoa New Zealand and are an important, if 
unintended, by-product of the economic reforms. 
14 Despite the omnipresent discourses of “efficiency” and austerity, the restructuring of the health 
sector and the National government’s attempts to transform health services into competitive businesses 
were enormously costly. Kelsey (1997, p. 378) explains that by 1996 the government had spent $1.3 
billion propping up indebted CHEs (Crown Health Enterprises). Barnett and Barnett (2005) also detail 
the financial consequences of the health reforms: 
Instead of substantial savings as anticipated from the introduction of competitive and commercial 
incentives, overall public expenditure on hospital services increased and the efficiency gains 
(measured largely by indicators unrelated to patient benefit) were less than expected. (p. 184) 
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In 1999, a “centre-left” Labour government was elected, promising a new reform 
agenda and an end to the neoliberal pursuits of the previous decade. In 2002, the 
Prime Minister, Helen Clark, boldly declared that “neoliberalism is over” (Larner, Le 
Heron & Lewis, 2007, p. 224). However, Larner and Craig (2005) refer to the fifth 
Labour government’s reign as the “third phase” of neoliberalism in Aotearoa New 
Zealand. They describe this phase as “characterised by a ‘partnering’ ethos … in 
which discourses of ‘social inclusion’ and ‘social investment’ sit awkwardly 
alongside more obviously neoliberal elements such as economic globalisation, market 
activation and contractualism” (p. 407). Despite Clark’s proclamation and the 
development of potent social discourses by this government – suggesting a retraction 
from neoliberalism – neoliberal discourse simultaneously endured and continued. The 
radical changes undertaken and institutionalised over the previous decade had taken 
firm hold in collective discourse. Barnett and Barnett (2005) observe that, despite the 
new wave of reform under the Labour government from 1999 to 2008, “certain 
elements of the 1993 reforms and their legacy remain” (p. 192). These elements 
include the “presence of ongoing public hospital deficits, resulting in the need for 
high levels of service rationing” (p. 192). Fiscal restraint, and the accompanying 
policies of efficiency and limited services, appear to be par for the course for the 
health sector. The policies of the Labour government throughout much of the 2000s 
“continue[d] to draw on highly economistic language” (p. 229). Managerialist 
practices and objectives could be seen in the “continued emphasis on contractualism 
and a narrow, market-contested output accountability regime” (Larner & Craig, 2005, 
p. 420), for both state services and those services that are contracted by the state. 
Labour continued to expect public services to operate in the manner of businesses and 
to require “entrepreneurial discipline” (Kelsey, 1997, p. 4) from workers within these 
services. 
This potted history of the “New Zealand experiment” and the rise of neoliberalism 
within Aotearoa New Zealand canvasses the policies of governments throughout the 
late 1980s, the 1990s, and the 2000s, particularly in respect to the provision of social 
services. I now turn my focus more specifically to what the neoliberal reforms of this 
period have meant for therapy practitioners and the institutional settings of their work, 
and examine more closely the relationship between discourses of neoliberalism and 
the field of therapy. Therapy practitioners who were working during the era of radical 
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neoliberal reform – from the late 1980s and throughout the 1990s – had to contend 
with a changing, “reformed” institutional environment that, for many, as the 
discussion in the next section will illuminate, was at odds with their own goals and 
aspirations as therapists. By the 2000s, many of the tenets and policies of the 
reformers had been institutionalised and had become the “commonsense” logic of the 
state sector and of publicly provided therapy services: neoliberalism had been 
established as a hegemonic discourse. Using the descriptions and stories of the study 
participants, I critically analyse the operations and implications of this discourse 
within the therapy field of Aotearoa New Zealand. The terrain of therapy work is 
entwined and necessarily engages with key principles of neoliberal discourse, 
including fiscal restraint and austerity; managerialism; and the authority and 
legitimacy of business knowledge. As the therapists in this study detailed their 
grappling with the pervasive influence of neoliberalism on therapy work, they 
identified shifts in, and conflict between, the forms of capital that govern and delimit 
the field and that wield symbolic power: their own capital was frequently “trumped” 
by “neoliberal capital”. 
The quantification and commodification of therapy time 
As discussed above, the economic and social reforms of the 1990s drew strongly on 
neoliberal discourses of “fiscal restraint” and “efficiency”. Following these 
discourses, the state sought both to withdraw from the provision of social services and 
to impose the logic and methods of the competitive business world onto those services 
that they continued to provide and those with government contracts. The alliance 
between policies of fiscal restraint and the discourse of efficiency, which achieved 
omnipresent status in Aotearoa New Zealand over the late 1980s and the 1990s, 
resulted in a shift in the governance and operations of services provided or funded by 
the state. Danny MacKinnon, discussing similar processes that took place in Britain 
during the 1980s and 1990s, explains this shift: 
The nascent “enclosures” formed by professional expertise within the public 
sector have subsequently been breached by a series of calculative technologies 
embedded in specific practices such as budgetary management, audit and 
targeting (Clarke & Newman, 1997). These technologies depend upon the 
authority and apparent objectivity of disciplines such as accountancy, economics 
!%+!!
and management which have risen to prominence in the 1980s and 1990s (Rose, 
1996a). (2000, p. 298) 
While MacKinnon’s work concerns the arena of local governance in Britain, within 
Aotearoa New Zealand the neoliberal policies of fiscal restraint and efficiency 
similarly involved the introduction of “calculative technologies”, with a focus on 
quantitative measures and standardised services, into the field of therapy. In 
particular, the work and activities of therapy have increasingly been subject to 
processes of calculation and quantification, a development that challenges the 
expertise and authority of therapy professionals. By virtue of their education and 
training, professional memberships and roles, and experience within the “enclosure” 
of therapy, therapy practitioners possess specific forms of “cultural capital” (Everett, 
2002, p. 62). As members of the therapy profession, they also accrue and can call 
upon particular forms of “social capital”: “the powers and resources that stem from 
networks of relationships” (p. 63). These forms of capital, within the shifting field of 
therapy, are forced into competition with other, newer forms of economic and cultural 
capital.  
Among those therapists interviewed for this study who were working throughout the 
1990s, frequent mention was made of the lack of resources within publicly funded 
services – primarily the resource of time. Numerous therapists commented on how, 
during the period of radical economic and social reform, public therapy services 
reduced their scope, focusing primarily on short-term contact with clients/patients, 
referral on to other services, and speedy discharge. During the mid-1990s, Frank 
worked as a counsellor at a public sector alcohol and drug service that had narrowed 
the focus of its work with clients in these ways. He explained how, when he was able 
to do therapy work with clients/patients: 
It couldn’t be more than six sessions. It was interesting because they didn’t make 
any distinction between the nature or the extent of the problems. So someone 
could have absolutely, um, multiple, outrageous drug addiction issues with a 
million other major psychological and social issues and they would get the same 
six sessions as someone who maybe a couple of times drunk a bit too much over 
the weekend and maybe got caught drunk driving and needs to change these 
habits. So there was no distinction and everyone had to be fixed in six sessions. 
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Within this publicly provided alcohol and drug treatment service, the therapy work 
that took place between therapist and client/patient was calculated as requiring six 
sessions. Under this model of service provision, time was a commodity to be rationed 
and both clients/patients and therapists were subject to a standardising logic: six 
sessions should be sufficient for everyone “to be fixed”. 
Frank’s words represent a tension between the then newly introduced managerialist 
rationale within the organisation – limit costs, calculate the cheapest ways to provide 
services, turn the work of the organisation into visible equations – and his 
professional identity and expertise. Frank critiqued the “inefficiencies” of this service, 
pointing out that standardised, time-limited therapy services were not helpful for, nor 
designed to meet the needs of, particular groups of clients/patients. In the telling of 
this anecdote, Frank displayed his professional authority and capital as a therapist: his 
knowledge and experience of the diversity of issues experienced by clients/patients of 
alcohol and drug therapy services; and his knowledge of and ability to appraise and 
classify “drug addiction issues” and other “major social and psychological issues”. 
These forms of cultural capital informed his proposition that a more “realistic” and 
“helpful” model of operations would acknowledge differences between 
clients/patients and the consequent need for varied amounts of therapy time to be 
provided.  
Frank’s comments referred to the 1990s and to the advent of “calculative 
technologies” within the field of therapy. The rationale of limited therapy time – 
where therapy work becomes a numerical measurement – and the under-resourcing of 
public therapy services were mentioned by nearly all of the therapy practitioners who 
had worked in public sector services, and seemed to be a natural condition of work 
within this sector. Within more contemporary public therapy services, conflict and 
tension between managerialist practices of calculation and standardisation, and the 
knowledge, expertise and ideals of therapy practitioners, continued to structure the 
therapy field. Pat was a clinical psychologist who was working for a community 
mental health service when interviewed in 2006. He also spoke of time restrictions on 
his therapy work. He told me how, within his service, he was expected to help 
clients/patients with at times long histories in the mental health system, and with 
complex problems, “overcome depression in 10 weeks”: 
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And it’s like, well, yes, we could work with these people and could use cognitive 
principles and therapeutic principles but it’s not likely to be in 10 weeks. It just 
takes a while. And because there’s so little psychology time and psychotherapy 
time available in the public system, there’s just a limit to how much of that can be 
done. 
Like Frank, Pat critiqued standardised, time-limited therapy by invoking his 
professional knowledge and expertise. He challenged the construction of therapy as 
both commodified time and a uniform, standardised and quantifiable activity. 
Drawing on his knowledge of working with “these people” – people with complex 
problems and long histories within the mental health system – Pat explained that 
therapy “just takes a while”.  
Charlotte, a clinical psychologist, also described and critiqued the workings of fiscal 
restraint and the principle of time-limited therapy that operated within her mental 
health service workplace. She again highlighted tension between these organising 
principles and her own knowledge and experience of therapy work. Charlotte 
described how her workplace managed client/patient “caseloads”: “there’s a huge 
pressure on caseloads and things, it’s ridiculous the amount of caseloads people have 
got. So, yeah, pressure on time is massive, and not being able to establish that 
relationship”. When I asked her where the pressure on time came from, she answered 
that it is a result of “caseloads”: “So, you’ve got more and more cases coming in so 
there’s kind of pressure to wrap cases up and finish them, you know, because you’ve 
got the pressure to pick up more and more and more people”. Fiscal restraint within 
public services, and the goal of quickly discharging service users, stretches the 
capacities of workers. From a neoliberalist view, such stretching encourages greater 
efficiency and a more economical service. However, for Charlotte, as a therapist this 
model of therapy provision was “ridiculous” and meant subjecting workers to huge 
pressures. She identified the establishment of a “relationship” between therapist and 
client/patient as something that was sacrificed under the time-limited regime of her 
workplace. In doing so, she drew on a strong tradition of therapeutic discourse, which 
positions the relationship between therapist and client/patient as essential to the work 
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and benefits of therapy.15 Her concern for the “relationship” within her therapy work 
displayed the cultural capital she accrued through her education and training as a 
therapist and again highlighted friction between the authority of this capital and the 
neoliberal discourses that have infiltrated the field of therapy.  
As Charlotte, Frank and Pat described and commented on the imposition of 
standardised time-frames for therapy work within their services, they drew on, 
displayed, and reproduced a specific body of knowledge and series of statements – a 
discourse (Foucault, 1972) – about therapy: therapy needs to respond to individual 
needs and contexts; therapy can just take a while; therapy requires the establishment 
of a therapeutic relationship; and, implicitly, what therapy is and how it should be 
done is best defined by those with legitimate therapy expertise. These statements 
demonstrated Charlotte, Frank and Pat’s command of a specific form of cultural 
capital, a “therapeutic capital”, that they had obtained through their educational and 
professional credentials, their skills and knowledge of the therapy field, and their 
professional status. However, as the above discussion demonstrates, therapeutic 
capital did not have significant sway or currency to prevent the reorganisation of 
public therapy services and the institution of rationed, standardised and commodified 
therapy time. The following sections further explore the encroaching forces of 
neoliberalism within the therapy field and the changes wrought by these forces to the 
workplaces and practices of therapists. In turn, my discussion examines the struggle 
between different forms of capital for symbolic power within the field. 
A market model of therapy: the ascendancy of “outcomes” and 
“outputs” 
As detailed earlier, the reforms put in place by the Labour and National governments 
in the 1980s and 1990s were designed to bring market rationality and the practices 
and structures of the competitive business world into state operated and funded 
services. In their appraisal and analysis of the rise of the New Right in Aotearoa New 
Zealand in the 1980s and 1990s, Dolores Janiewski and Paul Morris declare that 
“efficiency, personal responsibility and accountability featured as the cardinal values 
of this market faith” (2005, p. 1). In 1989, before the end of their reign, the Labour 
                                                
15 Carl Rogers, for instance, the widely acclaimed “father” of person-centred counselling and an 
important figure in the development of humanistic therapies, believed “that the therapist's primary 
effectiveness is through the therapeutic relationship” (Niolon, 1999). 
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government passed the Public Finance Act as an instrument for restructuring the 
public service along corporate business lines and institutionalising the values of 
efficiency, personal responsibility and accountability. With the passing of this Act, 
neoliberalism, as a form of cultural and economic capital, was legally consecrated. 
This involved conferring upon this “perspective an absolute, universal value, thus 
snatching it from a relativity that is by definition inherent in every point of view, as a 
view taken from a particular point in social space” (Bourdieu, 1989, p. 22). The 
consecration of neoliberalism as an absolute, universal value and its elevation to an 
“official discourse” (Bourdieu, 1989, p. 22) had the effect of transforming how public 
departments or Crown agencies obtained and accounted for public funding, moving 
away from an emphasis on inputs, “or the amount of money a department or Crown 
agency could secure, to identification of and accountability for outputs, or goods and 
services” (Kelsey, 1997, p. 142). Kelsey explains that: 
These outputs would form the basis for the department or agency’s corporate 
plan, and its annual budget. Ministers would buy outputs from the state agency 
for a certain price to achieve the government’s desired outcomes. An outcome 
was defined in the Act as “the impacts on, or the consequences for, the 
community of the outputs or activities of the Government”. (p. 142) 
The language of “outputs” and “outcomes” became integral within the public sector 
and intrinsic to how service providers conceptualised their activities, measured the 
value of these activities, and sought and accounted for state funding. It remains a 
governing doctrine today.  
Throughout the 1990s and 2000s, therapists within public services, as evidenced by 
the participants in this study, have increasingly been subject to and required to engage 
with the outputs and outcomes model and to account for themselves and their work 
with clients in accordance with these terms. As it has been progressively colonised by 
the official and seemingly self-evident discourse and forces of neoliberalism, the field 
of therapy has shifted and transformed in ways that trouble many of the therapists in 
this study. These changes challenged the authority of therapists over the meaning of 
therapy, provoking criticism and opposition from my participants.  
Several therapy practitioners described how the outcomes and accountability 
measures required within their workplaces imposed structures and forms of 
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engagement with clients/patients that were at odds with their own therapy practices 
and ideals. For instance, Alex, an educational psychologist working in the public 
sector, described “the whole thinking about outcomes” within his service as: 
“We set a goal here, we start here, we do that, we make it happen here”, which is 
a very different philosophical way of coming at the world from seeing that what 
we do is construct our world through the world of language, things come into 
being in the way in which we talk, some things are much harder to bring into 
being than others, and so on. But, the belief that I alone can create those realities 
is very naïve in my opinion. 
Alex critiqued the presumption that outcomes, designed and implemented by the 
practitioner, are reached through a linear, step-by-step process. He rejected as “naïve” 
the idea that the therapy practitioner can solely create the meaning of therapy work 
with clients, both in advance or outside of engagement with clients, and during 
therapy sessions. His critique drew on his command of therapeutic capital, 
particularly postmodern and social constructivist therapy ideas and approaches. These 
approaches informed his claim that we “construct our world through the world of 
language”, rather than through rationalist systems built around simple cause-and-
effect scenarios. Alex’s words suggested a collaborative and negotiated approach in 
his work with clients, with appreciation for the simple fact “that some things are much 
harder to bring into being than others”. This approach differed from the expert-led 
power relations implicit in his account of how the outcome model is institutionalised 
within his workplace. As a practitioner, Alex wanted to engage in therapy work on 
very different terms and with very different objectives from those that stemmed from 
neoliberal management approaches.  
Alex talked further about how the outcomes approach functioned within his 
workplace: 
You know, the Ministry will say “of course it’s never linear, blah, blah, blah”. 
But actually, the way that they evaluate it and the way in which we are called to 
evaluate it in group-supervision is very linear. And to actually keep going, trying 
to go through this [the outcomes model], the way in which they’ve structured it, is 
so hard, to actually use that process.  
Alex pointed out that the requirement to undertake therapy work that fitted within the 
government-directed, outcomes-focused model in place in his workplace – in addition 
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to being at odds with his approach to therapy work – was in practice “so hard” to 
actually do. Robin Gauld reinforces and contextualises Alex claim that the outcomes-
focused processes within his workplace posed difficulties and were unwieldy. In his 
appraisal of the health reforms in Aotearoa New Zealand over the 1990s, Gauld 
questions the transferability of neoliberal methods to the arena of health care, “where 
outputs, outcomes, multiple objectives and motivations are particularly difficult to 
identify and measure with any accuracy” (2001, p. 51). Alex contended that therapy, 
like other health services, does not reduce simply to a linear process that is predictable 
and easily measured and documented. His critique of these neoliberal methods within 
his workplace highlighted conflicting and paradoxical meanings of neoliberalism: 
neoliberal discourse, as discussed earlier, is characterised by talk of “efficiency, 
personal responsibility and accountability” (Morris & Janiewski, 2005, p. 1), but, 
from Alex’s point of view, neoliberal practices obfuscate the reality of therapy work, 
attempting to simplify the complexities of therapy and constrain therapists, in turn 
misrepresenting therapy and subjecting therapists to time-wasting and inappropriate 
processes.  
The inherent difficulties involved in accurately identifying and measuring the 
outcomes of the activities of state operated and funded services have meant that many 
services have turned their attention to other, more easily measured indicators of 
productivity and value for state money. In her analysis of the introduction of the 
Public Finance Act (1989) in Aotearoa New Zealand, Jane Kelsey explains that, 
within the state sector, “outcomes were almost impossible to specify or measure with 
precision. That meant outputs, which commodified policy advice, regulation and 
service delivery, became the primary reference-point” (1997, p. 144).  Throughout the 
state sector, including public therapy services, the demand for “measurable outcomes” 
has frequently been translated by services into a focus on outputs, which are much 
easier to measure but, in turn, increasingly commodify and simplify the services 
provided.  
At the alcohol and drug service that Frank worked at during the mid 1990s, 
assessments became the measure of the service’s outcomes and the focus of the work 
done by practitioners: 
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The thing is, of course, with a lot of therapeutic work it’s very difficult to 
measure kind of outcomes. It’s easy to measure outputs. So when I came to work 
at this place, the focus was very much on assessments, because that was 
something that you could measure, like you could measure how many 
assessments you’d done in a year, and like if the next year you did a hundred 
more then you could be deemed to be far more efficient and having a higher 
output and therefore you were meeting the main economic sort of framework, 
which that sort of system was based on. So there was this whole focus on 
assessments, but not much beyond. 
Frank’s description of this organisation’s focus on assessments as the measurable 
output, or “good”, produced by therapists illuminates two functions of neoliberal, 
managerialist technologies within the field of therapy. Firstly, the necessity to 
measure and quantify the “outputs” of therapy further reveals the operation of 
“calculative technologies” (MacKinnon, 2000, p. 298) within the therapy field. 
Instead of trusting therapists, endowed as they are with expertise, qualifications and 
professional opinions – their “therapeutic capital” – to deliver effective therapy 
services to the public, therapists are forced to “prove” their effectiveness in 
economistic, calculable terms. Assessments, in Frank’s workplace, were the means by 
which the service could quantify and demonstrate its value – to prove that the 
practitioners at the service were doing something. Under this model, therapists are 
forced to operate under the logic of corporate business, providing appropriate figures 
and statistics to calculate and make visible their work.  
Secondly, and in concert with this first function, Frank’s words demonstrated how 
therapists within neoliberalised public services increasingly became subjects of new 
forms of surveillance and control. The necessity for therapists to “prove” their worth, 
and the methods of calculation and reporting required to fulfil these forms of 
accountability, can be seen as evidence of the workings of a “new panopticon” 
(Davies, 2003, p. 91). Bronwyn Davies, drawing on the work of Mary Schmelzer, 
explains that the old model of the panopticon, invented by Jeremy Bentham and 
theorised by Michel Foucault (1995), involved “(more or less) benign leaders who 
could rely on our own internalised gaze to monitor our own work” (Davies, 2003, p. 
92). However, in new managerialist, neoliberal worksites “we have the multiplied 
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gaze of the workers on each other, their gaze shaped by the politics and practices 
emanating from management” (p. 92). Davies goes on to explain that: 
The multiplied gaze infiltrates and shapes the way work is understood. Little or 
no attention is paid to the actual effects on the work that this new panopticism 
might have, other than to monitor the meeting of institutional objectives. As long 
as objectives have been specified and strategies for their management and 
surveillance put in place, the nature of the work itself is of little relevance to 
anyone. (p. 92) 
The management-imposed practice of collecting and collating the numbers of 
assessments performed by therapists at Frank’s workplace, with therapists 
understanding that assessment rates were the measure of the service’s, and their own, 
outcomes and worth, worked to normalise and regulate the activities of therapists – or, 
more accurately, worked to have therapists normalise and regulate themselves. While 
the original panopticon envisaged a visible architectural structure bringing about self-
regulation, under the new panopticism of neoliberalised public services, workers can 
rank and compare themselves with each other and are all already aware of the 
agency’s objectives and expectations, their multiplied gaze “finely tuned to the inflow 
and outflow of funding” (p. 91). The necessity to have “the numbers” for ongoing 
funding, coupled with the effect of the multiplied gaze of colleagues as each 
therapist’s assessment numbers are recorded and compared from year to year, sets up 
a model for self-disciplining, self-regulating practitioners. Frank’s appraisal of how 
assessment measuring functioned within his service also illustrates Davies’ claims 
about the primacy of surveillance methods and management-determined objectives 
and strategies. As Frank detailed, “there was this whole focus on assessments, and not 
much beyond”: meeting institutional objectives became the focus, and the reality of 
the work done by therapists, in all its complexity, was of little relevance to the 
organisation. 
The reduction of therapy work into a primary focus on measurable, commodified 
activities, in relation to which therapists are compared and their worth calculated, 
again challenges the authority and expertise of many therapy professionals, 
particularly those with interests in postmodern and political therapy ideas. After 
detailing the importance of assessments as measureable outputs at his alcohol and 
drug service workplace, Frank critiqued this, pointing out that: 
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Hey, it might be nice to have assessments, but assessment doesn’t really do 
anything for the person. It may give some indication of the nature and extent of 
their problems, and may give some indication of how they could be helped, but it 
doesn’t go much beyond that. 
According to Frank, what was being measured and regarded as the “good” produced 
by the alcohol and drug service was not actually of particular therapeutic value to the 
client/patient. Like Alex, through his criticism of the outcomes process, Frank saw 
neoliberalism as paradoxical: practices of measurement and calculation, as modern 
forms of surveillance, predicated on the goal of efficient, accountable public services, 
resulted in inefficiencies, as clients/patients did not actually receive useful therapeutic 
help. Managerialist understandings of therapy “work” and Frank’s own understanding 
of this “work” differed markedly: Frank viewed effective therapy work as requiring 
more than just psychological assessments.  
Both Frank and Alex’s statements about the workings of outcome-focused processes 
and practices within their therapy service workplaces illustrated how business and 
management logic have come to play important roles in the structure and activities of 
public therapy organisations. Therapists’ work, and workloads, as they struggle to 
fulfil the requirements of these organisations, have likewise been transformed.  
Workers are required to undertake various forms of reporting and monitoring of their 
activities and to feed into the service’s measurement and catalogue of outcomes and 
outputs. Services are also subject to frequent review and restructuring: methods of 
surveillance are common features of this model of operations. In a discussion of 
neoliberal systems and their reporting mechanisms, Bronwyn Davies (2005) 
emphasises that these mechanisms are “very costly and devour an enormous 
proportion of shrinking funds, thus requiring an increase in the amount of work each 
worker is expected to do” (p. 10).  
Many of the therapists included in this study remarked on the amount of work 
involved in processes of accountability, reporting, and outcome and output 
measurement. For instance, Ruth, a clinical psychologist working within a public 
hospital setting, explained that in her work, “there’s an increased focus on justifying 
your presence through statistics and outputs and measuring effectiveness, so we’ve 
got to put a lot of work into that area as well”. In order to fulfil institutional 
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requirements and, in many respects, to retain their jobs, therapists are required to “put 
a lot of work” into the area of administration, reporting, and outcome and output 
measuring – an area of work that has grown significantly over the last two decades. 
Ruth’s example demonstrates the symbolic power of neoliberal discourse and forms 
of capital, which take shape in management strategies, statistical data and various 
forms of measuring tools. Therapists find themselves required to increase their 
knowledge and command of these practices in order to participate within the field of 
therapy and “justify their presence”. 
 For many participants in this study, the demands of neoliberal, state-operated therapy 
institutions, and the consequent increased workload, conflicted with their professional 
identities as therapists. In interviews, many therapists described these demands as 
obstructing them from utilising their professional knowledge and skills – their 
“therapeutic capital” – making it difficult for them to do what they considered to be 
good and effective therapy work. Frances was a social worker and counsellor who 
worked for a community mental health service throughout the 1990s. She told me 
how she would frequently stay at work after 5pm “making therapeutic books for kids, 
those kinds of things”. When I asked whether there was time for this kind of work 
within her working day, she responded quickly, saying: 
Oh absolutely not, no, no, no, no. No (laughs). It got to the point there where just 
keeping up with reporting and, um, written reporting and feeding statistics into 
the computers was rivalling the time you would spend face-to-face with clients. 
So putting considerable effort into things like therapeutic letters and therapeutic 
books for kids, no, no, no (laughs).  
Frances’ laughter and repeated utterances of “no” emphasised the idea that having 
dedicated time within work hours to write therapeutic letters or create books for kids 
was a farcical notion. She depicted a workplace where administration and 
recordkeeping were prioritised, while her knowledge and expertise as a therapist – the 
ability, for instance, to create therapeutic books and letters – were sidelined and 
comparatively less valuable.  
Alex echoed Frances’ description of her public sector therapy workplace. During our 
conversation, he talked about a meeting that he would be attending after the interview, 
and explained that, “if I actually tried to meet all the requirements of this organisation 
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I would not have time to do the kind of work that I need to do for this meeting to be 
successful”. From these descriptions, it seems that organisational requirements, under 
managerialist, neoliberal, “business-like” public services, occupy so much of these 
therapists’ time that actual therapy work can be sidelined and compromised. For 
postmodern therapy practitioners, restrictions on time and resources, stripped back 
and standardised therapy services, and the managerialist fixation with measurable 
outcomes and outputs conflicted with their therapy knowledge and expertise. 
Negotiating the neoliberalised therapy service involved struggle for these 
practitioners, as they tried to find ways to incorporate their knowledge – such as the 
value of therapeutic books and letters – into a system in which other forms of capital 
dominate. 
Gap between management/policy makers and practitioners 
Management discourse enables people with no knowledge of the specifics of 
practice to have power over it. 
Andrew Brighton, “Management speak: A master discourse?” 
The last two sections of this chapter have cited numerous criticisms from therapists 
about the entry of neoliberalism and the “market-model” into the therapy field. 
Repeatedly, therapists in this study, invoking their therapeutic capital and authority, 
critiqued “fiscally austere”, “calculable”, “efficient” and “accountable” policies and 
practices as being at odds with and obstructive to good, effective therapy work. These 
criticisms, while strongly expressed during the interviews, appeared to have little 
bearing on the organisation and structure of the therapy field: the therapists’ 
complaints and points of debate referred to an order that, in many cases, was already 
instituted. Within these publicly provided therapy services, therapists’ voices and 
their capital had little sway over the structure and activities of the organisations, 
echoing Bourdieu’s observation that “speakers lacking the legitimate competence are 
de facto excluded from social domains in which competence is required, or 
condemned to silence” (as cited in Prosise, Miller & Mills, 1996, p. 124). The 
legitimate competence to define and organise the therapy field – and to speak on these 
matters – belonged, increasingly, to those with management and business skills and 
prowess. The capital possessed by these “players” in the field mostly “trumped” 
therapists’ capital and wielded symbolic authority and dominance. 
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 The legitimacy and symbolic power and authority accorded to management and 
business professionals within the therapy field, and the subordinate status of 
therapists’ knowledge and skills, are consequences of government-led objectives to 
“neoliberalise” public services. Numerous commentators observed that the economic 
and social reforms of the late 1980s and the 1990s changed the nature of how state 
services were managed, with the elevation of business and corporate management 
knowledge and professionals. For example, when the National government 
reorganised hospitals into Crown Health Enterprises (CHEs) in 1993, boards of 
directors and chief executives were chosen for their managerial skills and few had any 
professional experience of health and disability issues (Kelsey, 1997, p. 121). 
Commenting on the health reforms of the 1990s, Robin Gauld explains that, 
in accordance with the heavy influence of managerialist thinking of the time, 
there was an attempt to replace “health” managers (those with experience in the 
sector) with “business managers, and to isolate health professionals and the health 
workforce from the decision-making arena. (2001, p. 90) 
This shift in the sorts of people chosen to manage, structure and make decisions about 
public services is consistent with the operations of neoliberalism. Bronwyn Davies 
(citing Nikolas Rose) explains that “new managerialism” (the techniques of 
neoliberalism) “is characterised by the removal of the locus of power from the 
knowledge of practising professionals to auditors, policy-makers and statisticians, 
none of whom need know anything about the profession in question” (2003, p. 91). 
“Legitimate competence” to manage, structure and make decisions about public 
services has shifted away from professional practitioners and been bestowed upon 
business managers and those who both speak the language and uphold the objectives 
of neoliberalism. These changes stratify the therapy field, legitimising neoliberal 
forms of capital over therapeutic capital, a power arrangement that – as I have 
repeatedly emphasised –many therapists experienced as oppressive, begrudged and 
were frustrated by. 
Several therapists detailed the workings and effects of this power arrangement within 
the therapy field. During our conversation, Alex, an educational psychologist, 
described an example of how policies and directives for therapists were created within 
his institution. He gave his perspective on a recent process where a new policy was 
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developed that was designed to direct practitioners’ work with a particular client 
group: 
Um, that’s come from the Ministry [the decision to institute the policy], they have 
co-opted some people from the field to be involved with that, that’s been top 
down. We’ve been asked to implement that, and not only implement it but we 
have been told that certain practices will be required for that, which, in my view, 
not only cut across how creative we’re able to be but also, um, there are ethical 
questions about what’s happening which aren’t even considered. 
Alex described his perspective on the power relations that structure his work system 
and his own position within them. He depicted the “Ministry”, made up of policy-
makers, as having authority to command him to implement a policy that was at odds 
with his professional knowledge and judgement. The policy obstructed his ability to 
be “creative” in therapy work and conflicted with his understanding of the 
professional ethics in relation to therapy work. Alex’s words conveyed suspicion and 
mistrust of the decision-makers within his workplace: people from the field were “co-
opted”, suggesting that their selection was partial and that, rather than representing 
genuine collaboration between practitioners and policy-makers, they were simply 
incorporated into the status quo model of decision-making. 
When I asked Alex about the possibilities for giving feedback on the problems he 
perceived with the policy, he explained that, for the people devising the policy, 
“there’s pressure on them to steer this project through within a time line to meet the 
demands that are being made on them”, which meant there was little room for 
practitioner feedback. When “efficiency” and business-like operations are expected of 
public sector services, scarcity of time is likely a frequent phenomenon. In this 
instance, scarcity of time justified “top-down” decision-making, without the 
involvement of practitioners. Alex went on to critique this process of decision-making 
within his workplace, demonstrating a lack of trust in the skills and knowledge of 
managers and policy-makers: 
I mean anyone who’s done any work around organisational change will know, a) 
it is really difficult to create that change within a couple of years, or in such a 
large group, and b) a top-down approach, like this, is doomed to failure. I mean 
the mind still boggles that they believe this process can work. And I suspect it’s a 
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sort of power and control mentality, there is almost a group-think that “we are in 
control and we can manage systems in this way.” 
Again, Alex’s words asserted his command of particular forms of cultural capital – 
his knowledge and experience of theories of organisational change. He used this 
capital to critique the knowledge of the policy-makers and their processes for 
instituting the new policy, declaring it to be “doomed to failure”. Despite the authority 
of his critique, as an experienced, qualified and knowledgeable therapy practitioner, 
within the neoliberalised public therapy service Alex lacked legitimacy – “seventeen 
years [of working as a therapist]”, he explained, “means absolutely nothing”. In 
describing the operations of management and policy-makers as a “sort of power and 
control mentality”, Alex implied that a rigid, autocratic model of power relations 
structured his work environment. He occupied a position that Bourdieu and Wacquant 
describe as the “dominated dominant” (1992, p. 81): despite his qualifications, status, 
knowledge and experience, and his membership in the professionalised middle class, 
in “the struggle for positions” (Swartz, 1996, p. 79) within the therapy field, Alex was 
dominated by those wielding more potent forms of capital – namely, bureaucratic and 
management credentials.  
Frances echoed Alex’s portrayal of the management and decision-making within 
public sector therapy services, describing oppressive power relations and a personal 
toll, for both therapists and clients/patients, of neoliberal management. As the 
community mental health service that she worked for over the 1990s and early 2000s 
was increasingly restructured and reorganised along the lines of a corporate business, 
Frances reached the conclusion that the new model of operations 
did not work very well for the clients, because it’s not about them. It meets the 
organisation’s needs. And the organisation’s tasks are dictated by social policy 
and politics, you know, government funding, and none of that’s got anything to 
do with the people who walk through the door. So they are fodder, just as are the 
workers in that system. Ever since we ceased to have a “personnel department” 
and gained a “human resources department”, then workers ceased to be anything 
except something to be exploited or as a cost to be minimised. So they’re a cost, a 
necessary cost, you know, rather than a valued and supported resource or asset. 
Um, and the clients are “volumes”. So it’s got nothing to do with them, it doesn’t 
meet their needs very well at all. 
!&&'!!
Frances’ appraisal of the workings of her workplace reinforces Davies’ comment 
(quoted above) that under the new panopticism of neoliberal systems, “as long as 
objectives have been specified and strategies for their management and surveillance 
put in place, the nature of the work itself is of little relevance to anyone” (2003, p. 
92). Frances perceived the complex, human dimension of therapy work – in terms of 
the experiences of both clients/patients and therapists – as being of little relevance 
when the system was focused on its own needs and operating along the lines of a 
competitive business. She drew on economic language to illustrate her perception that 
clients/patients and workers alike were dehumanised under the neoliberal 
management agendas of her workplace: therapists were a “human resource”, a 
“necessary cost” to be “minimised”, while clients/patients were seen simply as 
“volumes”. Frances concluded that clients/patients and therapists were simply 
“fodder” within an impersonal, alienating and exploitative system.  
Frances’ description brings to life Harry Hall’s (2004) warning that organisations that 
prize “standardisation” and “efficiency”, and that focus on methods and instructions, 
rather than individuals, create, 
an environment where personal satisfaction and fulfilment are subsumed by the 
organization and clearly become secondary or even tertiary concerns. The 
impersonality brought on by the elevation of efficiency as the sine qua non of 
organizing, dehumanises the worker and dissociates him or her from colleagues. 
(p. 47) 
The human “cost” of the impersonal, neoliberalised therapy service, as Hall warns 
and Frances proclaimed, is therapists who feel like they are simply fodder – 
dehumanised cogs in a machine that cares little for their needs or interests. 
Conclusion 
This chapter examines the profound and transformative impact that neoliberalism has 
had on the therapy field in Aotearoa New Zealand over the last twenty-five years. 
With the legal consecration of neoliberalism and its incorporation into state 
bureaucracy over the late 1980s and the 1990s, the discourse and capital of 
neoliberalism have taken on symbolic authority: “efficiency”, “accountability” and 
“measurable outcomes” are seemingly benign and unarguable social “truths” 
comprising our “commonsense” understandings of organisational imperatives. 
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However, for many of the therapists in this study, the entry of neoliberal discourse 
and capital into the therapy field was not experienced as a benign or progressive 
development. Instead, it has provoked struggle and conflict within the field over the 
forms of knowledge that have authority and legitimacy. Swartz (1996), discussing 
Bourdieu, explains that: 
The struggle for position in fields opposes those who are able to exercise some 
degree of monopoly power over the definition and distribution of capital against 
those who attempt to usurp those advantages. In general, Bourdieu sees this 
opposition occurring between the established agents and the new arrivals in 
fields. (p. 79-80) 
The chapter demonstrates the shift in the power arrangements of the therapy field in 
Aotearoa New Zealand, which has seen the weakening of professional power and a 
reduction in the value and currency of therapeutic capital. With the “new arrivals” 
into the therapy field from the worlds of corporate business and management, the 
balance of power shifted markedly, with neoliberal capital in many respects usurping 
therapeutic capital and being promoted to a position of authority and legitimacy. 
This chapter has catalogued the impact that the proliferation and elevation of 
neoliberal capital has had on the meaning of therapy: therapy time has become a 
standardised, rationed commodity; therapy must produce measurable outcomes; 
therapy services should be organised and managed along the lines of a competitive 
business; and those with authority to speak about how therapy services should operate 
are largely managers, policy-makers and business people. Throughout the chapter, I 
have highlighted the contestation over these meanings of therapy, as postmodern 
therapy practitioners, invoking their own forms of capital, have vigorously critiqued 
the neoliberal practices and forms of knowledge that increasingly govern the therapy 
field. However, their representations of their experiences frequently involved 
dispossession, domination, alienation and frustration: their therapeutic capital lacked 
the requisite legitimacy to enable them to be involved in defining and determining the 
organisation of public therapy services. They occupied subordinate positions within 
workplaces structured by neoliberal principles, where new forms of surveillance 
worked to regulate their activities. 
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 The power relations within the field of therapy, whereby fluency in, and command 
of, neoliberal forms of discursive capital accords bearers symbolic authority over the 
workings and activities of the field, are by no means an absolute or universal process. 
The authority and legitimacy of neoliberal capital fluctuates within different 
institutional settings, particularly in settings removed from the “heart” of the 
neoliberalised public service; while some practitioners included in this study were 
directly employed by public health or welfare services, others worked in the NGO 
sector, education services or private practice, where the force of neoliberal capital and 
discourse could perhaps be tempered. Therapists too, as later chapters of this thesis 
will discuss, attempted to resist, subvert and negotiate neoliberal forces within the 
therapy field. Power arrangements within the field were thus not total; nor were these 
the only struggles over legitimacy taking place, as the next chapter will illustrate. 
However, neoliberal discourse and capital are dominant, authorised forces that play a 
profound role in structuring the terrain of the therapy field in Aotearoa New Zealand. 
It is from within this field that the practitioners in this study were attempting to do 
postmodern-inspired, politically engaged therapy work – work that, as this chapter has 
demonstrated, was frequently constrained by neoliberal objectives and operations 
because of its perceived lack of currency and value.
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6. Medicalised Therapy and the Fetish for Science 
Reflection: Kate’s year of counselling training, 2006 
So the counselling approach they’re teaching me is called “Solution-Focused.” It’s 
based on the idea that we construct ourselves and our world through language, and 
that traditionally the talk of therapy has been focused on problems – dissecting 
problems, labelling problems, measuring their effects, inquiring about their histories 
and origins, and, in the process, growing problems, making them big and turning 
them into “things” that exist inside people. Our lecturer explains that “problem-
talk”, even when there’s a goal of alleviating the effects of problems, often leaves 
people feeling depressed and powerless, with little vision of life without these 
problems. So instead, they instruct us to focus our talk on solutions to problems, on 
clients’ goals and desires, on the successes and achievements in their lives, and on 
the times in their lives that are free from the effects of the problems. As we do this, 
clients, rather than counsellors, are to be regarded as the experts in relation to 
problems and potential solutions and our job is to be curious and elicit their 
knowledge, expertise and ideas. We are to avoid dissecting problems, and are to steer 
conversations away from talk of deficiency or dysfunction on the part of our clients. 
This approach, they tell us, will make problems less oppressive, less big; will energise 
clients and make them aware of their abilities and agency; and will quickly – for this 
is “brief therapy” – bring about changes for clients. Through strategic use of 
language and a collaborative approach, we are to encourage clients to construct and 
experience a new view of themselves and their worlds. 
And yet, for many of us, as we start to practise this method of therapy in various 
settings, it proves difficult to avoid both problem-talk and the expert-role. Many of us 
are required by our workplaces or placement agencies to rigorously appraise and 
label problems at the outset of therapy relationships with clients. One classmate 
complains to me about the multitude of tests that he must continually subject his 
clients to: appraising their intelligence, diagnosing any psychiatric disorders, 
cataloguing and evaluating the extent of their problems over time. The tests occupy 
all of the time in the first session and regularly reappear over the course of the 
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counselling, repeatedly directing his own and the client’s attention to the anatomy of 
their problems. In my own workplace, where I introduce and practise these new 
counselling skills, my colleagues and I grapple with the conflict between the 
organisation’s vision of an accessible, non-medical, feminist counselling and support 
service for people affected by food and body image issues, and the contractual 
requirement that we provide “treatment” to those individuals with “eating 
disorders”. The terms of this contract position us as experts delivering “treatment” 
while our clients are subject to the classificatory system of the DSM-IV, a move that 
immediately emphasises their “problems” and labels them as pathological. The 
solution-focused, non-expert talk that we practise in class proves hard to speak and 
maintain within our workplaces, which seem perpetually interested in problems and 
to require the expertise of experts. 
I’m left feeling angry at the disconnection between what I’m taught in the classroom 
and the reality of the workplace. My training feels naïve and overly idealistic, even 
though I mostly like the sound of it. Along with my anger, I find myself feeling 
inadequate and critical of the compromises that I have to make in my work. I want to 
open things up in my counselling work, have space for my clients to explore, define, 
and potentially redefine, their own meanings and values. And yet the requirements of 
those who fund us threaten to narrow the focus of my work with clients. I feel 
constrained, uncomfortable and troubled. I feel torn between what I’d like to be doing 
and what I’m supposed to be doing. And what I actually end up doing in my work with 
clients feels jumbled and uncertain. 
Introduction 
I begin with a reflection on the counselling training that I undertook in 2006 as a 
means of highlighting a paradox that will be explored more deeply within this 
chapter. Throughout Aotearoa New Zealand, there are numerous therapy-training 
programmes that teach trainee therapists critical and postmodern-inspired therapy 
modalities.16 As discussed in Part Two, these modalities and approaches seek to 
                                                
16 For instance, the University of Canterbury’s M.Ed Certificate in Counselling teaches solution 
focused counselling; Massey University offers a Postgraduate Diploma in Discursive Therapies 
through its School of Psychology; Waikato University’s Master’s of Counselling degree includes 
narrative therapy and social constructionist perspectives on counselling; Unitec’s Bachelor of Social 
Practice (Counselling) teaches narrative and collaborative approaches. The Clinical Psychology 
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resolve some of the problems of therapy by taking a de-pathologising approach, and 
contextualising and politicising the difficulties affecting individuals. They require 
therapists to be reflexive and constantly alert to the power relations of therapy. And 
yet, for students and proponents of these approaches – including my classmates and 
me, and the participants in this study – the realities of workplaces frequently 
confound and complicate our ambitions. The tasks required of us in our workplaces 
often seem to position us as scientific technicians: at various times, we may measure 
and examine clients/patients with the aid of psychological tests, apply or discuss 
psychiatric diagnoses, or determine appropriate categories for our clients/patients, 
ticking boxes as we do so. Like doctors, many therapists are instructed to provide 
“treatment” to people suffering from pathological disorders. Despite our ambitions 
and ideals, we are pulled into a system that frequently requires therapists to comply 
with medical and scientific methods for explaining, “treating”, and managing the 
problems experienced by clients/patients. 
This chapter will discuss how medical and scientific knowledges have come to wield 
symbolic authority within the therapy field and to have considerable impact on the 
work of therapists. These knowledges inform an official point of view within the 
arena of mental health in Aotearoa New Zealand; Pierre Bourdieu defines an “official 
point of view” as “that which is the point of view of officials and which is expressed 
in official discourse” (Bourdieu, 1989, p. 22). Bourdieu, drawing on Aaron Cicourel, 
explains that official discourse fulfils three functions: 
First, it performs a diagnostic, that is, an act of knowledge or cognition which 
begets recognition and which, quite often, tends to assert what a person or a thing 
is and what it is universally, for every possible person, thus objectively. It is, as 
Kafka clearly saw, an almost divine discourse which assigns everyone an identity. 
In the second place, administrative discourse says, through directives, orders, 
prescriptions, etc., what people have to do, given what they are. Thirdly, it says 
what people have actually done, as in authorized accounts such as police records. 
In each case, official discourse imposes a point of view, that of the institution. … 
This point of view is instituted as [the] legitimate point of view, that is, a point of 
                                                                                                                                      
programme at Auckland University also included critical psychology among its courses during the 
1990s.  
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view that everyone has to recognize at least within the boundaries of a definite 
society. (p. 22) 
Within therapy institutions in Aotearoa New Zealand the official point of view has 
become increasingly medicalised and “scientised”. Medical and scientific knowledges 
and discourse have been made to fit the three functions of official discourse outlined 
by Bourdieu. As therapists like my classmate and me apply or discuss psychiatric 
diagnoses with clients/patients, we assume roles where we assert what a person is, 
assigning an officially recognised identity: an identity as someone who is mentally ill. 
The tests that my classmate administers and his catalogue of clients/patients’ 
problems over time inform the “treatment” decisions permitted within his agency, 
determining what clients/patients have to do, “given what they are”. And as we record 
information about clients/patients and our work with them, supplying this information 
to the official bodies that require it and adding it to our agencies’ records, we produce 
authorized accounts of these individuals and the therapy work. Medical and scientific 
practices enable the classification, instruction and documentation of individuals, 
fulfilling the functions of official discourse and, in turn, facilitating the control and 
regulation of the population. These practices, as they comply with and reproduce 
official discourse, are “instituted as [the] legitimate point of view”, seeming like the 
natural and inevitable requirements of official institutions. 
The official discourse that structures the fields of therapy and mental health in 
Aotearoa New Zealand enshrines medical and scientific knowledges into the formal 
workings of the health and welfare systems. This chapter discusses the rise of these 
knowledges and the symbolic authority and legitimacy granted to things medical and 
“scientific” within therapy services that are subject to official discourse. I examine the 
implications of increasingly medicalised, “scientised” therapy services for 
postmodern therapy practitioners. Many of these practitioners have experienced the 
ascendancy of medical and scientific knowledges within therapy institutions as an 
aggressive takeover and an assault on their agency and autonomy as therapists. They 
have increasingly found themselves required to engage with psychiatric diagnoses and 
subject to the rhetoric of “evidence-based practice”, despite their own critiques of 
these concepts. The rise and expansion of medical and scientific discourses within the 
therapy field coheres with and further cements the existing, officially sanctioned, 
occupational hierarchy. Among therapy practitioners, power relations are frequently 
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organised by an occupational hierarchy that privileges those practitioners who possess 
medical and scientific capital and credentials. Those without these forms of capital or 
appropriate credentials lack legitimacy and are granted less license in their therapy 
work. Medical and scientific knowledges and discourses both influence and organise 
the working lives of therapists. In turn, therapists, as my own account above and the 
following discussion reveals, have found themselves governed by and acting as agents 
for a medicalised, “scientised” official discourse. For these postmodern therapy 
practitioners, the institutional spaces of therapy were conflicted and complicated, and 
their necessary engagement with official discourse was a source of professional and 
personal struggle. These therapists, as the following chapters in my thesis will 
explore, were forced to negotiate these potentially oppressive and obstructive spaces 
and to develop various strategies of subversion, resistance and compromise. 
Medical authority and the expansion of the “science” of therapy 
The conflict outlined above – where students trained in postmodern therapy 
approaches find themselves compelled to test, measure and diagnose clients/patients – 
results from the expansion of the science of “mental health” within the field of 
therapy and from the authority within the field it has thus accrued. Within mental 
health services, psychiatry – operating within an illness framework – is the dominant 
discourse (Rogers and Pilgrim, 2005, p. 2) and plays a fundamental role in how 
therapy work is talked about, organised and practised. Over the last fifty years the 
anti-psychiatry movement has thrown “doubt on the validity of the concept of mental 
illness and the benevolence of psychiatric intervention” (Samson, 1995, p. 78; see 
also Masson, 1994; Szasz, 1961, 1970). As detailed in chapter 3, postmodern and 
poststructuralist thought has likewise been used rigorously to critique and 
problematise psychiatry (Fee, 2000, p. 4; see also Foucault, Martin, Gutman and 
Hutton, 1988; Foucault, 2001; Turner, 1997; Crowe, 2000). Ironically, as Colin 
Samson points out, at the same time that anti-psychiatry and postmodern perspectives 
have developed and taken shape, 
the psychiatric profession has marched on defiantly, and often oblivious to these 
critiques, with a “new biologism” in which biochemical, genetic and 
psychological causes of mental illness have become the predominant focus of 
treatment and research. For many mainstream psychiatrists a biological and 
scientific foundation is the only valid approach in psychiatry. (1995, pp. 78-79) 
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Postmodern theories and the claims of the anti-psychiatry movement have shaped 
entirely new bodies of knowledge about therapy and stimulated discussion and 
interest among therapists. Yet, as Samson asserts, they have had limited impact on 
mainstream psychiatry. Instead, the forms of knowledge that reign within the mental 
health sector are particularly concerned with the biology and psychology of 
individuals, and with the scientific practices and “discoveries” that illuminate the 
biological nature of “mental illness” and “provide the basis for the widespread use of 
medical interventions, in particular psychotropic drug use” (Ussher, 2000, p. 213; see 
also Rogers & Pilgrim, 2005, p. 2; Moncrieff, 2008). The “chemical imbalance” 
theory of psychiatric disorders, for example, which has been vigorously promoted by 
both the psychiatric profession and the pharmaceutical industry in recent decades, 
holds that “psychiatric disorders are caused by abnormalities of neurotransmitter 
chemicals in the brain … and that abnormalities of different neurotransmitters cause 
different psychiatric disorders” (Moncrieff, 2008, p. 242). This theory has gained 
widespread popularity, homing the focus of mental health science onto the brain 
chemistry of individuals and, concomitantly, promoting the use of pharmaceutical 
treatments.17  
Psychiatry’s dominance and command within mental health services, coupled with the 
“new biologism” of the late twentieth century, which continues unabated in the 
twenty-first century, privilege medical and scientific discourse and practices. 
“Science”18 increasingly functions as a badge of authority and legitimacy within the 
arena of “mental health”, and many professionals are therefore at pains to assert their 
                                                
17 Likewise, the entry of the pharmaceutical industry into the field of sexology has seen the rise and 
dominance of sexuopharmaceutical research, which treats “sexual dysfunctions as asocial matters of 
physiology and bodily function” (Tiefer, 2000, p. 279), thereby justifying pharmaceutical interventions. 
In doing so, the complexities of the psychosocial context of sexuality are ignored (p. 278; see also 
Potts, 2002). 
18 My statements about “science” in this chapter, rather than referring to a total body of knowledge or a 
single entity, are concerned with a discourse of science that is spoken and invoked by officials and 
within the public discourse of psychiatry, psychology and “mental health”. It refers to assertions about 
what constitutes “the scientific”, “good science” and “scientific rigour”. In many respects it coheres 
with Patti Lather’s observation of how the United States federal government constructs “science” in 
respect to education: 
The effort by the federal government to legislate scientific method is an attempt to muscle through 
a “fantasized normal science” toward improving educational practice. It is a kind of bullying that is 
grounded in the search for a normative philosophy of science that disallows the complexity and 
messiness of practice. (2005, pp. 13-14) 
Similarly, the discourse of science discussed in this chapter is in many ways a “fantasized normal 
science” that offers an extremely simplified version of “science”. 
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scientific prowess. Within clinical psychology training programmes, for instance, 
prospective practitioners are taught that their role is to be a “scientist-practitioner” 
(Barnett, 2004, p. 35); critics claim that this training model, as it is currently most 
commonly deployed, focuses predominantly on the scientist, rather than practitioner, 
role (p. 35). Glenn Larner, writing at the beginning of the twenty-first century, 
observed that the scientist-practitioner model has also become more dominant 
throughout psychology literature (2001, p. 36). Practising psychologists, as well as 
many other therapy professionals, are encouraged to conduct their therapy work from 
the position of a medical scientist. Accordingly, many therapy professionals, seeking 
to be aligned with psychiatry and identified as scientists, utilise medical and scientific 
terminology. Heather Barnett, reflecting on psychological research and practice, notes 
that terms such as “mental illness”, “mental disorders”, “conditions” and 
“psychopathology” incorporate “medical and clinical language [that] contributes to an 
allure of the scientific and contributes to the positioning of clinical psychology as a 
powerful and authoritative producer of knowledge” (2004, p. 32). While Barnett’s 
comments specifically refer to clinical psychology, her analysis can be extended 
beyond this profession: the use of medical and clinical language produces an “allure 
of the scientific” and is a means by which practitioners can communicate authority 
and wield symbolic capital within medicalised therapy services.  
As the above discussion demonstrates, scientific and medical knowledges play key 
organising roles within mental health services. These forms of knowledge impose 
particular frameworks and methods onto therapy work. Central to these frameworks 
and methods is a positivist version of science, which assumes “that universal ‘truths’ 
can be discovered through scientific empirical research” (Barnett, 2004, p. 23). The 
scientific methods for discovering “truths” about “mental illness” and its “treatment” 
“mimic those adopted in the natural sciences” (Ussher, 2000, p. 209), including the 
homogeneous use of the hypothetico-deductive model, and an emphasis on 
objectivity, reliability, and research replicability (p. 209). Quantitative methods are 
typically favoured by this version of science (Barnett, 2004, p. 23). The application of 
these methods represent “good”, rigorous, incontrovertible science. And, in turn, these 
“truths” and forms of “evidence” are used to instruct the practices of therapists within 
the mental health sector. Glenn Larner explains that “what is to count as knowledge in 
psychology and efficacious in therapy is established solely through controlled 
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scientific experiment or clinical trial methodology” (2001, p. 36). Science, in 
particular a positivist form of science, is positioned as an authorised and authoritative 
discourse and form of knowledge within the medicalised mental health sector. It 
instructs therapy practitioners in particular ways and defines what is credible, 
legitimate therapy work: that which utilises positivist scientific methods and is based 
on sound scientific evidence. 
The Diagnostic and Statistical Manual of Mental Disorders (DSM) (American 
Psychiatric Association, 1994), currently in its fourth edition, is a key instrument of 
mental health science and plays a major structuring role within both mental health 
services and the wider field of therapy work. Its continual refinement is a further 
expression of “the renewed vigour with which the ‘new biologism’ is being pursued” 
(Samson, 1995, p. 79). The DSM imposes much of the official language for 
conceptualising, talking about, and responding to the difficulties experienced by 
individuals who present at therapy services. The illness model of psychiatry – with its 
concern for the causes and treatment of “mental illness” – and the attendant positivist 
project to discover, through good science, universal truths about mental illnesses, 
“precipitated the desire to establish ‘consensus definitions’ of mental health 
problems” (Ussher, 2000, p. 210). The DSM represents the coalescence of consensus 
among psychiatric and psychological experts on definitions of mental health 
problems. It assembles and organises authoritative scientific knowledge about mental 
illnesses into a classificatory system of psychiatric diagnoses. Particular forms and 
features of mental illness are classified as “discrete, consistent, and homogeneous 
clinical entities, which further have an identifiable etiology, and cause the symptoms 
that women [and men and children] report” (Ussher, 2000, p. 210). By applying the 
manual, practitioners – acting as scientists – can observe, measure and define the 
specific pathology of their clients/patients, and, following this, determine appropriate 
treatment. The methods of positivist science and the premise that psychological 
distress or problems experienced by individuals can (and should) be understood 
through the application of a system of psychiatric diagnoses make up much of the 
knowledge that counts within mental health services. This knowledge, as this chapter 
will discuss in detail, exerts dominance within the wider field of therapy work, and 
constitutes the normative system within and against which postmodern therapy 
practitioners negotiate their practice.  
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The dominance and authority of psychiatry within mental health services is not a new 
phenomenon. However, with the rise of the new biologism over the last twenty years, 
and the expansion of mental health science through such instruments as the DSM and 
the practice of psychiatric diagnosis, biomedical and scientific knowledges have 
assumed even greater prominence within these services and in society generally (see 
Moncrieff, 2008, p. 235). Further, the ascent of these forms of knowledge is closely 
tied to and aided by the rise of neoliberalism: the “scientisation” of therapy work 
complements a neoliberal agenda. The neoliberal reforms that occurred in Aotearoa 
New Zealand in the late 1980s and the 1990s echoed similar reformist activities 
throughout the western world: fiscal restraint, privatisation, the retraction of state 
services, and the commodification and corporatisation of remaining services have 
become state agendas in many countries (Harvey, 2005). As they have pursued these 
agendas within public sector therapy and mental health services, many government 
agencies and policy makers have invoked and utilised mental health science, elevating 
its authority. Heather Barnett, commenting on how the DSM functions as an 
authoritative instrument within the mental health arena, notes that “DSM 
classifications are increasingly required to source government funding” (2004, p. 33). 
Diagnosis enables workers within publicly funded services to identify those 
individuals who are suffering from bona fide psychiatric “illnesses”, and those who 
are not, ensuring that services can be gate-kept and that state funding is not spent 
unnecessarily. The authoritative taxonomy of mental illnesses serves a dual function – 
as a scientific tool enabling practitioners to identify pathology and categorise 
“mentally ill” individuals, and as an instrument of economic rationalisation.  
Neoliberal agendas combine with the positivist science that dominates mental health 
in further ways, institutionalising specific approaches and practices within public 
therapy services. Rogers and Pilgrim (2005), in relation to mental health, observe that 
“(t)he rising popularity of ‘evidence-based practice’ (EBP) is linked to the 
imperatives of health policy makers to control service costs” (p. 158); what counts as 
evidence, under this model, in line with the assumptions of the science of mental 
health, is primarily discovered through positivist research methods. Neoliberal 
governments, with their interests in “measurable outcomes” and value-for-money (see 
chapter 5), encourage practitioners to utilise those therapy approaches that have been 
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scientifically “proven” to be efficacious.19 As a consequence of government demands 
for evidence-based practices, cognitive behaviour therapy (CBT), which has become 
“synonymous with ‘empirically validated treatments’, ‘evidence-based practice’ and 
‘best practice’” (Barnett, 2004, p. 42), now dominates as “the” therapy approach 
within mental health services (p. 42). Barnett explains that, in part, 
CBT’s rise in popularity has occurred as the [clinical psychology] profession has 
responded to a progressively restrictive political and economic environment 
internationally. The provision of short term and inexpensive psychological 
services is preferred when government agencies and third party payers dictate the 
conditions of health funding. (2004, p. 42) 
Therapy approaches within publicly provided services are increasingly dictated by 
both the demand for “reputable” – i.e. scientifically validated – evidence, and 
therefore the promise of efficacy, and the requirement that they be as inexpensive as 
possible; conveniently, both these factors are features of CBT practices. Those 
therapies that lack a scientific evidence-base, and/or are not easily rationed and made 
cost-effective, lack legitimacy within neoliberalised therapy services. 
This somewhat lengthy – albeit significantly condensed – background discussion to 
the issues raised within this chapter details the status of medicine and science within 
the specific arena of mental health services, demonstrating the dominance of these 
species of knowledge and the discourses that are linked to them. As chapter 3 
detailed, postmodern-inspired critics and therapists see medical and scientific models 
and explanations of mental health as installing a particular model of power relations 
between therapist and client/patient. From this perspective, through the application 
and utilisation of psychiatric diagnoses, practitioners both display rarefied knowledge, 
taking up an expert role, and become arbiters of normality as opposed to abnormality 
– as clients/patients are informed about appropriate forms of behaviour and thinking. 
Clients/patients’ self-knowledge, explanations and understandings of the issues 
affecting them are subordinated by the expert authority of the practitioner. In viewing 
the problems of clients/patients as “discrete, consistent, and homogeneous clinical 
entities” (Ussher, 2000, p. 210), the social and discursive contexts of individuals’ 
                                                
19 “Proving” the efficacy and validity of therapy approaches through the application of positivist, 
quantitative methods – the randomised control trial (RCT) representing “the ‘gold standard’ of EBP” 
(Rogers & Pilgrim, 2005, p. 158) – necessarily favours those therapies that are able to conform to the 
highly specific demands of such a research process. 
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lives are excluded, and the political meanings of their distress – such as issues of 
gender, class, sexuality and race – are ignored; the individual’s flawed and faulty 
body, brain and person are deemed to be the cause of their problems and the object of 
treatment. These are precisely the power relations between therapist and client/patient 
that the postmodern therapy practitioners in this study sought to subvert. The 
increasingly medicalised and scientised terrain of therapy therefore complicated and 
obstructed their goals for their therapy practice. 
The medical “takeover” of public therapy services in Aotearoa New 
Zealand: “The DSM was in” 
The previous section detailed the increased authority and command that scientific and 
medical knowledge have come to enjoy within mental health services over the last 
twenty-five years, as consequences both of the new biologism and consequent 
expansion of mental health science, and of the imperatives of neoliberalism. This 
section examines this shift in the currency and status of forms of knowledge from the 
perspectives of postmodern therapy practitioners. Their descriptions ground the above 
discussion in a specific context, demonstrating how medical and scientific 
knowledges became increasingly powerful and commanding over the 1990s in public 
therapy institutions in Aoteaora New Zealand. From their vantage as self-identified 
postmodern therapy practitioners, they reveal their understandings of the meaning of 
these changes and the implications for their therapy work. Their descriptions reveal 
the workings and their own negotiations of particular forms of power relations within 
the field of therapy, especially within public services. These power relations involve 
the subordination of the practitioners’ own forms of knowledge and capital – their 
knowledge of postmodern therapy ideas, social networks, training, credentials, and 
their professional language – while medical and scientific knowledge have 
increasingly been given official status. For these practitioners, the installation of 
medicalised and scientific approaches to therapy work within public services during 
the 1990s represented a hostile “takeover” and an assault on their professional 
identities.  
Many of the therapists interviewed for this study who were doing therapy work 
throughout the late 1980s and the 1990s encountered the increasing authority of 
medical and, more specifically, psychiatric models and discourses within public 
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therapy services during this period. Their narratives described how medical and 
scientific discourses extended their reach within therapy services, and profoundly 
changed the nature of their therapy work. Kerry, for instance, was a social worker and 
counsellor who worked for a child and family therapy service provided by the local 
Area Health Board. In the early 1990s this service underwent a radical transformation. 
As we talked, Kerry explained how she had become very interested in narrative 
therapy ideas during this same time, so I asked her how these ideas were received 
within her work environment: 
Once again, a small number of people were very enthusiastic. And some people 
were very hostile, particularly the people who were psychologically trained by 
and large. Not all of them, but some of the psychiatrically and psychologically 
trained people. And this was as the move towards the greater use of the DSM was 
happening. And in actual fact that’s, there was a coup really, and, so DSM was in. 
We had to diagnose all the children. And that’s when I left. 
Kerry detailed a professional and philosophical division within this workplace 
between a small group of practitioners interested in narrative therapy ideas, and those 
who were psychiatrically and psychologically trained (although she stresses that these 
demarcations were not absolute). With the introduction of the DSM and the 
requirement that children using the service be “diagnosed”, the possibility for 
conversation about and consideration of differing therapy ideas among colleagues was 
significantly impeded: a “coup” had been staged in the interests of psychiatric and 
scientific constructs and frameworks for therapy.  
The introduction of psychiatric diagnoses for children marked a change in the power 
relations that operated within Kerry’s workplace; psychiatric knowledge and expertise 
now significantly directed her practice, which challenged the very tenets and 
ambitions of Kerry’s narrative therapy ideas. Kerry explained: 
That was the final straw for me. And the power bloc had moved so that I could 
see that this was one battle we weren’t going to win there, basically. And the 
whole thing was sweeping right through the DHB [sic] as well. Other 
organisations like us went totally that way – counselling became very much a part 
of the mental health rather than family therapy places, when previously they had 
been outside the mental health system. 
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Kerry lacked the requisite and legitimate capital to oppose or influence the 
institutionalisation of the DSM. The warfare metaphors utilised in Kerry’s talk – 
“battle”, “win”, “coup” – coupled with the depiction of health sector managers and 
decision-makers as a “power bloc”, conveyed an image of adversarial, all-powerful 
forces, “sweeping through” and radically changing the sector. The requirement that 
clients/patients be given psychiatric diagnoses transformed community and family 
therapy services into specialist “mental health” services, a move that led Kerry to 
leave her job: medicalised therapy work was not something she could reconcile with 
her postmodern, critical therapy interests. 
The increasing authority of medical and scientific knowledges over the activities and 
objectives of therapy work within public services in the 1990s was similarly 
perceived by other therapy practitioners as a hostile and antagonistic “takeover”: the 
shift in power relations within the public therapy sector challenged the values and 
ideals of postmodern therapy practitioners. Frances was a social worker and 
counsellor who worked for much of the 1990s and some of the 2000s for a therapy 
service provided by the regional health body.20 Initially, this therapy service operated 
under the mantle of “primary health” and provided accessible counselling and group 
programmes, responding, according to Frances, to “the needs of the community”. As 
the 1990s progressed, Frances explained, the health reforms meant the service came 
“under threat”. As we sat in a café, she catalogued the impact that the health reforms 
and the reorganisation of public therapy services had on the service, using the muffin 
she was eating to demonstrate: 
Frances: You know, what’s been happening is that – and I’ll use my muffin for 
example [cuts up parts of her muffin to demonstrate] – is, um, if you take away 
primary health out of this, it’s a big chunk isn’t it? 
Kate: Mmm. 
Frances: And then we’re in mental health, otherwise the service would have 
disappeared altogether, so that was a sensible sort of decision. And then over time 
it shifts and you get to a point where counselling has to come out of the name [of 
                                                
20 The regional health body operated under various names and structures during Frances’s time 
working for this therapy service. The various entities responsible for the provision of health and 
disability services within a specific region have included the following: AHB – Area Health Board 
(1983-1993); CHE – Crown Health Enterprise (1993-1997); RHA – Regional Health Authority (1993-
1997); HHS – Hospital and Health Service (1997-2001); HFA – Health Funding Authority (1997-
2001); DHB – District Health Board (2001-). (Gauld, 2001). 
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the service], and from this point diagnosis is really important. And in both those 
instances, um, you know, we were told that the changes were just what we needed 
to do in order to be able to keep doing what we were doing, but in fact that wasn’t 
a very honest way of selling it. So from here, there has to be an Axis I diagnosis. 
… Um, but a little bit gets chopped off here [demonstrates with her muffin], 
chopped off there, and self-referrals are gone. 
Kate: Oh okay. 
Frances: They would have gone there if they hadn’t gone before [gestures to a 
part of her muffin that has been discarded]. And, um, quite a lot’s gone really. 
Now they’re so dependent on, um, there’s such a focus in mental health on Axis I 
diagnoses and treatment of disorders that I don’t know what’s happened to 
counselling in here [gestures to muffin] [laughs]. I don’t know how much it still 
exists. 
Frances’s shrinking, carved up muffin was reduced to an unappetising scrap. Her 
narrative of the effects the health reforms had on her workplace – with the visual aid 
of the muffin – literally depicted a retraction and destruction of the social spaces of 
therapy, the activities of therapists, and the types of people able to access therapy 
services. The service shifted from being accessible and self-consciously positioned as 
responsive “to the needs of the community”, to being a medical, “mental health” 
service, governed by the psychiatric construct “Axis I diagnosis”,21 and oriented 
towards the “treatment of disorders” – in keeping with both the scientisation of mental 
health discussed in the previous section and the accompanying neoliberal agendas. 
The process of transformation, from Frances’s account, was presented as simply a 
matter of course – what was needed for therapists to keep doing what they were 
doing.  
The agency’s name change and re-organisation, however, were neither benign nor 
simply a matter of semantics. They signalled the ascent, legitimation and authority of 
medical science within the field of therapy. Clients’/patients’ problems became 
psychiatric disorders through the compulsory application of DSM-IV diagnoses. 
Therapists were required to “treat” these disorders, an activity that Frances 
distinguished from counselling; in fact, counselling and activities outside of 
                                                
21 The DSM-IV organises each psychiatric diagnosis into levels or axes. Axis 1 encompasses clinical 
disorders, including major mental disorders, as well as developmental and learning disorders. 
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medicalised treatment for psychiatric diagnoses were carved and sliced out and left 
with little role in her workplace. Frances pointed to a dramatic and sudden shift in the 
currency and legitimacy of particular forms of knowledge as she detailed the impact 
the health reforms had on professional therapy practices during the 1990s. Her 
knowledge and expertise – as a social worker with narrative therapy interests – were 
increasingly stifled and restrained as the scientific methods and approaches of 
psychiatry became the reigning knowledge form; with each cut to her service, 
Frances’s therapy practices were curtailed. The space of her therapy work, structured 
by medical referrals, Axis I diagnoses, and the treatment of disorders, shrank – 
becoming an unappetising scrap – as did her own agency and autonomy as a 
practitioner.  
Kerry and Frances’s narratives described a concerted attack on public therapy services 
throughout the 1990s, which reorganised and redefined the power relations within 
these social spaces: “coups” were staged and the “power bloc” enacted changes with 
both force and duplicity, carving up therapy services. While their interests in narrative 
ideas, as Kerry pointed out, may have been shared by only a small number of 
colleagues, and no doubt provoked debate, before the 1993 health reforms, public 
therapy services offered a degree of space to these ideas and license to their 
practitioners. However, as the DSM “swept through” public therapy services this open 
space was severely retracted and practitioners’ freedoms curtailed. The 
institutionalisation of the DSM, and its attendant psychiatric practices, were 
experienced by Kerry and Frances as an assault on their professional knowledge and 
expertise; so antithetical to Kerry’s professional identity was the prospect of 
diagnosing psychiatric disorders in children that she resigned from her job. Tangible, 
verifiable and uniform scientific methods were given official status and accorded 
legitimacy, while individualised counselling, oriented by curious questions and an 
openness to the discovery of “unique outcomes” (White & Epston, 1990), played little 
part in the official activities of these mental health services. With the ascendancy of 
medical and scientific knowledge within public therapy institutions, and their 
incorporation into official discourse, the terrain of the field of therapy in Aotearoa 
New Zealand was sharply altered. Engagement with scientific and medical practices 
was required of therapists – complementing the cost-cutting agendas of the neoliberal 
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government – despite the reservations of postmodern therapy practitioners like Kerry 
and Frances. 
Diagnosis and the illness model as official discourse: “business as 
usual” 
For therapy practitioners working within specific mental health services, and within 
many other publicly provided therapy agencies, biomedical and psychiatric 
approaches to, and explanations for, the problems experienced by clients/patients 
have become part of the status quo operations of their workplaces. The rise of 
medicine and science that Kerry and Frances witnessed in the mid-1990s – as the 
DSM “swept through” health services – resulted in medicalised and scientised public 
therapy services. Medical and scientific approaches, as discussed in the opening to 
this chapter, are utilised by official institutions to fulfil the three functions of official 
discourse: performing a diagnostic and asserting what a person is; directing people in 
what they have to do, given what they are; and producing authorised accounts of what 
people have actually done (Bourdieu, 1989, p. 22). Psychiatric diagnosis, and its 
accompanying practices, greatly – and conveniently – aid the aims of official 
discourse within public therapy services in Aotearoa New Zealand. These practices 
organise and manage people in ways that enable the continued exercise of official 
bureaucracy and an “official point of view”. 
Frank illustrated how the compulsory practice of diagnosis within his therapy 
workplace forced him to comply with and impose an official point of view. Reflecting 
on his role as a counsellor at an alcohol and drug service in the 1990s, Frank 
described how he was required to formally assess clients/patients before offering them 
“treatment”. The assessment was 
to find out how many of the seven criteria they meet for alcohol addiction, or 
opiate addiction, whatever it may be. And you also assess for all the psychiatric 
disorders as well. So, are there issues of social phobia? Depression? Whatever it 
may be. 
In each of these interactions with his clients/patients, Frank was required to reiterate 
the idea that “mental illness” is a “thing” and to reinforce the presumption that 
diagnosis could faithfully discover and capture the nature of his clients’ problems and 
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lead to and direct their treatment. He explained that, following assessment in these 
areas, practitioners  
determine what’s actually the problem for this person. They may have alcohol 
dependence or whatever, depression, etc. And then they determine how this 
person should be treated and maybe come up with a plan, which could be to stop 
drinking, maybe to see a psychiatrist for a medical consultation, maybe 
medication for depression. Could they do that maybe with outpatient support? Or 
maybe they need to detox? Or maybe they need to go to a treatment centre? And 
then they’re sent off there. 
Through the official process of identity discovery and assignation – “depressed”, 
“alcohol dependent”, “socially phobic” – therapists determine “what people have to 
do, given what they are”. Therapy practitioners at Frank’s workplace appraised and 
determined the needs of clients/patients and, following the prescribed institutional 
pathways, directed them to appropriate services. As Frank engaged in the required 
processes of this institution, undertaking the practices of assessment and diagnosis, he 
produced authorised accounts of the outcomes of these practices and his own actions 
and directives. Therapists’ notes, reports and other documents were shared with 
colleagues, fed into the health system’s collection of data, and followed 
clients/patients as they moved through and out of services. The official discourse that 
governs Aotearoa New Zealand’s public therapy institutions draws heavily on 
biomedical and psychiatric knowledges. Therapy practitioners working within these 
institutions are positioned as agents for this official point of view, which requires 
them to bestow identity; give directives, orders and prescriptions; and produce 
authorised accounts in biomedical and psychiatric terms.  
Bourdieu explains that official discourse imposes the point of view of the institution: 
“This point of view is instituted as [the] legitimate point of view, that is, a point of 
view that everyone has to recognise at least within the boundaries of a definite 
society” (1989, p. 22). The legitimacy and validity of a medicalised and scientised 
official discourse is seen in the official dictates of Aotearoa New Zealand’s mental 
health system: namely, that in order to gain access to clinical mental health services, 
“consumer(s) should have, or be suspected of having, a moderate to severe mental 
illness” (Midcentral District Health Board, n.d.; see also Ministry of Health, 1997). 
The psychiatric concept of “mental illness”, determined through psychiatric methods 
!&)'!!
of assessment and diagnosis, is imbued with legitimacy and validity within the health 
system. Jo, a clinical psychologist working for a mental health service provided by the 
local DHB, detailed the workings of the official point of view in relation to 
clients/patients: “to not have a diagnosis is to not come here [to the service]”. 
Clients/patients whose problems are undocumented and without psychiatric 
recognition, or fail to meet diagnostic criteria, are denied official recognition. The 
official, legitimate point of view therefore renders invisible and illegitimate such 
clients/patients. Without an identity as someone who is psychiatrically ill, the mental 
health system, and many other publicly provided therapy services, are inaccessible to 
potential clients/patients. Therapists become implicated in the task of bestowing and 
denying this identity. 
The official point of view constrained and confined many of the therapists in this 
study, especially those working within officially governed therapy institutions: it 
clashed both with their professional knowledge bases and with their preferred 
approaches to therapy work. Pat, who worked as a clinical psychologist for a DHB 
mental health service, voiced numerous criticisms of the practice of psychiatric 
diagnosis, pointing out, for instance, that “the DSM is so inclusive that most people 
could diagnose themselves with at least one or two things”. Yet, Pat explained, 
outright opposition to diagnosis is untenable: 
I could take a position in the system, “diagnoses are bad, I refuse to use them, I’m 
not going to use them”, and I wouldn’t survive in the system very long, and so I’d 
be somewhere else doing something else. 
The mental health system required Pat’s engagement with and reproduction of 
psychiatric diagnoses, despite his grounding in a knowledge system that critiques the 
very foundations of the scientific model; this model of operations had simply become 
part of the order of things. 
The ubiquity of psychiatric practices within public therapy services and their sanction 
by officials provoked discomfort and turmoil for postmodern therapist practitioners, 
as their professional knowledge clashed with the official point of view. Sara, a social 
worker and counsellor working for a youth service operated by the local DHB, 
described the conflict she experienced over the issue of diagnosis in her work with 
young people: “in the course of my work I have to provide assessments. I have to 
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provide a diagnosis. Which is totally anti narrative [therapy] and totally anti 
postmodern approaches”. Narrative therapy critiques the internalising, objectifying, 
expert-defined practices of traditional therapies. Recognising the complicity of 
therapies with dominant culture, narrative therapy proponent Michael White declares, 
“I think we should make it our business to ensure that we are not so” (White, 1995, p. 
45). When Sara began training in narrative therapy and focusing her attention on how 
she could avoid being complicit with dominant culture in her therapy work, the act of 
diagnosing became an experience of conflict: “I’d sit down to write my diagnosis and 
I’d be like ‘oh, I just don’t know if I can do this. It’s too much of a conflict of 
interest.’”. The model of operations within public therapy services impedes and 
complicates the aspirations of postmodern therapy practitioners, drawing them into a 
“conflict of interest”. Those therapists who worked within public services, but even 
those in private practice or working for NGO services, as the following chapters will 
explore, were forced to negotiate, through compromise, accommodation and acts of 
resistance, the official discourse that structures therapy practices in Aotearoa New 
Zealand  
Kerry abandoned public sector therapy work in the early 1990s because she refused to 
diagnose children with mental illness. She explained this decision by saying, “I opted, 
in the end, to work privately because I could then work freely the way I wanted to 
work”. Kerry assumed that private practice would allow therapists freedom from the 
constraints of officially governed institutions and the ability to do therapy work in 
accordance with their own preferences and ideals. However, the currency and 
authority of biomedical and psychiatric knowledge has even infiltrated the realm of 
private therapy practice. A portion of many private therapy practitioners’ therapy 
work involved working with clients/patients whose sessions are funded through the 
Accident Compensation Corporation (ACC). The state-operated ACC allows a 
“sensitive claim” to be lodged when “a mental injury is caused by certain criminal 
acts”, which comprise forms of sexual abuse and sexual assault (ACC, 2009). If a 
claim is accepted, ACC provides funding for claimants to engage with an approved 
therapist for therapy work that focuses on “rehabilitation” from the “mental injury” 
(ACC, n.d.). By providing ACC funded therapy work, Kerry, an experienced and 
qualified therapist, again confronted the medicalised “official discourse”: 
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Initially there was no pressure in the ACC work to diagnose. And that has been 
one of the ongoing struggles for me, that the legislation has moved towards 
mental disorders. But it [the effects of sexual abuse] certainly is not a mental 
disorder. 
Kerry, an experienced and qualified therapist, was fundamentally opposed to 
psychiatric explanations and descriptions of the effects of sexual abuse. However, the 
official point of view, enshrined and actioned through legislation, has moved 
increasingly in the direction of the psychiatric model.  
Kerry went on to detail the “ongoing struggle” that she experienced as she interacted 
with and reported to ACC: 
They [ACC] say that it doesn’t have to be a diagnosis, you can, you know, 
describe it [the effects of the abuse] in the manner in which you were trained, but 
when I have done that in purely narrative [therapy] terms, every single time they 
send it back wanting a diagnosis.  
Even in private practice, Kerry could not escape entanglement with official discourse. 
Despite the seeming “freedom” offered by private therapy practice in Aotearoa New 
Zealand, medical and scientific discourses exercise their command, obstructing 
postmodern, critical practitioners’ philosophical and political approaches to both 
therapy work and the problems experienced by their clients/patients.22 Kerry’s 
experience highlights how narrative therapy lacks the requisite authority to be 
accepted as legitimate and valid by ACC; its terminology and non-diagnostic 
approach do not meet required standards. Kerry’s knowledge and expertise, and her 
professional standing were invalidated by this official discourse. She was required to 
comply with the official point of view, or deny clients/patients ACC-funded therapy 
services and not get paid herself.  
                                                
22 A postscript on ACC: In October 2009, subsequent to the interviews included in this study, ACC’s 
Sensitive Claims procedures, requirements and provisions were amended to conform more rigidly with 
psychiatric practices. ACC now specifies that “mental injuries” “must meet the criteria outlined in ‘The 
Diagnostic and Statistical Manual (DSM-IV™) of the American Psychiatric Association’ in order to be 
eligible for ACC cover” (ACC, 2009). Counsellors and other practitioners who are not authorised to 
determine DSM-IV diagnoses can now no longer solely verify the injurious impact of incidents of 
sexual abuse or assault. Instead, claimants must undergo psychological assessment by appropriately 
qualified professionals in the process of making a claim. 
In response to complaints and concerns raised by ACC counsellors and claimants about these changes, 
an amendment was made in August 2010: “people with a new ACC sensitive claim, or with a new 
claim already in the system but awaiting a decision, are able to access up to 16 hours with a counsellor, 
to ensure their safety and wellbeing” (ACC, 2012). 
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“Show us the evidence” 
The hegemony of “evidence based practice” works to subordinate further the 
postmodern and critical therapy ideas of the practitioners in this study. Martyn 
Hammersley comments on the spread of the evidence-based practice movement 
across many disciplines over the 1990s and on the rhetorical power of its slogan: 
“After all, who would argue that practice should not be based on evidence?” (2001, 
para. 2). However, the seemingly commonsensical and uncontestable appeal for 
evidence-based therapy practice involves the predominant use of evidence that is 
discovered through positivist research methods. This “good science” has currency and 
authority among both the mental health sector and government funding bodies in 
Aotearoa New Zealand. Postmodern practitioners’ therapy ideas and practices, and 
their professional experience lack validity, under current formulations of what counts 
as reputable evidence. Danny, a psychiatrist working within a community mental 
health service, was interested in and utilised narrative therapy approaches in his 
therapy work. However, he explained that one of the “stumbling blocks” for narrative 
therapy has been “that there hasn’t been a sense of urgency about getting an evidence 
base, or the evidence base is seen as being a qualitative evidence base”. He gave voice 
to the official questioning of narrative therapy within the mental health system: “it’s a 
nice idea, but is there evidence to show that it makes a difference?” The importance 
of sanctioned, recognised evidence within the mental health system is indicated by his 
observation that “the Ministry of Health have poured lots of money into programmes 
that have evidence bases”. Officially recognised evidence functions as a form of 
currency, both symbolically and in a very real economic sense in respect of state 
funding.  
As Danny and I discussed the absence of a recognised evidence base for narrative 
therapy, he acknowledged the deliberateness of this strategy, explaining that it is in 
keeping with “Michael [White] and David’s [Epston] idea of being anti-institutional 
or renegade.” Narrative therapy, as discussed in chapter 3, has reacted against the 
positivist and medical methods of traditional psychological therapies and is self-
consciously at odds with narrow, solely quantitative forms of evidence. As a 
“renegade” therapy, however, without reputable scientific evidence to justify its 
worth, the value and usefulness of narrative therapy are rendered invisible by the 
official discourse of the mental health sector. As a psychiatrist who was interested in 
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narrative therapy but working within the mental health sector, Danny recognised that 
scientific knowledge and discourse structure the sector and influence the activities and 
practices of therapists. The refusal and inability of many narrative therapy proponents 
and researchers to “play the science game” and conduct “sound” quantitative – rather 
than qualitative – research invalidates their therapy approach within the official 
mental health environment. Without reputable scientific evidence to base their therapy 
preferences on, postmodern, critical therapists are positioned as illegitimate within the 
official discourse of their work environments. 
Numerous scholars have drawn links between the proliferation of the rhetoric of 
“evidence-based practice” and neoliberal, managerialist agendas for the public sector 
(Davies, 2003; Hammersley, 2001; Trinder, 2000). Under managerialist modes of 
operation, as detailed in the previous chapter, therapy practitioners’ knowledge and 
expertise wield limited power over the organisation and management of services. 
Managers and policy-makers, instead, tend to make management decisions and 
increasingly direct the activities of therapists. The evidence-based practice model 
similarly usurps the professional knowledge and experience of therapists. 
Hammersley explains how research evidence is privileged over professional 
experience when evidence-based practice dominates a professional arena: 
The idea that research can make a major contribution to improving practice stems 
from the assumption that it is systematic and rigorous, and provides explicit 
evidence which can be assessed objectively. This is held to contrast with evidence 
from professional experience, which is portrayed as unsystematic – reflecting the 
particular cases with which a practitioner has happened to come into contact – 
and as lacking in rigour – in that it is not built up in an explicit, methodical way 
but rather through an at least partially unreflective process of sedimentation. 
(2001, para. 5) 
Within many contemporary disciplines and institutions, evidence discovered through 
adherence to the principles of objectivity and verifiability, and to the expectation that 
research be systematic and rigorous, is deemed superior to the observations and 
experiences of professionals themselves. Professionals lack the authority and 
reliability of the findings of a reputable scientific research project.  
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Alex, an educational psychologist, demonstrated the potency of scientific accounts of 
evidence and the illegitimacy of professional experience within the field of therapy 
work in Aotearoa New Zealand. He told me how he had written to a key manager 
within his service “around the issues to do with evidence and outcomes”, raising the 
idea of professional “intuition” as a source of valid evidence: 
He did at least entertain a few flurries of emails and then just said “no” [laughs], 
“you’re wrong. This is the way it is”. And he was very disparaging about the 
whole idea of intuition. I wasn’t actually suggesting intuition as the main guide 
for our work, but actually … it means that, as a practitioner for over seventeen 
years, you would have been in many, many different situations, incorporated 
patterns of interactions, ways of thinking, whatever, and you’ve developed a felt 
sense for that and you’re able to somehow communicate that. And this is more of 
the art of what we do in these complex social situations. 
Alex argued that the “felt sense” born from professional experiences and observations 
over time is an important component of therapy work and a source of knowledge and 
guidance. Yet the official point of view disparages and discredits this knowledge 
source. As with narrative therapy, Alex’s experiential knowledge could not be 
quantified or scientifically verified so was deemed suspect and excluded from 
officially recognised evidence bases. 
Medical dominance and the hierarchy of therapy professions 
The discussion above depicts the promotion and assertion of particular forces within 
the cultural and professional spaces of therapy in Aotearoa New Zealand – namely, an 
expansion of medical and scientific knowledges and their function as official 
discourse. Therapists included in this study witnessed the expansion of these 
knowledges – and the exclusion and denial of their own forms of knowledge – as 
publicly provided therapy services became increasingly governed by psychiatric 
practices and the doctrine of evidence-based practice. The tradition of medical 
dominance, and its accompanying occupational hierarchy, bolster the hegemony of 
medical and scientific knowledges within therapy services. In turn, as therapy services 
have become more medicalised and scientised, many therapists have found 
themselves subject to this occupational hierarchy. This section looks closely at how 
power relations among numerous therapy professions reinforce and reproduce 
medicine and science as dominant, officially authorised discourses. It examines the 
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implications of these forms of power relations for therapists, paying particular 
attention to the agency and autonomy of therapists and their abilities to practise their 
preferred therapy approaches.  
This section demonstrates how command of, and proximity to, medical and scientific 
knowledges organises the therapy workforce, demarcating colleagues from each other 
and determining the status and power of different occupational roles. Those 
practitioners who are aligned with medicine and science, and who possess the 
requisite qualifications and credentials, are granted authority and the right to “speak”, 
whereas, to quote Bourdieu again, “speakers lacking the legitimate competence are de 
facto excluded from social domains in which competence is required, or condemned 
to silence” (as cited in Prosise, Miller and Mills, 1996, p. 124). Throughout my 
interviews with therapy practitioners, it became apparent that the ability to “speak” 
among therapy colleagues within public services – to put forward a point of view, to 
participate in discussions and, importantly, to be listened to and recognised as 
legitimate – was linked to people’s professional therapy roles. Postmodern and critical 
therapy approaches, as the previous section suggests and as later sections will 
demonstrate, lack the legitimacy and recognition that is accorded to medicine and 
science by officialdom and within public therapy services: these therapies are, as 
Danny observed, positioned as “renegade” and “anti-institutional”. Despite this, as 
will be discussed in the following chapters, the therapy practitioners gathered in this 
study utilised varied methods to resist or subvert the official discourse and 
requirements in place within public therapy services and to practise their preferred 
forms of therapy. Importantly, however, the extent and nature of their acts of 
resistance and subversion was influenced by their professional role and their status 
within a medicalised occupational hierarchy. 
Within the arena of health, as Bryan Turner explains, “medical dominance is a 
necessary feature of the professional power of the medical practitioner in relation to 
other occupations” (1995, p. 138). Turner goes on to define medical dominance as “a 
set of strategies requiring control over the work situation, the institutional features of 
occupational autonomy within the wider medical division of labour, and finally 
occupational sovereignty over related occupational groups” (p. 138). For therapy 
practitioners working within the general health sector, which is predominantly 
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focused on physical health and illness, medical dominance over their own inferior 
positions was often palpable. When I interviewed Ruth, a clinical psychologist, she 
was working in a public hospital – the medical setting par excellence – offering 
therapy services alongside the medical treatments received by patients. Ruth 
explained that, within this hospital setting, she was required actively to market 
psychology: 
So it’s about actually doing quite a lot of liaison with different professionals, 
introducing ourselves and presenting a friendly face of psychology basically, and 
almost de-emphasising the mental health aspects of psychology and emphasising 
the user-friendly, kind of human, chatty side, the more informal side of 
psychology perhaps in a setting like this. … There is no acknowledgement of 
mental health needs or the needs of psychologists in this kind of setting, so we 
need to survive in a medical environment. 
Ruth depicted a health setting in which people’s “mental health needs” and the 
profession of psychology were given no regard: physical bodies, and their medical 
treatment, were the legitimate focus of medical practitioners’ attention. Ruth’s actions 
within this environment indicated conscious efforts on her part to avoid any perceived 
threat posed by her work and knowledge as a psychologist to the sovereignty of the 
medical profession. She sought to educate medical professionals who knew little 
about psychology and/or needed to be convinced of the benignity and “human-ness” 
of psychologists, and of her acceptance of her own subordinate and ancillary status.  
Ruth’s comments conveyed the potential for suspicions and preconceptions among 
her medical colleagues in regard to her psychology work. She explained some of 
these preconceptions: “Like perhaps they might have a perception of someone who’s 
focusing on acute mental health problems or who’s, you know, perhaps got strong 
political views or particular views that might be unhelpful to the medical profession.” 
Ruth’s medical colleagues enjoyed sovereignty over the ailing, physical bodies of 
their patients within this medical setting, while her therapy work occupied a marginal 
role within strict boundaries. Within the occupational hierarchy of this hospital 
environment, Ruth’s clinical psychology credentials carried less sway and authority, 
and she was forced to negotiate a workplace that was either oblivious or hostile to her 
knowledge and expertise.  
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Medical dominance is particularly pronounced within the clinical setting of a public 
hospital, ensuring medical control over patients’ treatment and the activities of non-
medical allied professionals. The mental health sector, while differing in many ways 
from the wider health sector, also reproduces power relations on the basis of medical 
dominance. Within mental health services, psychiatrists tend to occupy the pre-
eminent position in regard to therapeutic decision-making. In the main, they possess 
the highest-ranking medical qualification within the sector and have been bestowed 
with the title of Doctor. Within multi-disciplinary teams – the main model for the 
provision of treatment and therapy services within the sector – they are often, as one 
participant described them, “the top dog”. By virtue of their medical status, 
psychiatrists exercise dominance via the strategies outlined by Turner (1995). Frank, 
commenting on team meetings at the alcohol and drug service for which he worked as 
a counsellor in the mid-1990s, described how “the psychiatrist has the last word on 
everything”. While governments, policy-makers and managers exert degrees of 
control and influence over the work situations within public therapy services, in the 
day-to-day activities of service provision and decision-making about clients/patients, 
psychiatrists are usually in charge and wield the most authoritative voice. The 
psychiatrist role is distinguished from other medical occupations through a unique 
combination of specialist medical and therapy skills: rigorous training in medicine 
and the discipline of psychiatry, a focus on a therapeutic doctor-patient relationship, 
the ability to conduct physical as well as psychiatric examinations, and authority to 
prescribe psychotropic pharmaceuticals. Psychiatrists are distinguished from other 
therapy practitioners as a result of their medical knowledge, and from other medical 
practitioners because of their knowledge of psychopathology: their role within public 
therapy services is specialised and exclusive. 
Within the mental health sector and other public therapy services, psychiatrists work 
alongside other medical and allied professionals, including nurses, clinical 
psychologists and social workers. During my conversation with Jo, she highlighted 
the sovereignty often exercised by psychiatrists over other professionals’ therapy 
work with clients/patients. Jo, a clinical psychologist working for a community 
mental health service, described an instance where she and the psychiatrist in charge 
of her team disagreed over whether a particular client/patient should receive therapy 
services: 
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Jo: The psychiatrist on our team just seems to be arbitrary in terms of how he 
divides up people’s problems. 
Kate: And he is, in the hierarchy, he’s at the top? 
Jo: Oh yeah, oh yeah. So he can, he could over-rule me, like he could say, “no, 
she shouldn’t be here”, he could over-rule me. But if you make a strong enough 
case, that has enough clinical justification, and it’s not considered a dangerous 
decision or an unethical decision, you can get it through, but you’re constantly 
questioned around it, you know. 
Within her team, the psychiatrist’s sovereignty was evidenced by the fact that, at any 
point, “he could over-rule me”. In order to assert her professional opinion, Jo utilised 
the terms and frameworks of the psychiatrist, providing appropriate “clinical 
justification” and adhering to the official forms of knowledge: she needed to “play the 
game” if her point of view was be seen as valid. Even when she was able to defend 
her position and have it accepted, Jo’s position and actions were subject to constant 
scrutiny and appraisal from the psychiatrist. Jo’s critique of the “arbitrariness” of the 
psychiatrist’s decisions in regard to clients/patients demonstrated a clash of 
professional knowledge. However, the sovereignty and authority of the psychiatrist 
over the various professionals within the team curtailed Jo’s agency and required her 
compliance with the psychiatrist’s frame of reference. Medical dominance 
distinguished the psychiatrist within medicalised public therapy services from other 
professionals and enabled the exercise of power over these professionals.  
While clinical psychologists are not medical practitioners in a traditional sense, the 
biomedical and psychiatric interests of their profession, and its concern for scientific 
methods and practices, accord clinical psychologists high status roles within the field 
of therapy. The association of clinical psychologists with scientific rigour and 
authority is captured in their self-description as “scientist-practitioners”. Ian John 
(1998) argues that the scientist-practitioner discourse serves 
as a means by which an epistemic status claim furthering the interests of 
psychologists as an occupational group, or guild, is staked out and defended. In 
the process it also enables a particular group of psychologists to position 
themselves as the elect voice of psychological authority. (p. 25) 
John contends that clinical psychologists distinguish themselves from other 
practitioners through the scientist-practitioner discourse. The cultural authority and 
!&*'!!
prowess of science as a form of knowledge and an official discourse serves as a badge 
of distinction for clinical psychologists, imbuing their profession with legitimacy and 
high-ranking status.  
The legitimacy and eminence of clinical psychologists is widely recognised within the 
therapy field. While telling me how she came to the decision to study clinical 
psychology, Charlotte explained that counsellors “in this country don’t seem to have 
the mandate that a psychologist has, you know? And I suppose that’s what attracted 
me to doing clinical”. Pat, another clinical psychologist, echoed Charlotte’s 
sentiments. Pat was initially uncertain about what training path to take in order to 
become a therapist. He relayed a conversation he had with the head of a university 
counselling department that influenced his decision-making: “He said to me, ‘I only 
employ clinical psychologists. That’s the best profession’ [both laugh]. So I thought, 
‘oh well, I should do that’. So that’s how I became a psychologist”. Charlotte and Pat 
described a perception of clinical psychology as “the best” among the therapy 
professions and as having a mandate and authority within this field of work: the 
alleged superiority of the profession and its status as reputable and authoritative 
influenced their own career paths. The mandate that is given to clinical psychologists 
and the profession’s status as the best is reflected in the recruitment practices of the 
mental health sector. Clinical psychologists occupy the bulk of specialised therapy 
roles within mental health services. Counselling practitioners who do therapy work 
within these services tend to do so as a result of their qualifications as nurses or social 
workers; there are few jobs for people with only counselling credentials.23 The 
mandate that is granted to therapists within public services, and the extent of their 
endorsement as eminent professionals, relates to their proximity to scientific and 
medical knowledge; the possession of these forms of cultural capital is like, to use 
Bourdieu’s game analogy, holding “aces in the game of cards” (1989, p. 17). 
The hierarchy of therapy professions that was invoked and described by participants 
throughout my research process sees psychiatrists exercising sovereignty over other 
therapy professionals as a feature of medical dominance. Clinical psychologists, by 
virtue of their scientific credentials and close proximity to medicine, while still 
                                                
23 Counsellors are currently largely excluded from District Health Board services, on account of the 
profession not being recognised under the Health Practitioners Competence Assurance Act. 
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subject to psychiatric control, have prominence as “expert” therapists, superior to 
other therapy practitioners. For therapy practitioners further down this occupational 
hierarchy, distance from medical and scientific knowledges and credentials results in, 
for many, subordination and limited agency and autonomy within public therapy 
services. Turner identifies “subordination” as a particular mode of domination 
exercised in medical settings in respect to allied professionals: “Subordination 
describes a situation in which the character and activities of an occupation are 
delegated by doctors with the result that there is little scope for independence, 
autonomy and self-regulation” (1995, p. 138). While, as this thesis will explore in the 
following chapters, one-to-one therapy sessions are difficult to govern or wholly 
control, and therapists find ways to subvert prescriptions for their practice and instead 
practise their preferred therapy approaches, therapists who occupy low-ranking 
professions are, in the main, subject to more restrictions than their higher-ranking 
colleagues. Social workers and nurses who engage in therapy work within public 
therapy services tend to be permitted less license for independence or autonomy in 
their work with clients/patients. Frances, a social worker-counsellor who worked for a 
community mental health service over the 1990s and early 2000s, demonstrated the 
distinctions between different occupations within her workplace in terms of the levels 
of agency experienced by practitioners. She commented on efforts made by people 
working within this service to defy its operations: “And then there was Susannah, 
through the wall from me, who was just subversive [both laugh]. Well, she’s a 
medical officer so she’s further up the hierarchy, so the things that she did were more 
tolerated for that reason.” Frances perceived her workplace as tolerant of the 
subversive, independent actions of practitioners with medical credentials because of 
the status and legitimacy accorded to these credentials. Non-medical practitioners, 
who also lack the scientific legitimacy of clinical psychologists, by her account 
enjoyed far less tolerance when they deviated from or challenged prescribed 
activities: those therapy professionals with subordinate credentials and knowledge 
were expected to remain subordinate.  
Frances’s perception of the value and authority of particular therapy qualifications 
within public therapy services, and of her own subordinate status, was echoed by 
other “low-ranking” therapy practitioners interviewed for this study who worked in 
officially governed institutions. During my interview with Cal, a social worker-
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counsellor, he told a story about his clash with a trainee psychiatrist while working for 
a child and family therapy service provided by the local DHB. The clash involved the 
trainee psychiatrist complaining about Cal’s use of narrative therapy ideas and 
practices in his work with a child and family. Cal explained the trainee psychiatrist’s 
actions and the conflict between these two therapy professionals as consequences of 
the hierarchy of therapy professions: 
I think she [the trainee psychiatrist] believed in that hierarchy of professional 
knowledge and that she was above me: even though she was an intern there, 
learning how to be a psychiatrist, she was already a doctor, and I was a qualified 
social worker, that didn’t come into it, right? [laughs]. So I started to get a sense 
of the hierarchy of professional knowledge that is taken to be the reality.  
The currency of Cal’s professional credentials, in his experience, counted for little 
alongside the doctor status of the trainee psychiatrist; medical knowledge, expertise 
and qualifications eclipsed his social work training and experience. The conflict 
between Cal and the trainee psychiatrist – which, in fact, led to Cal leaving this job – 
was characterised by Cal as inherently connected to his “place” as a social worker 
within a medically dominated mental health system.  
Cal went on to explain in more detail his view of the mental health system’s 
understanding of the rightful place of social workers: 
I had a supervisor too, bless her, who said to me ‘Cal, you realise when you go 
there [to this organisation] your role will be handmaiden?’ And I thought ‘that’s 
great’, you know, she’s deliberately saying too that I will be seen as pretty much a 
token female, you know I won’t have status as male there because I haven’t got 
any sort of qualification that would even give me a male kind of identity.  
Cal’s professional supervisor seemed concerned that he should be aware of “his 
place” upon joining this therapy service, stressing that as a social worker within this 
system he would be a “handmaiden” – a metaphor that suggests subservience, a lowly 
position, and menial tasks. Cal also analysed the supervisor’s metaphor as feminising, 
suggesting that as a social worker he was emasculated, while those with more 
legitimate, medical qualifications, even as females, were imbued with symbolic 
masculinity – potency, power, authority.  
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The supervisor’s comment, and Cal’s analysis of it, invoked the gendered nature of 
both medical hierarchies and the relationship between medicine and allied 
professions. Rogers and Pilgrim (2005), discussing the subordinated role of women 
within caring professions, explain how “women on average occupy lower-status 
positions within professions” and that “those occupational groups which are 
numerically dominated by women (like nursing) are more likely to be subordinate to 
male-dominated professions (like medicine)” (p. 135). While the literal demographics 
of these professions are subject to change, the gender associations remain: Cal, in his 
profession as a social worker, was associated with women as a consequence of the 
low status of this profession within a medicalised hierarchy of occupations. Social 
work, as an allied, “caring” profession under the command of the traditionally male 
dominated domain of medicine, further connected him with women – hence his role 
as “handmaiden”. Despite his “real” gender as male, Cal experienced female-like 
subordination within the work setting. As Cal summed up the story of the conflict 
between himself and his colleague, and the lesson of this experience, he explained, “I 
realised that I should have been a meek handmaiden and I shouldn’t have dared to do 
anything kind of spontaneous or outside the usual medical kind of practice.” Cal’s 
comments suggest both the belief that he should have “known his place” if he had 
wanted to survive within this system – and therefore have refrained from 
experimenting in his therapy work – and that practices that differ from “the usual 
medical kind of practice” are generally not well received within medicalised mental 
health services, especially when they are introduced by a social worker. His account 
of the incident with the trainee psychiatrist and of his supervisor’s educational lesson 
on his role as a social worker within a specialist mental health team demonstrated his 
cognisance of his subordinate position in the team; within this hierarchy of therapy 
occupations, he experienced little scope “for independence, autonomy and self-
regulation” (Turner, 1995, p. 138). Cal left this job, frustrated by the conflict that 
ensued in response to his narrative therapy practices and his lack of agency. 
Conclusion 
This chapter has focused explicitly on the forces that influence, instruct and dominate 
the practices of therapists within public therapy services in Aotearoa New Zealand, 
and, increasingly, those also working in community and private practices. The 
previous chapter detailed the effects of neoliberal and managerialist discourses and 
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the activities of the state on therapy services, demonstrating how these services have 
become “neoliberalised”. In tandem, contemporary therapy services have also 
progressively become more “medicalised” and “scientised” in their approaches to the 
problems experienced by clients/patients and in their expectations of therapists. 
Medical and scientific knowledges exercise dominance within the contemporary 
therapy field in Aoteaora New Zealand. The terrain of the therapy field, particularly 
within the public sector but also even within private, independent practices, requires 
therapists’ engagement with the medico-scientific practice of diagnosis and with 
medicalised explanations for clients/patients’ distress. As they apply and engage with 
psychiatric diagnoses, therapists are required to reproduce, and act as agents for, an 
official point of view, despite their own misgivings. Their own therapeutic knowledge 
– their capital, accrued through training, qualifications, experience, reputation, 
research, participation in interest groups, and collegial memberships – is of dubious 
value without a sound scientific evidence base, while scientifically endorsed therapies 
enjoy legitimacy. Their capital is also ordered and organised by an occupational 
hierarchy that sees those professionals with the highest ranking medical and scientific 
credentials granted greater autonomy and authority, garnering for them the right to 
speak over and instruct others. Within Aotearoa New Zealand’s contemporary therapy 
field, postmodern therapy ideas and practices lack currency and are likely to be met 
with scepticism, if not hostility, by both officialdom and many therapy colleagues. It 
is unsurprising that at least three of the therapists discussed in this chapter – Kerry, 
Frances and Cal – resigned from therapy jobs within public therapy institutions in 
protest at the regime requirements and their own restricted agency and subordinate 
status. 
It is from within this context, in which neoliberal, medical and scientific discourses 
dominate and are enshrined, that the therapists in this study attempted to mobilise 
postmodern therapy ideas and approaches. They operated within a conflicted and 
contradictory social space, alert to the paradox of their position: their therapy 
knowledge and expertise stemmed from the critique of medical and scientific 
techniques in therapy, and were founded on an alternative vision for therapy work, 
and yet medicine and science were accorded hegemonic status within the 
contemporary therapy field. In order to pursue their interests and practice therapy in 
ways that cohered with their own ethics and ideals, these therapists had to negotiate 
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institutional forces and practices that, to varying degrees, were obstructive to their 
aspirations. The next part of this thesis analyses their strategies of negotiation, 
including some of forms and methods of resistance and subversion that they utilised, 
as well as their compromises and accommodations. 
!&*"!!
PART 4 
7. Introduction to Part 4 
This part of my thesis examines and analyses how the therapists interviewed in this 
study saw themselves as negotiating their workplaces and professional roles, given 
the social and political forces that they perceived as influencing their working lives. 
As detailed in the previous two chapters, publicly funded therapy services24 have 
increasingly been subject to neoliberal/managerialist and medico-scientific 
discourses. Over the last two decades, these discourses, endorsed and promoted by 
powerful social institutions, have accrued authority and legitimacy, becoming 
naturalised features of the order and talk of public therapy services. The discursive 
frameworks utilised by the therapists in this study – including postmodern, feminist, 
and social justice discourses – backed by less powerful forces, tended to be 
subordinate rivals to those dominant discourses: these less powerful discourses and 
species of knowledge were often “trumped” within “the game” (Bourdieu & 
Wacquant, 1992) at play in the field of therapy by discourses of “evidence based 
practice” and “organisational efficiency”. As discussed, the spaces, talk and 
objectives of therapy work were defined in particular ways by neoliberal, 
managerialist and medico-scientific discourses. And, as the previous chapters suggest, 
these definitions frequently clashed with those preferred and asserted by the therapists 
in this study. For many of these therapists, the neoliberal, medicalised and 
“scientised” therapy workplace was experienced as restrictive and obstructive of their 
ambitions. 
Complicating my thesis narrative 
The previous chapters set up a relationship of conflict and rivalry between competing 
discourses and social forces. In chapter 4, I detailed how postmodern therapy 
                                                
24 I use the term “publicly funded therapy services” to encompass services provided directly by public 
health, welfare and education sector organisations, as well as services provided by NGOs or private 
practitioners through contractual relationships with public sector organisations.  
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practitioners, seeking to undermine the pathologising, individualising and expert-led 
traditions of therapy, participated in and were encouraged by a similarly oriented 
social movement. Their vision of therapy was concerned with collaboration and “co-
authorship” (Epston, Freeman & Lobovits, 1997) between clients/patients and 
therapists, exposing and, where possible, undermining the power relations of therapy, 
and deconstructing dominant discourses. Members of this social movement within the 
field of therapy connected and bonded through shared teachers and mentors, similar 
training backgrounds and interests, and participation in peer support and interest 
groups. The ideas and practices espoused and enacted by this movement represent a 
distinct challenge to the canon and traditions of therapy and frequently defy the 
knowledge forms that are positioned as pre-eminent and authorised within the therapy 
field. 
Yet I followed that chapter with two potentially totalising chapters, which could likely 
suggest that the activities and objectives of postmodern therapists were thwarted and 
stifled and that they were sapped of agency both in their work with clients and in the 
wider systems of their workplaces. Neoliberal discourse took on official status in 
Aotearoa New Zealand in the late 1980s and early 1990s and was “rolled out” within 
the public sector and beyond, taking shape in managerialist business practices. 
Scientific and medical discourses have also been integral to the conceptualisation, 
organisation and delivery of public therapy services. I argue that these discourses play 
profound roles in the field of therapy in Aotearoa New Zealand and have greatly 
influenced the language, activities and objectives of publicly provided therapy 
services. In turn, many therapists in this study described the ascendancy of these 
discourses as oppressive and limiting, creating working environments where their 
own forms of knowledge and expertise were marginalised or excluded. The trajectory 
of my narrative could suggest that working life in Aotearoa New Zealand’s publicly 
provided services was wholly antagonistic to the philosophical orientations of these 
postmodern therapists and repressive of their therapy practices. The force of 
neoliberal and medico-scientific discourses could be presumed to be so powerful and 
total that rival discourses were simply unworkable and absent from working life. 
Contrary to how the thematic structure of the preceding chapters could be interpreted, 
however, I am not interested in a simple, binary narrative where the rebellious 
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postmodern, critical therapy movement is squashed by the omnipotent forces of 
neoliberal and medico-scientific discourses; the narrative is much more complicated 
than this and involves struggle and contestation over the meaning of therapy and the 
nature of practice. Hegemony is never a finished, static or one-way process. Indeed, 
as Michel Foucault reminds us, “where there is power, there is resistance” (1990, p. 
95). Foucault explains that power relationships depend 
on a multiplicity of points of resistance … These points of resistance are present 
everywhere in the power network. Hence there is no single locus of great Refusal, 
no soul of revolt, source of all rebellions, or pure law of the revolutionary. Instead 
there is a plurality of resistances, each of them a special case. (1990, pp. 95-96) 
While the postmodern therapy movement represents a public ideological challenge to 
both traditional therapy practices and the discourses of neoliberalism and medico-
science that are so persuasive and powerful within the therapy field, this challenge, 
when viewed from the local, peopled level of everyday working life, is mixed, 
diverse, and necessarily partial. Power and resistance have an inextricable and 
constantly shifting relationship and take shape at multiple specific points. Indeed, 
“resistance is never in a position of exteriority in relation to power” (Foucault, 1990, 
p. 95); there is no “outside” to power relations, and resistance, like power, inevitably 
involves contradiction, tension and ambiguity. Individual resistance, as Thomas and 
Davies (2005) explain, is “a constant process of adaptation, subversion and 
reinscription of dominant discourses” (p. 687). The following two chapters seek out 
and analyse processes and strategies of resistance, negotiation and accommodation 
that were utilised by individual therapists in their neoliberal, “scientised” workplaces. 
I examine these processes and strategies as specific, contextual, and necessarily 
variable “special cases”.  
Bourdieu’s game 
Foucault’s descriptions of power and resistance inform my analysis of how the 
therapists in this study negotiate both the culture and practices of their workplaces and 
the contestation between rival discourses and forms of knowledge. In concert, the 
following chapters also draw on Pierre Bourdieu’s theory and metaphor of the field as 
a “game”. The idea of the therapy field functioning as a game, where players, invested 
in its terms and stakes, make moves according to “the volume and structure of … 
[their] capital” (Bourdieu & Wacquant, 1992, p. 99), coheres in many ways with 
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Foucault’s approach to power and resistance. Like Foucault, Bourdieu conceives of 
power networks as always open to resistance and the field as a constant site of 
struggle:  
players can play to increase or conserve their capital, their number of tokens, in 
conformity with the tacit rules of the game and the prerequisites of the 
reproduction of the game and its stakes; but they can also get in it to transform, 
partially or completely, the immanent rules of the game. (1992, p. 99) 
Bourdieu explains that players’ efforts to transform the rules of the game involve 
competition between forms of capital; for instance, players can work to discredit the 
species of capital on which their opponents’ authority rests and to valorise the capital 
they preferentially possess, changing the value of species of capital within the game 
(1992, p. 99). The concept of the field as a game, structured by the possession, display 
and exchange of species of capital, refuses the idea that individuals can evade or be 
outside the power relations of the networks of social relations in which they 
participate: the efforts of those who are dominated within the field to resist and to 
transform the game still reify its existence and involve attempts “to usurp, exclude, 
and establish monopoly over the mechanisms of the field’s reproduction and the type 
of power effective in it” (Bourdieu & Wacquant, 1992, ibid, p. 106). Throughout the 
previous two chapters, I repeatedly referred to the symbolic power and hegemonic 
status of particular forms of capital within the therapy field – in particular, scientific, 
medical and business credentials, and command of the accompanying discourses. In 
chapters 8 and 9, I will examine how postmodern therapists endeavoured to “play the 
game” within the contemporary therapy field in Aotearoa New Zealand. 
Resisting neoliberalism 
Foucault’s specific, micro-political, anti-universal approach to power relations, and 
Bourdieu’s conception of fields as complex sites of struggle that are “always 
relational, dynamic social microcosms” (Everett, 2002, p. 60), call into question grand 
narratives of power and domination. Their ideas necessarily challenge and complicate 
any sweeping claims made about neoliberalism, and the associated discourses of “new 
public management” and managerialism. Neoliberalism, and the managerialist 
discourses that have flourished with its application in state and public sector 
organisations, have become favourite subjects for researchers of all areas of 
contemporary social and political life. The influence of neoliberalism over the past 
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forty years has seen it become, to quote David Harvey, “hegemonic as a mode of 
discourse. It has pervasive effects on ways of thought to the point where it has 
become incorporated into the common-sense way many of us interpret, live in and 
understand the world” (2005, p. 3). Thomas and Davies discuss how new public 
management focuses strongly on “the desire to introduce new disciplinary 
technologies designed to inculcate new attitudes, values and priorities and self-
understandings among … [public service] professionals” (2005, p. 685); new public 
management has been explained by the authors as an “identity project” because of its 
mission to transform and redefine the public service workforce (p. 685). Neoliberal 
and managerialist discourses, through their own articulations and in the analyses of 
some critics, may be presumed so powerful and widespread “that they are almost 
inescapable” (Spicer & Böhm, 2007, p. 1668). 
While neoliberalism has been enormously successful “in colonising economic and 
cultural life in innumerable contexts” (Bondi, 2005, p. 499), in its translation from a 
philosophical theory to lived practices and effects, it becomes something “more 
complex, diverse, contested and open to interpretation than is often recognized” 
(Campbell & Pederson, 2001, p. 3, as cited in England & Ward, 2007, p. 7). 
Neoliberal discourses, despite their hegemonic status and profound influence, have 
not been “rolled out” and enacted in any simple or total sense. Thomas and Davies’ 
research on managerial identities in the UK public service reminds us that individuals 
“are not passive recipients of discourses” (2005, p. 700). And neoliberal discourses 
are not the only discourses that vie “for attention in the process of identity make-up” 
(Thomas & Davies, 2005, p. 690). Numerous critics have challenged over-arching 
claims about the power of neoliberal discourses, and instead demonstrate individuals’ 
agency and the “ways that people resist, manoeuvre and play with discursive 
practices” (Halford & Leonard, 2006, p. 657). Rather than reproducing generic claims 
about neoliberal discourses, such critics urge colleagues to examine the complexity of 
the relationships between these discourses and individuals by situating their 
discussions within specific organisational settings and the particular contexts of 
people’s lives (Thomas & Davies, 2005; Halford & Leonard, 2006). It is at this micro-
political level that the multiple and varied effects of neoliberal discourses can be 
examined, and points of resistance and struggle revealed.  
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Boundary riding 
In the next two chapters I will examine the micropolitics of the postmodern therapy 
movement, grounding my analysis in the reported experiences of my study 
participants. Situated in distinct institutional contexts, and occupying variously 
similar and diverse subject positions, these therapists utilised particular discursive 
strategies as they straddled the mixed and at times fraught interests of their 
workplaces. As they negotiated and resisted the frequently conflicting forces that 
structured their working lives and therapy practices, they engaged in constant 
processes of “adaptation, subversion and reinscription of dominant discourses” 
(Thomas & Davies, 2005, p. 687). As the following chapters will demonstrate, 
working life for the therapists in this study required, to varying degrees of both 
comfort and discomfort, a doubleness, an ability to negotiate and translate seemingly 
conflicting social discourses. During my interview with Harry, a nurse/counsellor, he 
encapsulated this necessary doubleness in his description of himself within his public 
mental health work setting: he described himself as operating “as sort of a boundary 
rider”. He, like other therapists, was required to traverse the in-between of very 
different forms of knowledge. The following chapters explore this in-between-ness 
and the concomitant strategies of boundary-riding. 
!&+(!!
8. Boundary Riders, Group 1: Battlers, Burn-Outs and 
Blow-Outs 
Introduction 
As I analysed the interview texts of therapists who participated in this research 
project, I observed that they fell into roughly two main categories, around which I 
have structured the following two chapters. This chapter examines the talk and 
narratives of approximately half of the participating therapists. These “group one” 
therapists are united by experiences of struggle, tension and disillusionment as they 
endeavoured to negotiate the cultures of their public sector workplaces. I have created 
a classificatory system to label and name these participants and to structure into 
stories their accounts of their experiences within publicly funded services. These 
group one participants include the “battlers”, whose texts positioned them as 
therapists struggling to ride the boundary between sanctioned knowledge and therapy 
practices and their own ideals; despite disillusionment and, for some, self-doubt, they 
remained within public systems, using numerous strategies to negotiate the cultures of 
their workplaces. Other participants are labelled as “burn outs”: those who eventually 
chose to leave the public sector as their strategies of negotiation became unworkable 
or the personal toll became too great. The final category is the “blow outs”, therapists 
whose maverick tactics or head-to-head conflict with high-ranking colleagues forced 
them to leave their public sector workplaces. 
This chapter analyses the discursive strategies utilised by postmodern therapists to 
“play the game” within the neoliberalised, scientised therapy field in Aotearoa New 
Zealand, focusing on their efforts to resist the hegemony of the field and practise their 
preferred therapy approaches. It pays attention to the efficacy and consequences of 
these strategies, as they combined with the specificities of the therapists’ work 
settings. The chapter is organised in two parts. Part A is an exploration of the 
therapists’ engagement with the official discourses of their working environments and 
their assertions of professional selfhood. These processes frequently involved the 
reproduction of the languages and ideals of liberal humanism, and even aspects of 
neoliberalism itself. Numerous therapists used these languages and ideals in strategic 
ways to promote their preferred ways of working, to display professional 
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knowledge/power, and to justify their actions within their workplaces. Part B 
examines how, in response to a recognition of the limits of the efficacy of employing 
these official discourses, these therapists also utilised oppositional and subversive 
practices, in keeping with the “under siege” narrative detailed in the previous two 
chapters. I bring to light a “hidden transcript” of the therapy field in Aotearoa New 
Zealand, exposing some of the subversive resistance strategies developed by 
therapists. In the talk of these therapists there is not a revocation of the liberal 
humanist discourse, so much as a reaction against its instantiation within the new, 
neoliberal institutional environment: in fact, much of these participants’ talk is 
indebted to a liberal humanist tradition, which they see as corrupted by a culture of 
surveillance, financial austerity, and decreasing professional autonomy. 
Part A: Professional voices 
“Official politics” and the professional self 
In Governing the Soul, Nikolas Rose (1990) gives an exhaustive account of the 
production of the modern concept of “self”. He progressively details the relationships 
among war, industry, family, and the proliferation of psychotherapies over the 
twentieth century, tying these to the rise of autonomy, entrepreneurialism, self-
management, and self-direction as idealised qualities of selfhood (p. 114). These 
qualities, Rose argues, are promoted and presumed across modern western social 
institutions, acting as techniques of normalisation and governmentality and informing 
our “commonsense” understandings of human selfhood.25 Likewise, liberal humanist 
tenets of individual freedom, character development, and a capacity to critique 
(Davies, 2005, p. 10) have encouraged western individuals to operate as autonomous 
and rational agents, to make “free” choices, and to question and critique civil society. 
These features of the modern, humanist self, as detailed by Rose and Davies, are 
influential to the workings of neoliberal discourse. As Liz Bondi (2005) explains, 
“[n]eoliberal governmentality invokes a concept of the human subject as an 
autonomous, individualised, self-directing, decision-making agent” (p. 497). These 
attributes, she points out, are “fostered in different ways by psychotherapies and 
processes of professionalisation” (p. 497). While in one instance neoliberalism speaks 
the language of financial austerity, efficiency and measurable outcomes, and takes 
                                                
25 See chapter 3 for a discussion of how the “self” figures in therapy. 
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shape in managerialism, at the same time, the neoliberal professional is constructed as 
a resourceful, participating, autonomous agent.  
The concept of the autonomous, decision-making professional was invoked by the 
therapists discussed in this chapter and was evident in their workplace practices of 
resistance and negotiation. As mentioned in chapter 6, Alex’s interview presented a 
conflict between the medical, managerialist knowledge that structured his workplace 
and his own professional therapy knowledge over what counts as evidence within a 
publicly operated therapy service. Alex retold how he had 
written directly to our big boss around issues to do with evidence and outcomes, 
and initially, it felt rather patronising, but he did at least entertain a few flurries of 
emails, and then just said “no” [laughs]. “You’re wrong. This is the way it is”. 
In this instance, Alex attempted, through open discussion and debate, to resist and 
challenge the definition of the kind of evidence that was accepted as the base for 
therapy practice within his workplace. He detailed other instances where he voiced 
opposition and posed resistance to the norms of his workplace through overt, public 
practices: submitting lengthy comments on proposed standards within his workplace 
and putting himself forward to debate the nature of evidence in a forum of mostly 
conservative psychology colleagues.  
Alex demonstrated the strategy of “official politics” (Spicer and B,hm, 2007, p. 
1674), as he directly challenged and disputed the instructions and forms of knowledge 
governing therapists’ practices within his workplace. Spicer and B,hm (2007), 
drawing on the work of James C. Scott, define this strategy as comprising “all open, 
declared forms of resistance” (p. 1674). Involving relatively open debate and conflict, 
official politics is often “the realm of elites (e.g. lawyers, politicians, revolutionaries, 
political bosses), of written records (e.g. resolution, declaration, news stories, 
petitions, lawsuits), and of public action” (p. 1674). As he engaged in official politics 
– through emails, formal comments, and public debate – Alex assumed a position as 
an elite actor, and presumed that his participation in conversation and debate about 
workplace decisions was both acceptable and a potentially effective resistance 
strategy: he clearly articulated his critique of workplace systems, putting forth an 
alternative point of view with the aim of changing or influencing others, and, in turn, 
changing the rules of the game. The concept and discourse of professional selfhood, 
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where autonomous, self-directed professionals are decision-making agents, makes 
engagement in official politics seem like a natural, predictable strategy for therapists 
like Alex.  
However, Alex identified official politics as offering limited success as a resistance 
strategy. As indicated by his words in the excerpt above, he felt patronised in his 
engagement with his “big boss”, who blankly refused Alex’s claims and eventually 
shut down their conversation. Similarly, Frances demonstrated official politics to be 
an unworkable resistance strategy for many therapists in public sector services, and to 
be risky for those who attempted to use it. Referring to her time working in a public 
mental health service, Frances described herself as having 
a reputation for being the one who stuck my neck out and asked questions in 
clinical meetings and in staff meetings. You know, the sort of things that people 
talk about in twos and threes over coffee, that they’re unhappy about, but nobody 
speaks up in meetings. And I was the one who would ask those questions in a 
meeting, I think trading on how long I’d been there and my relationship with the 
unit manager. And I think I was set back a bit, so it cost me a lot. I was getting 
bitten, um, I got bitten a fair bit. 
For Frances’ colleagues, who voiced dissatisfaction over coffee but kept quiet during 
clinical and staff meetings, official politics was seemingly not a viable resistance 
strategy. As discussed in the previous chapters, the dominance of medical and 
managerialist knowledge within public sector therapy services, and the accompanying 
medical hierarchy, restricts the abilities of those with alternative knowledge forms to 
“speak” and be accorded legitimacy. Despite this, Frances took an active and vocal 
role in the public spaces of this workplace, raising critical questions and participating 
in discussion. Yet she did not experience the freedom, autonomy and decision-making 
capacities promised by the discourse of neoliberal professionalism: “sticking her neck 
out” and critiquing the workings of the organisation were actions that “cost” her. 
Frances was unspecific about what “getting bitten” in her workplace meant, and 
whether this took the form of official reprimands or being made to feel generally 
uncomfortable. However, she followed this comment with a lengthy account of the 
difficulties she encountered with workload issues and tense employment contract 
renegotiations, and described feeling unsupported and undervalued by those in charge 
of her workplace. Her narrative of working life at this organisation emphasised 
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repression and discomfort, with few successful avenues for participation in decision-
making or public expressions of dissent. 
The humanist tradition of the free, autonomous individual, possessing a capacity to 
critique and an ongoing interest in character development, was implicit in Alex and 
Frances’ engagement in official politics as a resistance strategy. Both presumed their 
professional roles accorded them agency and a right to participate in debate and 
discussion with managerial colleagues. Yet in practice within public sector therapy 
services, engagement with official politics was limited as a resistance strategy. As 
Frances suggested, there could also be uncomfortable consequences for those who 
used this strategy. Alex and Frances’ attempts at using official politics to resist the 
regimes and regulations of their workplaces revealed a clash between the neoliberal 
discourse of autonomous, decision-making professionals and the realities of their 
neoliberal, managerialist workplaces: their experiences suggested that the humanist 
tenets of autonomous selfhood functioned more as rhetoric than reality within the 
public spaces of these environments. 
Liz Bondi explains that neoliberalism has “proved itself to be a flexible beast, capable 
of being marshalled in relation to both economic and social policies, and capable of 
hybridising with both authoritarian and social democratic ideas” (2005, p. 499). While 
“freedom” and “choice” are catchphrases that suggest liberal and democratic ideals, 
the goals of efficiency and financial austerity create workplaces where calculative 
technologies, measurable outcomes, and other forms of surveillance have a profound 
influence on activities – as discussed in chapter 5. Bronwyn Davies (2005) argues that 
within these neoliberal systems, the energies of supposedly free, autonomous, 
decision-making individuals often end up focused on individual survival: “Survival is 
constructed not as moral survival but as economic survival” (p. 9). 
Such combative, untrusting systems – which use surveillance to encourage self-
monitoring and self-preservation – limit space for the ideals they supposedly embody: 
Elements of the liberal humanist self that were integral to the maintenance of the 
social fabric (a commitment to liberal values – the development of character, 
predictability, a capacity to critique) are now less important than the skills for 
individual survival (the capacity to earn money, entailing flexibility, 
responsiveness, responsibility for self against the other). (Davies, 2005, p. 9, 10) 
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Davies’ analysis of neoliberal systems demonstrates the clash between different facets 
of neoliberal discourse: despite the rhetoric, in practice liberal humanist values have 
been dislodged from many contemporary work systems. Her characterisation of 
neoliberal work cultures can be extended to illuminate the limited success of official 
politics as a resistance strategy within Alex and Frances’ state operated workplaces. 
As the reluctance of Frances’ colleagues to “speak up” attests, and Alex and Frances’ 
own efforts demonstrate, their workplaces did not eagerly encompass or particularly 
welcome the enactment of liberal values: Davies’ argument suggests that neoliberal 
work cultures, and the people within them, have shifted in the direction of economic 
concerns, with less attention to moral or social issues. Davies’ analysis also 
demonstrates the flexibility of neoliberalism, where humanist selfhood and the ideals 
of autonomy and freedom are hybridised into a form of agency that is focused on 
individualised responsibility and economic survival. As humanist selfhood is 
transformed into its neoliberal version, engagement in official politics becomes less 
viable for vulnerable workers subject to surveillance and operating within work 
cultures that are structured around economic imperatives. Alex and Frances’ 
narratives demonstrate this tension for therapists in public sector therapy services, 
where official politics and the capacity to critique appear to be at odds with the 
culture of their workplaces. 
 Professionalism as a resistance resource 
Overt acts of resistance 
While official politics was an often limited resistance strategy for the therapists 
discussed in this chapter, professional selfhood still proved to be an important 
resource for resistance practices. These therapists utilised discourses of 
professionalism, through which they asserted and performed a professional identity, 
to refuse or subvert the dominant regimes of their workplaces. Discourses of 
professionalism, including the concept of the autonomous, decision-making 
professional, enabled therapists to exercise agency within the therapy field and to 
justify acts of defiance. The therapists discussed in this chapter demonstrated the 
multiple and contested meanings of professionalism (Noordegraa, 2007, p. 2). As they 
used professionalism to resist the managerialist and medical norms of their 
workplaces, they simultaneously adapted and reinscribed dominant discourses.  
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Over the last decades of the twentieth century, there was a proliferation of claims to 
professional status. The numerous branches of expertise that can be included in the 
therapy profession have undergone increasing professionalisation: psychologies, 
psychotherapy, nursing, social work and counselling have all developed or enhanced 
systems of self- and/or statutory-regulation;26 their training programmes have become 
increasingly academic; and specific and exclusive roles as therapy practitioners exist 
within the paid workforce (Bondi, 2005, p. 509). With increased professionalisation 
comes an increased claim by practitioners to symbolic power and authority: as Bondi 
(2005) explains, “professional status confers autonomy on practitioners who are 
deemed to have internalised and to embody the knowledge and conduct required for 
professional practice” (p. 501). While professional status accords cultural and 
economic capital to its bearers, it is also seen by many as enabling the extension of 
the neoliberal project. The multiple and contradictory character of neoliberalism is 
demonstrated by practitioners’ achievement of professional autonomy at the same 
time that they submit to the disciplinary mechanisms of their professions. Therapy 
professions, as previous chapters have made clear, have become increasingly 
concerned with the expansion of accountability and reporting, and managerialism has 
become central to the neoliberal definition of “professionalism” (Davies, 2005; 
Doolin, 2002; Gray and McDonald, 2006; Halford and Leonard, 2006; Larner and 
Craig, 2005). Discourses of professionalism are multiple and slippery, and while 
neoliberalism operates as a powerful and colonising force, professionalism can still be 
harnessed by therapists to oppose this force and to enact their preferred therapy 
practices. 
Despite the limitations of official politics as a resistance strategy, the therapists 
discussed in this chapter did still engage in overt acts of resistance. Therapists retold 
instances where they had refused to comply with the managerial and medical cultures 
of their workplaces and displayed their alternative practices to colleagues. In these 
instances, practitioners were buoyed by their professional identity as autonomous 
                                                
26 While counselling is governed by a professional body, to which membership is granted when 
counsellors have demonstrated the application of particular knowledge and skills, as of 2012, it is not a 
registered profession. However, social workers, nurses, psychologists and psychotherapists are all able, 
or required, to be registered health practitioners. The New Zealand Association of Counsellors is 
considering registration under the Health Practitioners Competence Assurance Act 2003, but for the 
time being counsellors do not experience the bureaucracy and potential constraints of registration, nor 
the privileges and protections it offers (for example, DHBs do not generally employ counsellors for 
therapy roles). 
!&+%!!
decision-makers, in concert with their accumulated therapy knowledge/capital and 
their own claims to professionalism. Harry’s narrative therapy training and 
orientation, combined with a sense of professional autonomy and discretion, informed 
his refusal to use some of the psychiatric disorders included in the DSM-IV: 
The DSM-IV also has an axis two category, and the axis two category has to do 
with personality disorders, and you’re probably familiar with anti-social 
personality disorder, narcissistic personality disorder, borderline personality 
disorder? Well I hate those particular descriptions and don’t use them, and that’s 
brought me to some slight, um, I’m not quite sure what the word is, some slight 
controversy. 
Harry refused to use Axis II diagnoses to categorise or discuss the problems 
experienced by clients/patients. This stand marked him as different and somewhat 
controversial among his colleagues within a public mental health service, revealing to 
some extent his critical perspective on the use of diagnosis. While outright refusal to 
engage with the concept of diagnosis was not possible within the medicalised mental 
health setting where Harry did therapy work (see chapter 6), he exercised autonomy 
over how he used diagnosis and resisted fully adhering to the psychiatric model.  
Similarly, Jo, a clinical psychologist, exercised overt resistance in relation to the use 
of psychiatric diagnoses at her mental health service workplace. She explained how 
the requirement that she enter a diagnosis for all clients into a national computer 
system “drives me crazy”:  
Jo: So I rebel against it and don’t do it. 
Kate: You don’t do it? 
Jo: Well yeah, but I’m being increasingly challenged about that. And there are 
other people that say that because only psychiatrists do diagnosis, if you want to 
be true on the computer system, on somebody’s record that will be there for life, 
get your psychiatrist to do the diagnosis. But even that doesn’t solve the problem 
of, um… [pause] being told that to not get a diagnosis means you can’t come here 
[for therapeutic services]. 
Jo rebelled against the instruction within this workplace that psychiatric diagnoses be 
assigned to all clients and entered into a national database, which recorded clients’ 
diagnoses “for life”. In doing so, she drew on both an institutional understanding of 
professionalism and her own personal construction of herself as a professional 
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psychologist. The definition of the clinical psychologist role can function as a 
resource for resisting the dominance of psychiatry in the therapy field. Jo described 
how others critical of the practice of recording diagnoses used the boundaries between 
professions as a means to oppose this practice: only psychiatrists are officially 
endorsed by their profession to assign diagnosis; the extension of diagnosing to those 
without psychiatry’s authority therefore risks inaccuracy and undermines the 
responsibilities that should be held by psychiatrists. This defence against the 
requirement that non-psychiatrists diagnose clients/patients represents both resistance 
to and reinscription of the medicalisation of “mental health”: those non-psychiatrists 
personally opposed to diagnosing have an argument to support them, but it is an 
argument that shores up psychiatric power and authority and does not undermine the 
practice of diagnosis per se – but only asks that it be as “true” as possible. 
Jo voiced misgivings about this resistance strategy, explaining that it did not solve the 
problem that she perceived – namely, diagnosis being a requirement for accessing 
therapeutic services. During our interview, Jo retold two experiences where she 
fought to be able to provide therapy services to young women who did not easily fit 
the psychiatric model for diagnosis and treatment because of their circumstances of 
being young and homeless. For Jo, the goals of therapy work are about “connection”: 
Helping that person start to feel like they have a connection, and strengthening 
the other connections that they have, to deal with whatever issues that they have 
to live with, yeah.  Which is probably, you know, the homeless girl, that was 
definitely what I was advocating for, you know, it’s like “fuck it, she needs 
something to hold onto or she’s going to hang herself, so fuck you, like come on”, 
you know? [laughs].  And everyone else was too busy focusing on entry criteria 
to be concerned, so that’s probably what I was trying to do, yeah, to advocate for 
her. 
Jo constructed and articulated a personal professional identity as a clinical 
psychologist that was based on the provision of timely, accessible services to people 
in need and that prioritised connection over bureaucracy and medical practices. This 
professional identity became a resource and strategy for resisting the requirement that 
she enter diagnoses into the computer system. This was an instance of a therapist 
drawing on her accrued therapeutic capital and the humanist and postmodern 
discourses that are integral to the construction of a professional identity. Combined 
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with the presumption of professional autonomy and a capacity for decision-making, 
she used these resources to pose resistance to the norms of her workplace. 
Harry and Jo’s examples of overt resistance practices occurred within public sector 
therapy services that significantly constrained the abilities of postmodern therapy 
practitioners to practise therapy as they would like to. As described in chapters 5 and 
6, neoliberalism and the medical model dominate the structures and systems of public 
services. Harry and Jo’s acts of resistance are significant for their openness and for 
their relative success: Harry experienced some controversy but was seemingly able to 
persist in his refusal to use Axis II diagnoses, while Jo continued to rebel against the 
instruction that she enter diagnoses into a database, despite being increasingly 
challenged over this stance. In each instance, the therapist asserted and demonstrated 
an alternative approach to therapy work, challenging the reach of psychiatric 
knowledge and practices. For other postmodern therapy practitioners in this study, 
acts of resistance may not have been as overt as the actions of Harry and Jo, and may 
have taken place surreptitiously or not been discovered by colleagues and managers. 
However, the concept of professionalism still informed and was invoked to justify 
these actions, revealing contestation over the nature and meaning of therapy work 
within public sector services. 
 Ethics 
The concept and discourse of “ethics” plays a central role among all the officially 
recognised therapy professions. With the rise of professionalisation in recent decades, 
ethics have been discussed, defined and codified, and then subjected to ongoing 
reviews and revisions. Through the operation of codes of ethics for therapy 
professions,27 governing professional bodies stipulate principles, values and 
guidelines by which respective therapists are required to govern themselves. Ethical 
codes are also integral to the process by which authorised ethics committees 
investigate complaints against therapists. The ethical codes in operation within 
specific therapy professions share many common features. Therapists – as nurses, 
psychologists, psychotherapists, social workers or counsellors – are required, to 
                                                
27 Codes of ethics operate within the Nursing Council of New Zealand, New Zealand Nurses 
Organisation, New Zealand Association of Counsellors, Aotearoa New Zealand Association of Social 
Workers, New Zealand Psychological Society, New Zealand College of Clinical Psychologists, New 
Zealand Association of Psychotherapists, and the New Zealand Psychologists Board.  
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varying degrees depending on the professional body, to have regard “for the 
provisions of, and the spirit and intent of, the Treaty of Waitangi” (Code of Ethics 
Review Group, 2002, p. 3). They must also respect the dignity of others, recognise 
people’s autonomy and rights to self-determination, have personal integrity, provide 
appropriate caring, and promote social justice and the wellbeing of society (Aotearoa 
New Zealand Association of Social Workers, 2010; Code of Ethics Review Group, 
2002; New Zealand Association of Counsellors, 2002; New Zealand Association of 
Psychotherapists, 2011; New Zealand Nurses Organisation, 2010). These ethical 
codes combine both liberal humanist and social justice ideals, and neoliberal 
rationality: as Bondi explains, referring to the ethical codes governing counselling 
professions in the United Kingdom, practitioners are incorporated “into a strict 
disciplinary framework, which, alongside its collective level of operation, 
individualises responsibility for maintaining discipline” (2005, p. 510). Therapists are 
required to adhere to ethical codes, with transgressions by individual therapists 
subject to formal complaint procedures and investigations by their professional body. 
While the professional status accorded to therapy practitioners requires self-discipline 
and adherence to regulatory guidelines, as discussed earlier, it simultaneously bestows 
autonomy on these practitioners to act within the interests of the profession.  
Alex and Frank both demonstrated how professional ethics could be used as a 
resource that enables agency and resistance for postmodern therapy practitioners 
working within neoliberalised and medicalised workplaces. Within the therapy field, 
ethics, as a symbol of professionalism and specialist knowledge, functions as a form 
of cultural/therapeutic capital and a means by which therapists “confer… a power 
over the field” (Bourdieu & Wacquant, 1992, p. 101) and engage in a struggle over 
the configuration of forces that shape the field. Ethics offers a rationale for resistance 
and a potential defence for therapists if challenged. Alex revealed to me that he had 
not “done my files in the way that I’ve been asked to do them”, which he said would 
be discovered by management when his record-keeping came to be audited. He 
explained that while he kept what he considered appropriate records of his work with 
clients, the information was not “in the form that they’ve requested it. Because they 
want to audit the files, they want a system that’s nice and easy for some auditor to 
come in and find it”. Alex perceived managerialism as dictating the professional 
practices of therapists within his public sector workplace, and resisted this. 
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I then asked Alex whether, despite being subject to auditing and other forms of 
surveillance and instruction, he would still try to resist the constraints of 
managerialism on his therapy work. He said:  
Yes, I will continue to do that because if what we hold at the centre of what we do 
is ethical practice, you know, I can’t do something that is not consistent with 
trying to do what I understand to be best for the young person I’m working with 
at the particular time. 
Despite the hegemony of neoliberal and medico-scientific discourses and capital 
within the contemporary therapy field in Aotearoa New Zealand, these are still subject 
to challenge and contestation. Alex used professional ethics to explain and justify his 
refusal to adapt his therapy practices to suit what he saw as the goal of easy auditing. 
By invoking and demonstrating his professional ethics, Alex gave his act of resistance 
legitimacy and the authority of an exclusive, specialist profession. He issued a 
reminder of his profession’s definition of what psychologists do as professionals: hold 
“ethical practice” at the centre of all activities. While Alex’s defence for his refusal to 
comply with instructions for recordkeeping had not yet been tested, it bolstered and 
supported his acts of resistance. 
Like Alex, Frank explained and justified his subversion of his workplace’s system by 
using a discourse of professionalism, with the concept of therapist ethics at its centre. 
Frank’s professional status imbued him with a sense of authority and autonomy that 
enabled him to defy the rules of his workplace, even though his actions required 
subterfuge and secrecy. During his time working for a public sector therapy service, 
Frank wrestled with the requirement that all clients received a maximum of only six 
therapy sessions. He explained his problem with this short therapy timeframe for all 
clients and how, consequently, he found a solution: 
If you were doing some work with people who have had maybe quite major sort 
of emotional trauma, I mean it’s almost criminal to half way through say “oh 
sorry, your numbers are up, I can’t see you anymore”. I mean that would be 
professionally and even humanly very unethical and detrimental, although the 
system may kind of require that. So, you know, people were reviewed every three 
months so you might choose to keep quiet, or you may present someone in these 
reviews in such a way that it’s likely that they would get some sort of extension. 
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Frank positioned himself as a professional, ethical practitioner interacting with a 
system that he portrayed, on this occasion, as “almost criminal” and at odds with 
being “human”. In complying with the ethical code of his profession, Frank was 
required to prioritise his clients/patients’ interests and welfare, advocate social justice 
and “act to ensure that everyone has access to the existing resources, services and 
opportunities that they need” (Aotearoa New Zealand Association of Social Workers, 
2010). While his references to “ethics” and being “human” in this instance were 
generalised, Frank determined what was and was not ethical by virtue of his 
professional membership and specialised training, and drew upon the backing of an 
ethical code. These credentials supported him to pose and justify this act of resistance. 
In Frank and Alex, we see efforts to resist and transform – or perhaps, more correctly, 
to rehabilitate – the immanent rules of the game within the therapy field. Their texts 
and actions discredited the economic and managerial forms of capital upon which the 
force of their workplace “opponents” rested. Instead, they valorised the species of 
capital they preferentially possessed: therapeutic, professional capital (Bourdieu and 
Wacquant, 1992, p. 100).  
 Credentials and standing 
As in other institutions, the distribution of capital within therapy professions creates 
hierarchical relations between members. Even with the incursion of neoliberalism and 
medico-science into the therapy field in Aotearoa New Zealand, command of 
authorised capital – or knowledge/power – provides postmodern therapy practitioners 
with opportunities to increase their stakes in the contestation over the nature and 
meaning of therapy work and to pose resistance. Those therapists with considerable 
experience, senior positions and distinguished clinical qualifications or credentials 
described these as assets within conflicted work cultures. For example, Frank 
explained how reputation and his command of therapeutic and cultural capital granted 
him some license and leeway within his public sector workplace: 
I mean the clinical coordinator, because my office was opposite hers, and in some 
ways she knew that I didn’t do certain things that I was required to do. But on the 
other hand, I think because I was very good at my job, I mean I had good 
outcomes therapeutically with people. And because of my formal training I was 
very knowledgeable in many areas, so I had clinically quite considerable 
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standing. And I had started as a social worker and then after two years I became 
senior social worker, and I had sort of a clinical leading role as well. 
Professional status and prowess, in the form of clinical knowledge, networked 
relationships, successful therapy outcomes and seniority, enabled Frank to resist and 
refuse some of the requirements of his workplace, as his clinical coordinator turned a 
blind eye to his activities. When the extent of his resistance was discovered, however, 
as will be discussed later, the license granted to Frank evaporated. But, within certain 
boundaries, the possession of significant markers of cultural capital sanctioned some 
challenges to the norms imposed within therapy workplaces. Again, 
professionalisation provided resources and space, to some degree, for postmodern 
therapy practitioners to resist the neoliberal and medico-scientific cultures of their 
workplaces. 
Summary of Part A 
Discourses of professionalism, as discussed earlier, are multiple and slippery. The 
humanist and, more recently, neoliberal concept of autonomous, decision-making 
selfhood has been explained by critics as a project focused on individualising 
responsibility and directing professionals’ energy towards self-monitoring, self-
discipline, and, consequently, self-governance. Yet the rhetoric and humanist roots of 
autonomous selfhood are still powerful, and see postmodern therapists presume a 
right to contest the meanings and nature of therapy in contemporary Aotearoa New 
Zealand public therapy services. The disciplinary boundaries of therapy professions 
both regulate therapists and provide a means to contest the managerialist systems that 
organise many contemporary public sector therapy services. In their command of 
professional ethics, postmodern therapy practitioners were able to assert authority and 
justify subversive actions. As bearers of credentials and titles within a hierarchical 
institution they were also granted some leeway and license in their activities. 
Professionalism proved a powerful discourse for resourcing and justifying the acts of 
resistance discussed so far, many of which involved overt refusal in some form.  
However, my discussion of official politics revealed this to be a somewhat limited 
resistance strategy for postmodern therapists in public sector therapy services. For 
instance, Frances’ questions and criticisms of management led to her being “bitten”. 
Harry encountered controversy, and Jo was increasingly challenged, in response to 
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their resistance to diagnose clients/patients in the orthodox manner. And Alex and 
Frank’s invocation of ethics related to surreptitious and not-yet discovered acts of 
resistance. Overt, public acts of resistance and opposition to the managerial and 
medical regimes imposed within therapy workplaces were apparent within these 
therapists’ narratives. However, these acts were frequently laborious and/or risky for 
the therapists and not often successful: therapists frequently needed to fight and lobby 
for their professional viewpoints, sticking their necks out in the process. Within these 
often oppressive and tightly regulated systems, resistance much more often took 
shape in underground, secret and subversive forms, as the next section will analyse. 
Part B: Hidden transcripts – the appearance of conformity 
Chapters 5 and 6 described the therapy field in Aotearoa New Zealand as an 
increasingly difficult and uncomfortable environment for therapists wanting to 
practise postmodern and politically engaged modes of therapy, especially for those 
working in public sector services. Participants in this research demonstrated how 
managerial and medico-scientific knowledge and credentials were used to wield 
authority and legitimacy within the therapy field, leaving many therapists excluded 
and alienated from decision-making about the nature and workings of their 
workplaces. This chapter considers and analyses the strategies and discursive 
resources employed by one group of participants to resist the regimes of their 
workplaces and to carve out space to practice their preferred therapy approaches. The 
first section of the chapter has examined the intersection of professional selfhood with 
the concept of official politics, and the wider potential for discourses of 
professionalism to enable therapists to pose resistance. This section looks more 
closely at what James Scott terms the “hidden transcript” that subordinate groups 
create, where “a critique of power [is] spoken behind the back of the dominant” 
(Scott, 1990, p. xxi). I examine the less public efforts of therapists to negotiate the 
power relations of their workplaces, and reveal strategies that offer the appearance of 
conformity while simultaneously undermining these power relations. These therapists 
appear to be aligned with, or even to revere, the hegemonic discourses of their 
workplaces, and in the process enact modes of resistance, critiquing the dominant 
from behind its back. My discussion of the discursive resources and strategies utilised 
by therapists again reveals their simultaneous accommodation and subversion of 
dominant discourses and the necessary complexity of resistance. 
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“Wearing a false moustache” 
In their discussion of employee struggles against the hegemony of management, 
Spicer and Böhm (2007) explain that the “location of resistance in the workplace is 
mediated by the availability of space to engage in acts of resistance in the workplace” 
(p. 1678). When workplaces provide spaces, resistance may take shape in formal 
mechanisms and official politics. When little space is provided, as is the experience of 
many of the therapists discussed in this chapter, resistance “might also take the form 
of informal spaces of everyday life created by incomplete surveillance and ingenious 
methods of avoiding surveillance. These would allow a zone where it is possible to 
challenge discourses of management” (p. 1678). During my interviews, the therapists 
detailed the efforts they made to construct such a zone within their therapy 
workplaces, with the goal of evading surveillance and the discourses of management 
and doing therapy work that aligned with their professional ideals. To construct this 
zone, therapists actively performed conformity in the public spaces of their work and 
managed the impressions they created among managers and medical colleagues.  
Frank and Frances revealed how they knowingly constructed performances of 
conformity with the dominant medical discourse of their public health sector 
workplaces as a means to resist the dictates and instructions of management. They 
explained how they utilised double-talk and translation to pursue their own interests 
while appearing to embrace those of management. Frances retold the origins of this 
resistance strategy:  
Frances: I once made the mistake of presenting a case in a clinical meeting in 
narrative [therapy] terms. The psychiatrist was incredibly scathing. 
Kate: Really? 
Frances: Yes [laughs]. So I learned the skill of translating it [the case report] into 
CBT [cognitive behaviour therapy]. … A little is lost in the translation but a least 
you get through a clinical meeting unscathed. 
Frank similarly navigated and resisted the confines of the official instructions for his 
therapy work. He observed that many of his clients/patients at a public sector therapy 
service did not fit the prescribed format for therapy. When I asked him what this 
meant for his therapy practice, he responded by saying “well, I just sort of decided to 
operate on two levels really. So I worked with clients in a very narrative [therapy] 
way but I’d produce material in a very medical way”. In both instances, these 
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therapists learned to hide their actual therapy practices with clients/patients behind a 
performance designed to appease their clinical managers. They evaded the 
surveillance that operated within clinical meetings and avoided scrutiny of their 
narrative therapy work by strategically utilising dominant medical discourses, 
including the medically sanctioned cognitive behaviour therapy (CBT); this evasion 
enabled them to get through clinical meetings “unscathed”. They constructed the 
appearance that they possessed and subscribed to the reigning symbolic capital within 
their workplaces. As they negotiated and attempted to resist, Frances and Frank made 
“use of disguises, deception, and indirection while maintaining an outward 
impression, in power-laden situations, of willing, even enthusiastic consent” (Scott, 
1990, p. 17). 
Scott identifies the tension that is integral to this kind of resistance strategy: “In 
ideological terms the public transcript will typically, by its accommodationist tone, 
provide convincing evidence for the hegemony of dominant values, for the hegemony 
of dominant discourse” (1990, p. 4). The public, official discourse of Frances and 
Frank’s workplaces appeared content and unchallenged as these therapists spoke and 
endorsed its language and logic; discontent and alternative discourses were largely 
absent from the public transcript. Yet therapists’ manipulations enabled them to 
exercise greater autonomy within the private and everyday spaces of their therapy 
rooms and to protect the meaning and nature of their therapy work with clients from 
scrutiny and criticism. However, Frances also suggested that by reproducing medical 
discourse, therapists might simultaneously be able to incorporate some aspects of 
their actual therapy philosophy into their public records and discussions: their 
seeming adherence to the medical model perhaps tempered management responses to 
their less conventional practices. She explained how elements of her narrative therapy 
practice were discernible in her reports on her work with clients: “There were a 
couple of us who used clients’ language rather than pathologising descriptions, 
sprinkled with enough terminology for it to be acceptable. It’s like wearing a false 
moustache [both laugh]”. As she “wore a false moustache” – which conjures images 
of espionage, subterfuge and ruses – and strategically reproduced just enough of the 
dominant discourse, Frances seemed to win some space in the struggle and was able 
to resist some of the pathologising habits of medicalised therapy by including her 
clients/patients’ descriptions of their experiences in her official reports. As a 
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resistance strategy, the performance of conformity by postmodern therapy 
practitioners was necessarily partial, as these therapists negotiated political regimes 
that were at times hostile to alternative knowledge forms. 
The “false moustache” resistance strategy, where therapists performed compliance 
and conformity with the dictates and instructions of their workplaces, involved the 
strategic use of silence and secrecy. As therapists translated their narrative therapy 
work into the language of CBT and managed their performances during clinical 
meetings, they kept silent about aspects of their therapy practice and kept their 
critique of the established order secret. These therapists were active and strategic in 
their use of silence, which helped them to navigate and resist the regulations imposed 
on their therapy practice. Throughout my interviews, therapists repeatedly pointed out 
the privacy they were afforded in their actual work with clients/patients. As Frances 
explained, “what I did behind closed doors was a secret”. The possibility of attaining 
a degree of professional autonomy – albeit unofficial and surreptitious – behind 
closed doors was echoed by Charlotte. Much to her frustration, during Charlotte’s 
clinical psychology training she was required to practise CBT in a prescribed, formal 
manner. Her practice was monitored in various ways by her teachers and supervisors. 
However, when she became employed as a therapist, she discovered methods to evade 
prescriptions for her practice:  
You can get away with it a bit more because you [laughs] don’t have to like write 
case studies. You don’t actually have to kind of say what you’re doing [laughs], 
which sounds awfully kind of covert and undercover, but it’s true. 
As the previous two chapters demonstrate, therapy work in Aotearoa New Zealand 
has been subject to increased surveillance through auditing and the imposition of 
medical practices and “measurable outcomes”. Yet therapists’ face-to-face encounters 
with clients/patients are generally private and free from immediate scrutiny. By 
actively employing the tactic and discourse of silence in their interactions with 
clinical and bureaucratic management, therapists like Frances and Charlotte were able 
to avoid surveillance and construct a zone outside the full reach of management. 
Brown and Coupland’s (2005) discussion highlights the complex and multiple 
meanings of silence within organisational settings. Frances and Charlotte’s strategic 
silences were “active performance[s]” (p. 1051): they constructed “knowing 
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compliance through reference to impression-management activities”, which suggested 
they were “agentic” (p. 1056, original emphasis). Frances held and protected her own 
secret, which enabled her to subvert the instructions of management, while Charlotte 
“got away with” refusing to do CBT with her clients/patients in the prescribed way. In 
each instance, being silent functioned as a deliberate resistance tactic that utilised 
impression-management, providing a means for these therapists to secure some space 
to exercise autonomy in their therapy work. Like the participants in Brown and 
Coupland’s research, these therapists were “reflexively able to create space for 
resistance even in the apparently accommodative performance of themselves as 
knowingly compliant employees” (2005, p. 1063). Their clinical managers 
experienced no obvious challenge to the dominant discourses of the workplaces, but 
challenges were manifest in the covert, underground activities of postmodern, 
politically engaged therapists like Frances and Charlotte. Strategic silence provided a 
means for therapists to meet their own needs and interests within their workplaces. 
At the same time that Brown and Coupland theorize silence as an active strategy of 
impression management, they highlight how it may also function “as a power effect” 
(2005, p. 1049). While the therapists discussed in this chapter constructed themselves 
as active agents who utilised silence as a means of resisting the regulations of their 
workplaces, several also perceived silence as an experience of oppression and 
marginalisation, particularly when it became an established, long-term practice. 
Reflecting on her many years working at a public mental health service, Frances 
declared that one of the greater costs for her “was developing the habit of being quiet. 
Allowing myself to be silenced”. Frances referred to her attempts at utilising official 
politics, which led to her being “bitten”:  
So I did learn to be silent. I thought of it as picking my battles, but I don’t think it 
was quite as functional as that. I was a bit silenced at the end, and it wasn’t good 
for me. I shouldn’t have worked there quite so long really. 
She went on to describe the severe “burn-out” she ultimately experienced as she tried 
to “hold onto the things that I’m passionate about” while working in a service that 
was shifting more and more towards managerialism and medicalised therapy. 
Frances’ self-narrative in our interview positioned her as an underground rebel, 
sporting a “false moustache” and being strategically silent in order to claim some 
autonomy as a therapist. Yet she also positioned herself as a “burn-out”, suffering 
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from the toll wrought by a hostile workplace that “silenced” her and from the 
exhausting labour involved in resisting and finding ways to hold onto what she was 
passionate about as a therapist. Her text showed the slipperiness of the meanings of 
silence, as she described how the strategy of “picking my battles” became less 
“functional” and more about being silenced by an oppressive system, which was 
implicated in her burn-out. 
Jo reinforced the dual meanings of silence for the group one therapists discussed in 
this chapter: it functions as both an active resistance strategy and a potential 
“principle of their own subjection” (Brown & Coupland, 2005, p. 1059) and 
oppression. After observing that Aotearoa New Zealand’s public mental health 
services “are moving more and more towards an American model of managed care”, 
evident in a focus on medically defined outcomes and definitions of “progress”, Jo 
declared: 
If you start to think about all that stuff it’s actually quite crazy making. Or you 
feel like if you stay involved with the family or a young person then it’s 
something the system might not approve of. And you feel in the closet, which is 
why I use that term, that you’re doing something that feels a bit devious. 
While “deviousness” does suggest therapist agency in the struggle over the nature and 
meaning of the therapy field, it is also the perspective of a judging onlooker; 
practising silence and evasion in her workplace seemed to make Jo feel like a 
wrongdoer. This was reinforced by her use of the metaphor of being “in the closet”, 
which evokes an oppressive identity politics where a lack of safety and fear of 
persecution work to stifle and inhibit full identity expression, leaving those “in the 
closet” in necessary but self-imposed hiding.  
Like Frances, Jo illustrated the personal toll of trying to resist a “crazy making” 
system that required her to be “in the closet”: 
I think for me it’s been quite a struggle, but I’m really passionate about working 
with kids, especially, and I think that’s how I hold on. But at times I’ve wanted to 
quit, I’ve wanted to get out and I’ve wanted to just grow flowers [Kate laughs], 
seriously. 
Like Frances, Jo “held on” to her passion for therapy work with clients as a means of 
trying to cope with an oppressive and exhausting system. Silence provided a shield 
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for both of their activities, and enabled some autonomy within private work with 
clients/patients, but could also be an experience of subjugation. The shifting, multiple 
meanings of silence for the therapists discussed in this chapter demonstrate the 
necessarily contradictory and contested natures of both resistance and hegemony. 
Silence and the other subversive activities involved in “wearing a false moustache”, 
as everyday acts of resistance, “represent the ways in which relatively powerless 
persons accommodate to power while simultaneously protecting their interests and 
identities” (Ewick and Silbey, 2003, p. 3). The appearance of conformity enabled 
these therapists to protect their interests and their therapist identities, but it also 
involved accommodating to power, bringing with it a personal toll and leaving the 
public transcript largely intact. In turn, the hegemonic system within the therapy field 
appeared to thrive. 
Playing the game and working the system 
“Wearing false moustaches” and staying strategically silent enabled postmodern 
therapy practitioners to appear to conform to the neoliberal and medical regimes of 
their workplaces while subverting these regimes and finding space for professional 
autonomy and agency. The therapists discussed in this chapter detailed other 
resistance strategies that similarly entailed the reproduction of dominant discourses 
and the appearance of conformity. These strategies involved the calculated use of the 
“Master’s tools”, rather than the overt rejection of these tools. With so little space for 
overt resistance and engagement in official politics, many therapists found they 
needed to “play the game” strategically within their workplaces, rather than to refuse 
or attempt to evade the game. The examples that follow demonstrate Bill Doolin’s 
assertion that “[d]isciplinary power is not exclusively constraining. It also empowers, 
in the sense that it opens up and legitimates a discursive space for action” (2002, p. 
381). Having the ability and authority to use the Master’s tools, or the dominant forms 
of knowledge and capital, and to play the game within the workspaces of the therapy 
field can win therapists some space for action.  
Caputo and Yount (1993) expand this idea in their discussion of the critique of 
institutions by agents from within. They declare that, “if a narrow claim to ‘expertise’ 
allows one to operate machineries of domination, that person is also positioned to leak 
the secrets of the machine, even to calibrate its parts toward opposite functions” (p. 
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8). Despite their reports of repression and constraint within neoliberalised, 
medicalised therapy workplaces, the professional knowledge and status of therapists 
still allowed them to claim expertise. As agents of institutions, equipped with 
recognised expertise, they were unavoidably involved in the operation of machineries 
of domination, focused as these institutions are on the regulation and normalisation of 
populations. However, Caputo and Yount (1993) suggest that the capacity to critique 
the power relations of institutions presents the option to agents of knowingly using the 
machineries toward opposite functions. By playing the game – reiterating dominant 
discourses and engaging with the terms that govern official discussion – therapists 
strategically vied for space and authority to practise therapy as they preferred to, or to 
at least temper the instructions for their therapy work. Their criticisms of the 
sanctioned knowledges and practices of their workplaces enabled a critical and 
knowing engagement with these knowledges and practices, through which these 
therapists worked to further their own therapeutic goals. 
During our interview, Alex critiqued the lengthy consent form that his organisation 
required him to administer with all the families he worked with. He explained the 
complexity and sensitivity of his work, especially in regard to building contact and 
engagement with the family members of a young person who is referred to him. He 
gave the example of the process of relationship-building with a mother, which would 
have been much more difficult “if I’d gone into my first meeting with her and said 
‘right, we’ve got to cover these 14 things [on the consent form]’”. Instead, because 
the family was M!ori, Alex was able to justify working with the mother in a less 
formulaic way and to spend concerted time focusing on the question of “how do I 
engage this family?”: 
One of the great things about this country is that it at least pretends, and at least 
this organisation pretends, that it wants to be bicultural. So whenever I get really 
stuck and in a hole I can wave, you know, the M!ori, Tangata Whenua28 flag and 
say “ohh, hang on a minute”. And our M!ori colleagues are a little bit 
                                                
28 Tangata whenua is a M!ori term of the indigenous peoples of New Zealand and literally means 
"people of the land", from tangata, “people” and whenua “land” (“Tangata Whenua”, 2011, para. 1). 
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beleaguered here but, you know, they would back me and would say “kanohi ki te 
kanohi”,29 and, you know, I’m able to pull that one.  
Alex adhered to and reiterated the official “rules” of the game within his work setting 
– that services acknowledged and responded to M!ori cultural norms and values – as 
a means of mitigating the prescription for how he administered the consent process 
with M!ori clients/patients. He identified and exploited the clash of rules and 
discourses within the service. 
The government of Aotearoa New Zealand is committed to “upholding the principles 
of the Treaty of Waitangi” (Te Puni Kokiri, 2001, p. 7).30 This commitment is 
documented in the policies and strategic plans of organisations and departments 
across the public sector, including health, education, social development, local 
authorities, and community organisations. While Alex expressed cynicism about the 
claims to “biculturalism” made by the public sector organisation, suggesting it was 
pretence, he also strategically utilised this dominant discourse when he was stuck or 
“in a hole” in regard to his client work and the demands of the system. The principle 
of “kanohi ki te kanohi” is reiterated in the policies and guides for providing effective 
and appropriate services to M!ori in many public sector services and organisations.31  
“Kanohi ki te kanohi” requires direct, face-to-face contact and communication 
between service providers and the people receiving services, and is integral to 
whakawhanaungatanga – that is, “building a relationship based on connectedness that 
allow[s] for a richer sharing of information” (Jones, Ingham, Davies, & Cram, 2010, 
p. 3). Being bicultural in Aotearoa New Zealand requires public services to 
demonstrate that they recognize and incorporate the cultural practices and values of 
M!ori. When faced with a complex family situation and the requirement that a 
                                                
29 “Translated - ‘Eye to eye'. To meet face to face to discuss issues. This is seen as important so 
physical reactions like body language and facial expressions are easily read” (Office for the 
Community & Voluntary Sector, Department of Internal Affairs, n.d.). 
30 For information on the “principles of the Treaty of Waitangi” see http://www.tpk.govt.nz/en/in-
print/our-publications/publications/he-tirohanga-o-kawa-ki-te-tiriti-o-waitangi/ 
31 See, for instance, the Environmental Risk Management Authority 
(http://archive.ermanz.govt.nz/resources/publications/pdfs/teputara9.pdf), the Ministry of Education 
(http://www.minedu.govt.nz/NZEducation/EducationPolicies/MaoriEducation/AboutMaoriEducation/
WhoWeAre/EngagementWithMaori/HuiTaumataMatauranga/BetterRelationshipsForBetterLearning/Pr
inciples_of_success.aspx), the Hawke’s Bay District Health Board 
(http://www.hawkesbay.health.nz/page/pageid/2145869726/Maori_Health), Suicide Prevention 
Information New Zealand’s M!ori Suicide Prevention Resource (Ihimaera & MacDonald, 2009),  and 
the Department of Internal Affairs 
(http://www.communityoutcomes.govt.nz/web/coutcomes.nsf/unid/TCAO-7GT2FE?openDocument). 
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lengthy consent process be promptly administered, Alex waved the “M!ori, Tangata 
Whenua flag”. Despite his suggestion that the biculturalism of his workplace was only 
“pretend” and lacked sincerity, he recognised that its symbolism was powerful and 
could be harnessed to stall and contest the management and bureaucratic imperatives 
imposed on therapy work. By “playing the game” and appealing to the dominant 
discourse of biculturalism, Alex was able to prioritise face-to-face relationship-
building with members of the wh!nau32 over the strict requirement that the consent 
form be filled in immediately, and could win some space for professional autonomy 
in his therapy work with this mother. He used a dominant discourse to trump the 
power and authority of other dominant discourses within the therapy field. 
Several therapists who were working in publicly operated mental health services 
found ways to mitigate and resist the requirement that they engage with psychiatric 
diagnosis in their work with clients/patients through the strategic use of such 
diagnosis. Wherever possible, Frances and Harry both used the DSM-IV “V-Codes” to 
diagnose clients/patients. Frances described the “V-Codes” as “preferable, less 
pathologising descriptions”. The “V-Codes” are included near the end of the DSM-IV, 
in a section titled “Other Conditions That May Be a Focus of Clinical Attention” 
(American Psychiatric Association, 1994, p. 675); they occupy less than ten pages in 
the 800-page tome. Harry explained that the “V-Codes” include 
things like “parent-child relational issue”, or actually “parent child relational 
problem”, “partner relational problem”, and then there are other ones, there’s 
maybe a dozen more respectful descriptions. 
Kate: Yeah, it sounds a lot softer. 
Harry: And I would use those where I can.  And it’s possible to write, well “no 
diagnosis given”.  And there’s also a V Code called “phase of life problem”.  So 
it’s possible to draw upon the DSM-IV to defuse its own toxicity at some level.   
Harry harnessed both his critique of psychiatric diagnosis and his professional 
expertise to find a way to limit the force of diagnosis, while still adhering to the DSM-
IV. He complied with the requirement that he diagnose clients/patients, but wherever 
possible used the least pathologising descriptions for their problems. The “V-Codes” 
                                                
32 Wh!nau is a M!ori-language word for extended family, now increasingly entering New Zealand 
English, particularly in official publications. In M!ori society, the wh!nau is also a political unit, below 
the level of hap" and iwi (“Wh!nau”, 2011, para. 1, 2). 
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allowed him to speak of specific and contextual “problems”, rather than psychiatric 
“disorders”, and were less obstructive to narrative therapy-style conversations with 
clients/patients: to speak of problems and people’s relationships to them is more in 
keeping with narrative therapy than the language of disorder and dysfunction. Harry’s 
critique of the “toxicity” of the DSM-IV enabled him to strategise to defuse and 
undermine it, from within the confines of a medicalised work environment: he 
calibrated the parts of this machinery of domination toward an opposite function. Like 
Alex, he “works the system” and knowingly reproduced its discourses to meet his 
own ends. 
“Beating the system”: a story of a maverick 
This chapter has considered various strategies and discursive resources utilised by 
therapists to resist the hegemonic regimes of their workplaces and the prescriptions 
for their therapy practice. As they wielded professionalism to engage with official 
politics and justify acts of defiance, or constructed an appearance of conformity to 
secure some space for autonomy and to “work the system”, these therapists attempted 
to negotiate and where possible limit the hegemony of medico-science and 
neoliberalism within the therapy field. Despite the dominance of these discourses, 
therapists found ways and occasions to contest and undermine them. Their resistances 
and rebellions were neither sweeping nor without compromise or tension; the 
impracticability of official forms of resistance and the necessity for hidden, 
subversive methods demonstrated the limited nature of therapists’ acts of resistance. 
Most of the therapists discussed in this chapter reluctantly abided by the rules and 
regulations of their workplaces, or at least worked hard to appear to, but pushed at the 
edges of these rules whenever it was possible and safe to do so.  
This section looks at the narrative of one therapist in particular – Frank – who stood 
out in the research because of his risk-taking and the scale of his resistance to the 
rules of his public therapy workplace. Frank’s narrative involved many of the 
resistance strategies discussed so far: impression management and the appearance of 
conformity, the strategic invocation of professionalism, and using the “Master’s 
tools” to obtain space for autonomous action. Yet he was distinguished by the extent 
of his efforts to “beat the system”. His narrative was significant and is discussed here 
because it is an interesting case study of the breadth and success of resistance in the 
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therapy field in Aotearoa New Zealand, but also of the consequent toll for therapists. 
His efforts also exemplify the vulnerability of “the system” and highlight how the 
logic of neoliberal/managerialist and medicalised therapy regimes can be exploited 
and within them gaps can be found for resistance. In particular, Frank manipulated the 
auditing and accountability systems of his workplace and exploited his manager’s 
lack of grounded knowledge and engagement with the activities of staff. Both of these 
strategies enabled Frank to develop his own sub-system of autonomous professional 
practice. 
My discussion of Frank’s resistance strategies reiterates the claims made in the 
introduction to this section: that neoliberal discourses, despite their hegemonic status 
and profound influence, have not been “rolled out” and enacted in organisations in 
any straightforward and absolute or total sense. At a micro-political level of analysis, 
discourses and power relations at play within organisations are always multiple and 
contestable – even the master discourse of neoliberalism. Knights and McCabe’s 
(2000) research is useful for my analysis of Frank’s narrative. They examined the 
effects of a recently introduced “Total Quality Management” model on the activities 
of employees at a major retail banking corporation. This neoliberal-inspired 
management model focused on employee subjectivity, with attention to “employee 
self-discipline and the internalisation of production and performance norms” (p. 421). 
As such, Knights and McCabe report claims that it “all but eliminates [employee] 
resistance” (p. 421). However, their research illustrates Foucault’s assertion of the 
interdependency of power and resistance (1990, p. 95). They found that: 
New opportunities for alternatively interpreting management directives are 
always arising on the office floor. While management seeks to devise universal 
coherent strategies, … gaps and gaffs, and deviations and disjunctions frequently 
occur. Employees can readily exploit the resulting tensions, inconsistencies and 
contradictions. (p. 431) 
However bold and totalising neoliberal discourses may be, their implementation 
within specific organisational settings is necessarily variable and in some instances 
contradictory. As Frank’s narrative demonstrates, at the level of the office floor – or 
the therapy room – contradictions and disjunctions provide employees with 
opportunities for resistance. 
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In our interview, Frank constructed himself as a maverick: he described himself to 
me, saying “I’ve always been a bit of a rebel and always been interested in finding out 
how to beat systems”. Some years earlier, Frank had been working as a therapist for a 
publicly operated counselling and mental health service, which was being managed 
along neoliberal/managerialist and medical lines. His description of the system 
operating within this workplace demonstrated both his maverick, rebel subject 
position and how his critique informed the actions he took to calibrate the parts of the 
“machine” of the system toward his own interests: 
The system is a bit like a straitjacket. I mean you have so little room and how to 
work is so prescribed that it becomes really difficult, and, you know, what you’re 
doing is actually not of great help to the people who come to see you. And, so you 
start looking for ways, you know, “can I find my own way in this?” Which I 
eventually got very good at. 
Frank critiqued the efficacy of the system of his workplace, asserting his professional 
identity as a therapist as he questioned the helpfulness of the prescriptions for therapy 
work with clients/patients. Like the descriptions included in chapters 5 and 6, he 
depicted the system as a stifling, constraining force that impeded therapists from 
working effectively. Frank’s narrative foregrounded these critiques and linked them to 
the beginnings of a project focused on finding his own way within the system and 
securing space for autonomous professional practice. 
Frank’s narrative of “beating the system” and “finding his own way” depicted the 
dominant, official system of a public sector therapy organisation and his own rival 
sub-system. He described an official system, which focused on bureaucratic 
accountability and rationed therapy time, and the evolution of his own sub-system in 
reaction to this official system: 
Frank: There’s a system that’s largely based on meeting the formal requirements 
of the organisation and accountability. Although, I mean on a therapeutic level 
there’s not a great deal of accountability or great depth; people don’t even have 
an understanding of this because of the limitations on time and everything. …  
So I mean, what you eventually do, which is what I did, is that you work entirely 
in your own way. So I ended up seeing people for far longer than I was officially 
allowed to. 
Kate: How did you get around that? 
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Frank: Oh, I got around everything really [Kate laughs]. … You end up working 
in an entirely different way within the system. 
Frank described a highly developed sub-system that allowed him to work “entirely in 
his own way”, while the official system appeared to prevail; his narrative brought to 
light a hidden transcript from within Aotearoa New Zealand’s therapy field. 
The strong focus on measurable outputs – that is, the numbers of clients/patients who 
were assessed by the agency – created tension for Frank: “As a worker, you were 
constantly caught up in that game, the numbers game versus trying to help people”. 
The “numbers game” was ironically integral to Frank’s ability to devise a sub-system 
from within the official system of his workplace: 
I mean there were so many audits and accountability systems. But then, because it 
was so focused on numbers, one month I thought I’d like to test these systems. 
You have to write a list of people seen, so I wrote down a person I hadn’t seen at 
all, a name, just to see what would happen. And nothing happened [Kate laughs]. 
And then I wrote down a couple more names, and nothing ever happened. And so, 
in some ways there was this focus on numbers but nobody actually checked if 
anything matched up or not. 
Frank’s tactic of regularly providing false client/patient details for his organisation’s 
database and accountability reports allowed him to work with his actual 
clients/patients for longer than the six sessions they were officially allocated. He 
subversively seized more time for his therapy work with individuals, which enabled 
him to exercise autonomy and professional judgement over the timeframe of their 
work together. 
As detailed in chapter 5, the extension of the market model into public sector services 
saw “value for (state) money” established as a governing management principle. 
Surveillance and performance monitoring became routine practices, with particular 
emphasis on “calculative technologies” (McKinnon, 2000, p. 298); evidence of the 
worth and value of services were increasingly required in visible and quantitative 
forms. These practices were evident in Frank’s workplace, where accountability was 
measured by client/patient output statistics and monitored through audits. Ironically, 
despite the emphasis on surveillance and quality management under neoliberalism, 
Frank was able to detect and exploit the “incomplete surveillance” (Spicer & Böhm, 
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2007, p. 1678) at his workplace. In doing so, he secured himself a zone where he 
could challenge discourses of management (Spicer & Böhm, 2007, p. 1678). The 
focus of the “numbers game” on only measurable data, rather than specific 
client/patient names, enabled Frank to provide false names without detection. Frank 
exploited the oversight and inefficiency of the system that attempted to govern his 
therapy practice; within this specific organisational setting, managerialism was both 
manipulable and inconsistent. His resistance also called into question the seeming 
precision and transparency of quantitative data, exposing the limitations of the 
neoliberal approach. 
Frank found and took advantage of other inconsistencies and disjunctions in the 
managerial regime at his workplace. As discussed in chapter 5, a feature of 
neoliberalism/managerialism has been the elevation of business and corporate 
management knowledge and professionals. With the health reforms in Aotearoa New 
Zealand in the 1990s, “health” managers were replaced with “business” managers; 
practitioner knowledge was no longer a requirement for the management of public 
sector services. Chapter 5 detailed criticisms and the frustrations of therapists who 
worked in organisations where neoliberal forms of capital were legitimised over 
therapeutic capital. Yet for Frank, this management arrangement also provided 
opportunities for resistance and the operation of his sub-system. He described his 
workplace as “quite an oppressive environment, particularly with this [one] manager”. 
In response to oppression: 
People became more creative in defying it in a way, and it was kind of almost like 
a game. And because he was the manager, I mean he actually had no clue of what 
really happens most of the time. And as a group of people, you also became 
proficient in sidetracking him, and when something else was put in place that 
maybe closed one gap then very quickly you find some other gap to still continue 
in the way you’re operating. 
Frank “played the game” within this system, with the intention of winning space and 
autonomy, by manipulating his manager. His description suggested a gap between 
management and practitioners, as he claimed the manager “had no clue of what really 
happens most of the time”. He and his colleagues exploited this arrangement in order 
to operate their unofficial sub-system. Again, Frank’s resistance undermined the 
supposed precision and reliability of neoliberal management and surveillance. The 
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manager’s lack of knowledge of practitioner activities was a weakness that Frank 
could harness to pursue his own professional goals. 
Frank operated his sub-system within the official system of this workplace for a 
couple of years. He did so with the knowledge that his tactics were time-limited and 
would eventually be discovered and halted: 
Frank: I mean in the end it all fell to bits, which I knew… 
Kate: You knew that was going to happen? 
Frank: Well, whatever you do sooner or later something will happen. And I also 
knew the system would be quite unforgiving. 
Frank’s deception and subversive, rule-breaking activities were eventually discovered 
and the sub-system did fall to bits. After this, he continued working but his activities 
were more closely scrutinised and controlled by management, and his working 
conditions became increasingly uncomfortable: “all these other things happened, 
which made life kind of awkward in a way, and I suppose were meant to teach me a 
lesson really”. The workplace eventually became intolerable for Frank and he 
resigned from his role. He continued to do therapy work, but from outside the 
immediate public sector, working for an NGO service. Frank posed the most extreme 
and systematic acts of resistance of all the participants in this study, and was very 
successful at securing the means and space to do therapy in accordance with his 
professional standards. Yet his actions were not sustainable and carried significant 
risks in terms of his livelihood and professional role. Being a maverick and beating 
the neoliberal, medicalised therapy system were possible, but were also at odds with 
long-term survival within this system. 
Conclusion: the toll and effects of resisting 
The postmodern therapy practitioners discussed in this thesis are “boundary riders”. 
Of necessity, they ride and negotiate the boundaries between their own philosophical 
positions, professional identities and aspirations, and the rules and norms of 
managerialist, medicalised public sector workplaces. This chapter examined the 
strategies and tactics used by one group of therapists to contest these rules and norms 
and to win space where they could exercise professional autonomy and do therapy 
work as they would like to. The discourse of professionalism and the liberal humanist 
and neoliberal concepts of self were used by therapists to play and contest “the game” 
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in their workplaces. At times, therapists refused instructions from management, 
voiced criticisms, and made use of the license granted to them by their professional 
status. Where possible, they agitated within the systems of their workplaces, voicing 
opposition and posing challenges. As they presumed a right to engage in official 
politics or invoked their therapeutic capital to discredit the regimes in their 
workplaces, they also reinscribed and reasserted dominant discourses, including 
neoliberal discourse: their resistances simultaneously undermined and reproduced 
dominant power relations. These public and professional contests – as in any 
hegemonic system – were necessarily complex, mixed and “never in a position of 
exteriority in relation to power” (Foucault, 1990, p. 95).  
Part A of this chapter focused on therapists’ assertions of their professional identities 
and capital, and their engagement with official politics as means of challenging the 
systems of their workplaces. As discussed, official politics had limited success for 
these therapists and posed potential risks. While overt acts of resistance did take 
place, my research shows that resistance by therapists to the rules and norms of 
workplaces largely happened surreptitiously and away from official view. Part B 
brought to light and examined the hidden transcript of the therapy field in Aotearoa 
New Zealand. Unofficially, and unbeknownst to management – and often colleagues 
– many therapists found ways and spaces to determine for themselves how they would 
practise therapy and engage with clients/patients, and for how long. They did so by 
constructing appearances of conformity with, and acquiescence to, the regulations and 
prescriptions of their workplaces, evading surveillance and sanction. As with the 
methods discussed in the first part of this chapter, these methods of resisting and 
subverting the governing system of their workplaces were similarly complex. While 
privately these therapists ignored and subverted the reigning discourses and norms of 
their workplaces, publicly they accommodated and reproduced them. They exploited 
the clash between different dominant discourses to further their own ends and 
interests, but left the public discourses of their workplaces intact. Under cover, and 
through the use of dominant discourses, therapists contested the meanings and nature 
of the therapy field and won space for autonomous practice, yet this largely remained 
absent from the official discourses and workings of their workplaces. The official 
discourses were maintained and reproduced, and appeared successful. 
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The tensions involved in “boundary-riding” and trying to negotiate the demands and 
instructions of neoliberalised, medicalised public sector therapy organisations also 
inflicted a toll on the therapists discussed in this chapter – hence my names for them, 
as battlers, burn-outs, and blow-outs. The in-between-ness experienced by these 
therapists, where they both attempted to resist and were forced to engage and appear 
to comply with workplace demands and instructions, was uncomfortable and, for 
many, unsustainable in the long term. As discussed, the strategy of using silence was 
an active performance by therapists that was integral to securing space for 
autonomous practice. However, several therapists spoke of the personal toll of being 
silenced within their workplaces, and connected this to burn-out, fatigue and 
disillusionment in their work. While these therapists seemed to enjoy sharing their 
triumphs and telling me about their methods for evading or beating often hostile work 
systems, isolation, weariness and uncertainty about both the value of their efforts and 
their future employment were common themes. For instance, I asked Alex what and 
who supported and sustained him in his work: 
Hmm, I kind of wonder that myself really, to be honest [both laugh]. Um 
[sigh/groan], I don’t know. I mean I have my up and down days, and if I was 
actually honest I think I’ve been pretty close to leaving a number of times. So, 
you know, it still puzzles me. 
While these therapists did find and exploit gaps, gaffs and disjunctions in the 
management of their workplaces, they were still largely constrained in their practice 
and unable to exert significant influence on organisational decision making. Frank 
was most successful at freeing himself from constraint, but for only a limited time and 
with harsh consequences.  
Unsurprisingly, most of the therapists discussed in this chapter ended up leaving 
publicly operated services (a strategy that will be discussed in the following chapter): 
many were recounting past experiences to me during their interviews, and others have 
left their workplaces since being interviewed. Those who had left frequently 
described themselves as having “burned-out”, reaching a point of physical and 
emotional fatigue that would not allow them to continue, or feeling the weight of 
profound disillusionment. For the likes of Frank, successful resistance was always 
going to be temporary, resulting in an eventual “blow-out”, where he was effectively 
squeezed out of his position. The others, like Alex, the “battlers” who remained in the 
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public sector and were talking to me of current experiences, exhibited weariness and 
uncertainty that often made me feel sad. Boundary-riding for these group one 
therapists was personally difficult and professionally precarious. 
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9. Boundary Riders, Group 2: Infiltrators, Outsiders and 
Accepters 
Introduction 
As discussed previously, my analysis of the “boundary-riding” strategies and 
perspectives of the postmodern, critical therapists in this study organises them into 
two distinct groups. The therapists discussed in the previous chapter (group one) were 
united, to varying degrees, by experiences of personal and professional struggle. 
Publicly asserting professional autonomy and engaging in official politics were often 
disappointing and unsuccessful for these therapists. Of the tactics they employed to 
resist or subvert the norms of their public sector workplaces, many involved 
subterfuge or had thus far been undetected; while their acts and expressions of 
resistance demonstrated the incompleteness of the hegemonic discourses that attempt 
to structure the therapy field, and called these discourses into question, within the 
official, public realm these discourses seemed to remain intact. Within their neoliberal 
and medicalised workplaces, boundary-riding frequently involved isolation, 
disillusionment and fatigue, with several therapists either “burning-” or “blowing-
out”.  
This chapter focuses on the second group of therapists (group two) – the infiltrators, 
outsiders and accepters – whose narratives were distinguished by the lack of personal 
struggle or pain involved in their boundary-riding. It focuses on the avowed strategies 
used by these therapists to negotiate between their own interests as therapists and the 
forces that limit and define the therapy field in particular ways. Some of the strategies 
used were similar to those employed by the therapists in the previous chapter: the 
group two therapists engaged in “official politics” (Spicer and Böhm, 2007, p. 1674) 
and they “worked the system”, exploiting gaps and disjunctures. Others differed 
markedly: some of the group two therapists were intent on infiltrating the systems of 
their workplaces or sector and doing “inside work”, while a significant number 
(including many of the group one therapists from the previous chapter) chose to leave 
the public sector. Their positions within the medicalised hierarchy of therapy 
professions influenced their use of these strategies and the success and comfort they 
experienced; their roles within the specific contexts of their workplaces impacted on 
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their experiences of “playing the game” within the therapy field in Aotearoa New 
Zealand. This chapter analyses these boundary-riding strategies, closely examining 
therapists’ efforts to practise critical, postmodern-inspired therapy within the 
institutions of the therapy field. I pay particular attention to the “success” – 
personally, professionally and politically – of these strategies within the therapists’ 
work contexts. 
Following from this, the chapter closes by shifting focus briefly to the personal 
philosophies and deliberate self-positions taken by therapists in order to personally 
manage the tensions and contradictions of their work. The therapists examined in this 
chapter utilised and spoke discourses that privilege a tolerance for contradiction: they 
positioned themselves as practitioners with postmodern sensibilities and/or lived 
appreciation for biculturalism and the necessity of compromise, or as followers of 
Buddhism. These discursive frameworks both influenced and justified their 
experiences as critical, postmodern therapists negotiating neoliberal, medicalised 
work cultures.  
The group two therapists avoided “burn-out” or “blow-out” and were able to practise 
their therapy work in ways that they experienced as sustainable and fulfilling. This 
chapter canvasses their boundary-riding strategies and discusses their self-conscious 
deployment of professional status and symbolic capital in effecting these; it concludes 
with a reflective discussion of their employment of discourses of tolerance for 
contradiction in the context of this work. 
Strategies for negotiating and resisting 
Official politics and medical/scientific capital 
The previous chapter examined Alex and Frances’ presumptions of professional 
autonomy and their attempts at utilising official politics as a resistance strategy and a 
means of engaging in debate over the nature and workings of their workplaces. These 
attempts, and Alex and Frances’ expressions of professional opinion, garnered little 
success. I argued that despite rhetoric claiming the opposite, neoliberal, managerialist 
therapy workplaces are actually opposed to therapists’ expressions of autonomy, 
freedom, and the capacity for critique and decision-making. However, other therapists 
in this study had more success with official politics and perceived this to be a viable 
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means for introducing alternative therapy ideas and practices to their professional 
colleagues; rather than wearing false moustaches and communing secretly with like-
minded colleagues, these therapists were public and open about their interests. As the 
following discussion will demonstrate, the possession of particular species of social 
and cultural capital – namely, those that relate to science and medicine, and that wield 
symbolic power within the game at play in the therapy field – was integral to the 
openness with which these therapists shared their therapy interests and their abilities 
to exercise professional autonomy and opinion.  
Danny was a psychiatrist working in the public mental health sector who had strong 
interests in critical, postmodern therapy practices. He told me about his experience of 
using narrative therapy ideas with a particular client/patient over a reasonably long 
period. Over the course of their work together, significant positive change took place 
in the client/patient’s situation and the effects of what had been labelled as a specific 
psychiatric disorder lessened greatly. Consequently, Danny decided that it would “be 
good to present this [their work together] in a psychiatric context”. According to 
Danny, the tradition of presenting interesting or significant “cases” to colleagues 
within the discipline of psychiatry involved a standard practice: “If you did bring a 
patient along you’d kind of wheel them in and then you wheel them out, and then 
you’d have the real conversation once they’d been wheeled out”. When he discussed 
the idea of sharing this “case” with the psychiatry fraternity with his narrative therapy 
mentor, she promptly rejected this standard practice, declaring “well you can’t do 
that. You have to do it differently”. She challenged Danny to do a presentation that 
was consistent with the aims of narrative therapy. Danny’s engagement with official 
politics – presenting an alternative perspective and challenging conventional 
psychiatric practices – was twofold: publicly introducing narrative therapy as an 
interesting and seemingly successful therapeutic approach and subverting the standard 
practices used for presenting casework to psychiatry colleagues.  
The idea of engaging in official politics and presenting narrative therapy work in a 
psychiatric context was contingent upon Danny’s full membership of the psychiatry 
profession. He explained his trepidation about doing an unconventional presentation: 
I knew that the ideas weren’t necessarily going to be well received, because in my 
training, I mean in the exam process, I was able to get through it reasonably well 
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by not emphasising my exotic interests. In the exam process you play the game, if 
you want to pass. If you want to get stalled and struggle with it then you can put 
your hand up about all the different exotic things that you’re keen on and all the 
rebellious things that you might do. But if you want to get through, you play the 
game. And in the end I felt quite at peace with that because it was a means to an 
end really. 
During the psychiatry exam process, Danny – like many of the therapists discussed in 
the previous chapter – kept his “exotic interests” secret and gave an appearance of 
conformity and conduct appropriate for a future psychiatrist  (narrative therapy 
constituted one of his “exotic interests”). He policed himself and “played the game”, 
recognising his subordinate position as a trainee-psychiatrist and publicly reproducing 
the norms and conventions of psychiatry.  
However, by the time Danny contemplated presenting his narrative therapy work – 
and exposing his “exotic interests” – to his psychiatry colleagues, he had gained full 
membership of this professional group. He developed a narrative therapy-inspired 
presentation and delivered it at a regular meeting of psychiatry colleagues. Danny’s 
presentation involved an inversion of standard practice. It was created in collaboration 
with his client/patient, who was positioned as an expert and authority on his own 
experiences: 
… all of these psychiatrists, some of whom would have had control over him at 
various times, but also some of whom he had tremendous respect for, asked him 
about his experiences of this stuff and what it meant to him, and so he was able to 
be the expert in this situation. He was creating new meaning around what had 
happened, in a typically narrative kind of way but very different for that setting. 
Danny explained that the presentation consciously worked against the psychiatric 
tradition where “the patient would be sort of an object of observation, and you’d learn 
certain things”. He endeavoured to orchestrate the presentation so that that 
client/patient was a subject, whose understandings of his experiences were of value to 
a psychiatric audience. Danny publicly introduced an alternative form of therapy 
practice to his psychiatry colleagues, disrupting and resisting the traditions of his 
discipline. 
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Danny’s engagement in official politics, and public discussion about the nature of 
psychiatry work and practice, was integrally tied to the status he had achieved as a 
psychiatrist. In becoming a psychiatrist, Danny was granted entry into a specialised 
medical guild, where “medical dominance” accords practitioners control over the 
work situation, occupational autonomy within the wider division of labour, and 
occupational sovereignty over related occupational groups (Turner, 1995, p. 138). 
Bourdieu explains the transformation that took place in Danny’s status, arguing that 
the academic and professional qualification “institutes cultural capital by collective 
magic” (Bourdieu, 1986, p. 51): with the achievement and conferral of qualifications 
comes an immediate increase in cultural capital. Within the medicalised therapy field, 
Danny’s psychiatry qualification “confer[ed] power over the field” (Bourdieu & 
Wacquant, 1992, p. 101), and functioned as a “trump card” within the game at play in 
the field (p. 98). It granted him authority to share his “exotic interests” with 
colleagues and to engage in collegial conversation over the nature of psychiatry, 
however unconventional his ideas may have been. Danny challenged the norms and 
practices of psychiatry by publicly displaying his narrative therapy work to the 
psychiatry fraternity and by transforming the “standard practice” of case 
presentations. Yet he was only able to do this after achieving the requisite cultural 
capital that grants the right to exercise professional autonomy and to “speak” within 
the field. 
When I asked how his colleagues received the presentation, Danny said: “Oh they 
were totally into it. And I think it was helped by the fact that I had relationship with 
quite a few of them and they’d been supervisors and so there was mutual respect and 
whatnot”. Danny’s comments highlight the role that social capital played in his 
successful use of official politics to challenge the norms and standard practices of 
psychiatry. According to Bourdieu,  
social capital is the aggregate of the actual or potential resources which are linked 
to possession of a durable network of more or less institutionalized relationships 
of mutual acquaintance and recognition – or in other words, to membership in a 
group – which provides each of its members with the backing of the collectivity-
owned capital, a ‘credential’ which entitles them to credit, in the various senses of 
the word. (Bourdieu, 1986, p. 51) 
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Alongside, and in concert with, his psychiatry qualification, the relationships Danny 
had formed with psychiatry colleagues provided him with membership of an elite 
group. He had graduated from being a student, supervised and mentored by 
representatives of the psychiatry fraternity, to being a full member himself of this 
professional and social group. The recognition and acquaintance between Danny and 
members of his audience functioned as a “credential” that entitled him to credit: 
“mutual respect and whatnot” helped him as he presented alternative therapy ideas to 
his psychiatry colleagues. Unlike Alex in the previous chapter, Danny’s presumption 
that he was able to publicly exercise professional autonomy and use official politics to 
engage in debate and conversation about the nature of therapeutic work with 
clients/patients was realised and welcomed by his professional colleagues. His 
cultural and social capital enabled him to participate in the “realm of elites” (Spicer 
and Böhm, 2007, p. 1673), who are most able to use official politics as a resistance 
strategy. 
As discussed in the previous chapter, “[d]isciplinary power is not exclusively 
constraining. It also empowers, in the sense that it opens up and legitimates a 
discursive space for action” (Doolin, 2002, p. 381). Danny’s narrative illustrates 
Doolin’s assertion: Danny’s recognition and acceptance of disciplinary power 
provided him with legitimate discursive space to introduce alternative therapy 
practices and perspectives to the discipline of psychiatry. Ruth also described the 
benefits of strategically accepting and reproducing disciplinary power. Ruth was a 
psychologist working in a public medical health setting. She was trained in critical 
and feminist therapy theories and methods, but described the new knowledge and 
training she had willingly pursued while working in her current workplace: 
My sense is of never having been a robust practitioner of mainstream psychology. 
I’m coming more to that as I’ve progressed really through my working life, 
learning different models and things. Like just now I’m learning about 
quantitative research and how to do a randomised control study [Kate laughs] and 
statistics, which were just so irrelevant when I was studying, because I was doing 
feminist qualitative critiques and things like that. So in some ways I’m only 
coming into it now [Kate laughs]. 
My laughter punctuated Ruth’s story: I was amused by the thought of this critical 
psychologist teaching herself how to do a randomised control study. I assumed that 
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we both shared a critical view of the dominance of this scientific method in relation to 
the therapy field and what is known and seen as valid within the field, so to hear Ruth 
talking about these new interests seemed incongruous and surprising to me.  
I questioned Ruth about her movement towards these methods of research: 
Kate: Is that necessary knowledge? Is that what you’re finding? Or you want to 
learn those things? 
Ruth: Yeah, it is quite necessary in this environment, being the ultimate kind of 
medical quantitative environment [laughs]. If you want to do any research in this 
type of environment, and have it understood and listened to by colleagues, then 
you’ve got to know how to speak the same language. And as a psychologist I’m 
finding that my confidence has increased just because I’m approaching those 
areas that were previously taboo in some ways and can now relate to colleagues 
that perhaps came through more mainstream [clinical psychology] training 
programmes. 
As discussed in chapter 6, the therapy field in Aotearoa New Zealand has become 
increasingly medicalised and “scientised”: the “feminist qualitative critiques” that 
Ruth learned during her training represent subordinate and inferior knowledge and 
cultural capital in relation to authorised scientific methods. Ruth learned that, in order 
to engage in official politics and to “speak” and participate in professional debate in 
her medical workplace, she needed to strategically use the dominant discourses. 
Professional selfhood and autonomy is sanctioned and can be realised by possessing 
and utilising symbolic capital: namely medical and scientific knowledge and methods. 
Being seen and regarded as a “robust practitioner” promised Ruth access to the “realm 
of elites” and the ability to use official politics to present alternative perspectives to 
her largely medical colleagues (Spicer and Böhm, 2007, p. 1673). Ruth actively 
worked to include her critical and feminist therapy perspectives in official discourses 
by using the authorised scientific methods. These methods also gave Ruth access to 
social capital, as she was able to form relationships with a wider range of clinical 
psychology colleagues and achieve greater membership of this professional group. 
The resistance posed by Danny and Ruth – as they engaged with official politics and 
introduced alternative therapy perspectives to colleagues – was persuasive because of 
the reverence they displayed for the norms and values of their disciplines and their 
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possession of the forms of capital that have the most currency within the medicalised 
therapy field. In their elite professional roles, they consciously worked with the power 
relations that structure the therapy field, strategically taking up the posture of a 
“robust practitioner” and utilising dominant discourses. However, in doing so they 
were able to offer forward alternative ideas to their colleagues and work towards 
altering the cultures of their workplaces. 
 Infiltrating the mainstream: “I’m not interested in being a heckling 
voice” 
Ruth’s pursuit of the most powerful species of capital within the therapy field was 
consistent with a broader discursive strategy used by some of the therapists examined 
in this chapter. Both Ruth and Jac’s narratives emphasised a discourse of infiltration, 
which positioned them as therapists seeking to join and participate in the mainstream 
of the therapy field. Rather than fighting “the system” in their work cultures, they 
sought to strategically join it and to do, as Ruth described, some “inside work”. This 
tactic differs significantly from those used by the group one therapists. As the 
following discussion demonstrates, Ruth and Jac deliberately accommodated and 
accepted many of the norms and structures of the institutions they worked in and 
engaged with, as they aspired to be included and recognised within these institutions. 
They specifically resisted the dominant medical interpretations of problems 
experienced by their clients/patients and instead put forward critical and alternative 
ideas and perspectives. Their efforts to involve and include themselves within the 
mainstream of their work cultures again illustrates the “ambiguity and double-edged 
nature of resistance” (Trethewey, 1997, p. 284). 
As mentioned earlier, Ruth was a clinical psychologist with strong interests in 
feminist and critical psychology approaches to therapy work. She worked in a medical 
setting where there was little knowledge or awareness among medical staff of the 
mental health needs of clients/patients, and psychologists were regarded with some 
suspicion. She described needing to actively work against the preconceptions of 
medical staff: 
Ruth: We also need to really work to promote ourselves as allied health 
professionals, or adjunctive to a person’s medical treatment. So, I mean, I was 
interested in talking to you because I see your focus is on perhaps critical 
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psychology. That’s my assumption, is critiquing the norms of psychology. 
Whereas, conversely I’m actually working hard to market psychology in this type 
of setting … 
Kate: Right, yeah. That’s fascinating [laughs]. 
Ruth: … whilst at the same time being very aware of critical perspectives on 
psychology and women’s health and that sort of thing. 
Ruth was correct in her assumption about my research: I was interested in therapists 
who were critiquing the norms of psychology and I had presumed that her critical 
psychology background would make her a rebel and agitator in her medical 
workplace. Instead, she was working hard to promote and market psychology in order 
to work alongside medical professionals, advocating psychological services as an 
adjunct to medical treatment. She described marketing as “presenting a friendly face 
of psychology” and “being personable and creating relationships with medical 
professionals and the women who attend this service, being someone who moves 
around the hallways, who’s relatively friendly and approachable”. Ruth identified 
how, within the epitome of a medical setting, she negotiated the field. Her 
negotiations involved seeking inclusion and acceptance within the field, rather than 
courting controversy or openly disrupting the norms of psychology. 
Ruth actively promoted her psychologist role within her hospital workplace by being 
personable, friendly and approachable, and developing warm relationships with 
colleagues. These were her initial means of promoting her discipline, and how she 
worked at infiltrating the culture of her workplace. Rather than critiquing the norms 
of medicine and psychology or engaging in the organisationally defined relationships, 
she initially focused on the pleasures of relationships between colleagues. Maria 
Dixon (2007) draws on the work of Foucault to discuss the role of pleasure in inter-
personal relationships. Foucault’s pleasure principle, Dixon explains, assumes   
that the more pleasurable and transformative the relational tie, the more power 
actually flows between relational partners. Consequently, friendships or 
relationships that provide partners a sense of well-being, pleasure, and personal 
self-actualization could manifest a power that, as it grows in pleasure, could 
supersede the power of transactional, organizationally structured relationships 
(such as manager-subordinate) to shape organizational behavior (p. 290). 
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Dixon foregrounds the power that emerges and flows when people form pleasurable 
relational ties. This power is often overlooked when researchers restrict their focus to 
the influence of transactional, organisationally structured relationships on 
organisational behaviour. Friendly, pleasant and pleasurable relationships – even 
though, in Ruth’s case, these were entwined with organisationally structured 
relationships – in themselves can be a determinant of how people experience and 
enact power (p. 291). Ruth’s focus on friendly interpersonal relationships with work 
colleagues can be seen as instrumental to her negotiation of power relations within her 
hospital workplace: it enabled a flow of power that supported her as she worked in the 
hospital and aided her organisationally structured relationships with colleagues and 
her goal of infiltration. 
Ruth utilised the power experienced from the establishment of warm and friendly 
relationships with colleagues to advance her own feminist political agenda within a 
highly medicalized workplace. It was a resource that helped her to join and then 
influence the workings of the dominant medical system that structured the activities 
and relationships at the hospital. By being personable, developing strong relational 
ties with medical colleagues, and promoting psychology as friendly and non-
threatening to medical dominance, Ruth was able to action her agenda in regard to the 
treatment of gynaecological problems: “it’s about increasing awareness of the role of 
the links between physical symptoms, intra-psychic factors, relationship factors and 
environmental stressors”. She sought to expand health practitioners’ understandings 
of women’s gynaecological problems, encouraging them to view these problems as 
more than simply physical symptoms requiring physical remedy. Ruth had success in 
achieving this goal: “the staff general awareness of the link between physical 
symptoms and psychological factors is increasing as people become more aware of it 
here. We do quite a bit of staff education, mini seminars, that type of thing”. 
Infiltrating the culture of her workplace, through the development of interpersonal ties 
and then the promotion of psychological services and approaches, allowed Ruth to 
establish some “discursive space for action” (Doolin, 2002, p. 381). In this space she 
was able to problematise medical ideas about women’s gynaecological problems and 
effect change in how medical practitioners perceive these problems. Significantly, and 
in contrast to the group one therapists, she described her workplace as “an exciting 
environment” because it offered her a chance “to do some quite useful feminist 
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political work” – both at an institutional level and in her interactions with 
clients/patients. Ruth negotiated the forces of her workplace by infiltrating its medical 
culture. She won space for action and influence and for practising critical, feminist 
therapy.  
Like Ruth, Jac also utilised a discourse of infiltration as she negotiated the dominant 
discourses of the therapy field and her own interests in feminist and poststructuralist 
therapy ideas. Jac was both a counsellor and a nurse, with a strong interest in sexual 
health. For Jac, infiltration involved utilising her already accrued cultural and social 
capital as a nurse in order to influence the treatment of sexual health issues in the 
public sector. Jac explained her relationships with health professionals: 
I do interact with health professionals and I really enjoy that. I think that I know 
that world so well that I can carry my ideas into that world in a way that I know 
how they’ll be received. I can speak in a way that cultivates a receptivity to those 
ideas, and that’s what I really enjoy, and that’s where my work will be taking me. 
I’m really interested in bridging these ideas [feminist and poststructuralist 
approaches to sexual health issues] back into areas of health. Because, you know, 
doctors and nurses, those are the people who have the most impact on the people 
who are living with what concerns me. 
Jac recognised the power exercised by medical practitioners in their professional 
relationships with people with sexual health problems. In turn, she recognised the 
value of both her familiarity with the medical world and her ability to use and speak 
medical discourse. These made her confident that she could “speak in a way that 
cultivates a receptivity” among medical professionals to feminist and poststructuralist 
ideas. Her knowledge of medical discourse and culture allowed infiltration, and for 
her to pursue change and influence from “inside” the system. 
Jac explained more fully her use of infiltration as a strategy for resisting the norms of 
both medicalised therapy and medical approaches to sexual health, and for bringing 
about change in the overlapping medical and therapy fields. Infiltration involved the 
knowing reproduction of the power relations that govern the therapy field, particularly 
in relation to the forms of capital that have the greatest currency. This strategy was 
born from Jac’s recognition of her difference from the mainstream of the therapy 
field: 
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I do feel that I’m on the margins and the way that I can strengthen my voice on 
the margins, what I have done is to get qualifications because I think that allows 
me to have a voice that’s considered to be creditable, even though it’s a different 
voice. 
Like Ruth and Danny, Jac recognised that qualifications, as well as proximity to 
medicine and science, authorise therapy practitioners to exercise professional 
autonomy and provide the possibility for putting forward alternative perspectives to 
colleagues. Recognised qualifications bestow legitimacy on practitioners and allow 
them to be perceived as “creditable”. Jac strategically and calculatedly invoked her 
medical knowledge and credentials and pursued further qualifications in order to 
strengthen her voice from “the margins”; she recognised that her feminist and 
postmodern therapy ideas lacked currency and legitimacy within medical and 
dominant therapy discourses, so consciously sought protection and backing from 
qualifications.  
Jac clarified the nature of the voice she sought to “strengthen”:  
I’m interested in being a voice from the margins but I’m not interested in being a 
heckling voice, you know. I’m interested in being a voice that makes a difference. 
And I think to make a difference, well… [pause]. I think heckling voices on the 
margins do make a difference, but that isn’t the position I want to be in. I want to 
be able to infiltrate the mainstream and make a difference there, to be alongside 
medical colleagues, nursing colleagues, therapy colleagues saying “have you 
considered this set of ideas?” 
Jac distinguished between a “heckling voice on the margins” and a voice that 
infiltrates “the mainstream” and is able “to make a difference there”. While heckling 
voices on the margins can make a difference, Jac viewed working from inside the 
mainstream as the most effective and desirable means of bringing about change 
within the therapy and medical fields. Infiltrating the mainstream gives opportunities 
for collegial conversation and the sharing of ideas, while “heckling” from outside the 
mainstream connotes protest, antagonism and a potentially unreceptive audience. Jac 
was actively seeking and courting a receptive audience to her ideas, and saw joining 
and participating in the mainstream as a requirement for effectively trying to change 
mainstream treatment approaches to people’s sexual health problems.  
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Like Ruth’s, Jac’s strategy for resisting and challenging the pathologising, 
individualising and de-politicising habits of therapy, especially within medical 
settings, involved strategically accommodating the norms of those settings: 
accommodation allowed space and license to present alternative ideas to colleagues. 
The professional hierarchies of the therapy field, and the power designated to 
particular discourses and species of capital – over others – remained in place and 
largely secure. These therapists consciously accepted and demonstrated respect for 
medical dominance within the systems they engaged in, with Ruth actively seeking 
pleasurable collegial relationships. They “played the game” within the public health 
sector, accruing symbolic capital and fashioning themselves to fit these systems, 
benefitting also from the association of their respective professions – nursing and 
clinical psychology – with medicine and science. The use of infiltration as a strategy 
for negotiating and resisting aspects of the power relations that structure the therapy 
field illustrates Dick and Hyde’s (2006) claim (quoting Collinson) 
that consent and resistance are inextricably and simultaneously linked, often in 
contradictory ways within particular organizational cultures, discourses and 
practices. Resistance frequently contains elements of consent and consent often 
incorporates aspects of resistance (p. 555). 
Resistances are necessarily engaged and entwined with the structures of power that 
they resist. Jac and Ruth strategically utilised dominant forms of capital and 
discourses: they followed the rules of their professions in order to earn success and 
power, invoked the “languages” of medicalised workplaces, participated in 
professional collegiality, and demonstrated conformity and reverence for professional 
hierarchies. They did so in order to challenge other dominant discourses within the 
therapy field. For them, doing “inside work” to infiltrate and change “the 
mainstream” meant both resisting and accommodating the power relations that work 
to structure the therapy field in Aotearoa New Zealand. 
Leaving the public sector 
Richard Sennett’s book The Culture of New Capitalism (2006) examines the cultural 
influence of the “new economy”, which has emerged out of institutional changes 
within the “cutting edge of the economy” (p. 12) over recent decades. The norms and 
practices of the new economy call for a flexible workforce, able to manage short-term 
relationships, while migrating between tasks, jobs and places. The ideal employee is 
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“constantly learning new skills, changing his or her ‘knowledge basis’” (p. 44). The 
bureaucracies of the new economy operate under a “highly centralized, diminished 
authority model”. With diminished authority and the rapid turnover of management 
that accompanies this model, “there is then no one in power who has shown 
commitment to the organization, who has experience of its problems, who can serve 
as a witness of the labours of those below” (p. 60). The workings of this new 
economy, Sennett argues, have been heralded as the exemplar for the larger economy, 
including government agencies and public sector services: chapter 5 demonstrated the 
influence of this model, as neoliberal and managerialist discourses have assumed 
dominance within the therapy field in Aotearoa New Zealand and 
“entrepreneurialism” has been encouraged among workers. The professional 
knowledge and skills of therapists have been usurped by managerial power and 
imperatives, and practitioners have been forced to adapt to unstable, frequently 
changing and “restructured” work environments. Within these environments, those in 
authority often lack understanding of the work done by therapists and may be 
motivated by a very different agenda. 
Sennett contends that most people do not resemble the self that is idealised in the new 
economy: “they need a sustaining life narrative, they take pride in being good at 
something specific, and they value the experiences they’ve lived through. The cultural 
ideal required in new institutions thus damages many of the people who inhabit them” 
(p. 5). Chapters 5 and 6 documented the manifestation of neoliberal and 
medical/scientific dominance within the work settings of the therapists included in 
this study. These chapters detailed the limited space and agency granted to therapists 
motivated by critical and postmodern therapy ideas. Following from this, chapter 8 
closely examined the boundary-riding strategies utilised by one group of therapists 
working within public sector therapy services to negotiate and resist the norms of 
their work environments and the instructions for their therapy practice. I concluded 
that these strategies were difficult for the therapists to sustain: isolation and the efforts 
required to both “wear false moustaches” and “work the system” left therapists 
fatigued and disillusioned, with some suffering from “burn out” or being reprimanded 
for their subversive activities. A closeted, underground working life, where it is 
difficult to find an appreciative and supportive audience for both the successes and 
challenges of therapy work with clients/patients, obstructs therapists from 
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experiencing a sustaining life narrative and taking pride in being good at their work: 
there is little institutional support for the development of pride under these 
circumstances. The difficulties they experienced in trying to “fit in” to their public 
sector workplaces – which required engagement with and seeming adherence to 
neoliberal and medical discourses – caused damage to these group one therapists. 
In response to this damage, many of the therapists discussed in chapter 8 chose to 
leave public sector therapy services. This trend among my research participants is 
consistent with Van Heugten and Daniels’ research (2001), which linked the rise of 
neoliberal reform of the public sector in Aotearoa New Zealand over the late 1980s 
and the 1990s to the movement of social workers into private practice. “Burn out” and 
disillusionment as consequences of the restructuring of public services led many 
social workers and other public welfare workers into private practice (p. 745). For the 
therapists in this study who experienced struggle and difficulty in their public sector 
workplaces, working privately or for non-governmental and voluntary sector welfare 
organisations became increasingly appealing. Moving to employment outside of the 
public sector was a strategy therapists used to resist the impact of medical and 
neoliberal discourses on their therapy work and to secure space, freedom and support 
to practise critical, postmodern therapy. 
Private practice therapy work differed greatly from Jo’s previous workplace, which 
had delivered clinical psychological services within the public mental health system: 
It’s very different [in private practice] because I’m away from the concept of 
assessment, there’s no requirement to do that. And what the client comes to me 
about is totally what we look at. Like there’s no other thing that I’m having to 
manage. Like I’m not having to manage how I communicate all that assessment 
stuff to them. It’s so liberating, and I’m sure that has an impact on how the clients 
feel too. … And in private work I don’t have to work with a psychiatrist at all, so 
yee ha! 
As discussed in chapter 6, the official discourse of public sector therapy services 
relies on and reproduces psychiatric discourse: biomedical constructions of the 
problems experienced by people engaged with these services dominate, and 
psychiatric assessment and diagnosis are fundamental to the therapy provided. In 
private practice, Jo was removed from official bureaucracy and able to avoid the full 
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force of this official discourse, which meant she was not compelled to conduct 
clinical assessments of her clients/patients. She was able to focus her therapy work on 
“what the client comes to me about”, rather than being sidetracked by the needs and 
instructions of the institution. Private practice freed her from having to manage the 
impact and repercussions of the institution’s interests on her therapeutic work with 
clients/patients. Likewise, she was free from the clinical oversight of a psychiatrist 
and able to exercise her own professional judgement, much to her delight. As a 
practitioner, the freedoms offered by private practice were “liberating”, allowing her 
greater space to exercise her own autonomy and skills as a therapist. 
In my discussion of the medicalised, scientised therapy field in Aotearoa New 
Zealand in chapter 6, I described Cal’s experiences of the medical professional 
hierarchy within a public sector mental health service. Cal had clashed with a trainee 
psychiatrist over his use of narrative therapy ideas in his therapy work. Cal explained 
that the conflict emphasised to him his “place” as a social worker within a medically 
dominated mental health system – as a “handmaiden” who “shouldn’t have dared to 
do anything kind of spontaneous or outside the usual medical kind of practice”. As a 
consequence of the conflict, Cal left this workplace and joined a community-operated 
counselling service. He described his first experiences in this new workplace: 
I remember getting to the agency and just feeling like I’d gone to a geographical 
piece of this city, an actual physical territory, where I could walk around and 
know that there would be other people who would be interested in the same 
approaches. And it was a huge relief to get to this agency, where there was a 
community of interest there and a community of support there. It didn’t, it just 
couldn’t exist at [my previous public sector workplace] at that time. 
Cal’s new workplace contrasted markedly from his experiences of the public mental 
health sector: he described a territory where he was both freed from the constraints of 
a medical professional hierarchy and able to enjoy a community of similarly oriented 
colleagues. His comments suggest that there was space and freedom for therapists to 
realise the promise of their professional status and to exercise autonomy and 
judgement in their therapy work. The official discourse of public sector therapy 
services did not dominate or govern working life within this community organisation, 
enabling therapists to discuss and practise critical and postmodern therapy 
approaches. Cal’s experience of connection and community within this workplace 
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contrasts with the secrecy and isolation often experienced by the therapists discussed 
in the previous chapter: there was little need for false moustaches and subversive 
tactics within this territory. 
Jo and Cal’s descriptions of private and community sector therapy work suggest a 
positive alternative for critical and postmodern-influenced therapists to the 
opportunities available within public sector services. They experienced liberation, 
relief and – for Cal – community, and were able to do their therapy work largely free 
from medical authority and surveillance. Leaving the public sector represents a 
strategy for resisting the hegemony of neoliberalism and biomedical discourse, for 
finding space where the forms of therapeutic capital held by these therapists are 
recognised and legitimised. Yet this resistance strategy is not without compromise or 
tension; at the same time as securing space for agency and evading medical 
dominance, the move to private practice and community sector services also enacts 
and extends neoliberal ideology. The principle of privatization is essential to 
neoliberal ideology. Neoliberal reform in Aotearoa New Zealand involved – and 
continues to involve – a deliberate project of reducing the provision of welfare (and 
other) services by the state, with privatization and the outsourcing of public services 
favoured and encouraged. As therapists move into the private sector or join agencies 
that provide services on behalf or in lieu of the state, they accept the state’s abdication 
of responsibility for the welfare of its citizens and take part in the construction of 
welfare services along neoliberal lines.  
Ilcan (2009) analyses what it means to provide welfare services along neoliberal lines, 
explaining that the rise of the neoliberal governmental approach in Western states 
during the late twentieth and early twenty-first centuries has involved “a shift of 
emphasis from social responsibilities to private responsibilities” (p. 208). She 
describes this neoliberal style of thinking about and acting on problems as 
“privatizing responsibility” (ibid). As therapists shift into private practice work, 
funded often by government third-party payment schemes33 or by clients/patients 
                                                
33 Therapists may receive third-party payment for services from the Family Courts and from the state-
run Accident Compensation Corporation. The Family Courts purchase counselling services from 
approved therapists “to aid couples to resolve difficulties and prevent expensive court proceedings” 
(Van Heugten and Daniels, 2001, p. 747). The ACC employs approved counsellors for sexual abuse 
counselling, physical injury counselling and work-related mental trauma counselling (Accident 
Compensation Corporation, 2011). In other instances, government agencies may establish additional 
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themselves, or join community-run welfare agencies, they participate in the 
privatizing of responsibility. Individual clients/patients, therapists, and community 
agencies all take up roles as agents of responsibility, while the state withdraws. When 
therapy is privatized, clients/patients are compelled to select and arrange for their own 
care, and often pay for it themselves or top-up third-party payments. Therapists 
operate their own small businesses, assuming responsibility for all aspects of the 
therapy transaction, as well as for their own professional development and 
sustainability. Both the client/patient and the private practice therapist are forced to 
demonstrate “entrepreneurship, autonomy, efficiency, and individualism” (ibid, p. 
212). 
These neoliberal values emphasise self-responsibility: clients/patients take on the 
responsibility for their own care and self-management, and therapists play multiple 
roles – as “responsibility experts” in their work with clients/patients, as 
businesspeople in addition to being therapists, and as providers of social welfare 
services in lieu of the state. Ilcan emphasises that privatization and the outsourcing of 
welfare services are 
not merely the reworking of the state but the means of governing new ways of 
thinking and acting, which stress a neoliberal governing rationality, that is, a 
rationality that emphasizes the opportunities of the market and business 
perspectives to solve current problems. (p. 212-213) 
As clients/patients and therapists increasingly demonstrate their entrepreneurship and 
engage in therapy as a business relationship, they extend and entrench the market 
model as the solution for social problems. 
With privatization and the outsourcing of services, in combination with a government 
emphasis on financial austerity and the reduction of state services, specific individuals 
and organizations have taken on duties that were previously the responsibility of the 
state. Since the economic reforms of the late 1980s and 1990s, the not-for-profit 
                                                                                                                                      
third-party schemes for the provision of therapy services; for example earthquake related counselling 
services after the Christchurch earthquakes in 2010 and 2011. 
Disability allowances from Work and Income New Zealand are sometimes paid to people on low-
incomes or receiving welfare benefits for the provision of counselling. 
In addition to government schemes, privately operated employment assistance programmes also 
contract therapists to provide services to their member organisations. 
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voluntary or community sector in Aotearoa New Zealand has played a prominent role 
in the provision of health and welfare services. Community sector therapy 
organizations – like private practice therapists – following Ilcan’s (2009) analysis, 
function as agents of responsibility: they support clients/patients to “act more 
responsibly” (p. 221-222), in the absence of a welfare state, at the same time as being 
compelled themselves to continually demonstrate entrepreneurship, autonomy and 
efficiency, particularly when they are accountable for public funding. Ilcan points out 
that the increased responsibilities of the voluntary/community sector have changed its 
character:  
Voluntary organizations and volunteers in many parts of the world are becoming 
increasingly responsible for managing the more vulnerable members of society 
instead of being a dynamic campaigner that demands change for the 
disadvantaged and the marginal. This situation has substantially reduced the 
capacity for the voluntary sector to make changes at the social policy level, 
especially under current conditions where research, advocacy, and sponsorship 
are fading in many western liberal societies (p. 228). 
As the voluntary/community sector subsidises the state’s withdrawal of responsibility 
for the welfare of citizens and/or is contracted by government to provide welfare and 
health services, resources and funding are increasingly geared towards service 
provision. Political advocacy, campaigns for reform and social policy initiatives 
become less of the “business” of busy, largely under-resourced community providers, 
and may be impeded when government contracts are a key source of funding. The 
dispersal of the work and social responsibilities of the state into the community and 
private sectors complicates and obscures lines of accountability and responsibility. 
Community organisations and private practitioners are implicated in the agendas and 
workings of the state, but are also isolated and outside of it: accountability to their 
“consumers” – both clients/patients and the parties who fund them – rests with the 
individual organisation or practitioner. Under this model, community organisations 
and private practitioners have fewer pathways or opportunities to advocate or work 
for social change at a macro level in society. 
Private practice and community sector therapy work offered therapists in this study 
freedom from medical scrutiny and hierarchy, and space and support to practise their 
preferred therapy approaches, and they enjoyed being able to exercise professional 
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autonomy. Yet, as the above discussion demonstrates, therapy work within these 
locations involves therapists in the privatisation of responsibility and makes them 
actors in the campaign to extend the market-model into the activities and issues of 
social life: their professional autonomy is double-edged. For many of the therapists in 
this study, the user-pays principle of privatization was an obstacle to private practice 
therapy work and highlighted their discomfort with entrepreneurship and the market-
model for social services. Charlotte pointed out that “in private practice, you tend to 
only get people who can pay for it, which is another constraint”. With the state’s 
retraction of welfare services and the rise of privatized therapy, clients/patients often 
need to fund therapy themselves. The limited availability of third-party funding 
means that therapy is often only possible for those who are able to make the financial 
investment. Jac explained her preference for therapy work within institutions that 
impose no charges on clients, comparing it to her experience of private work and 
demonstrating the impact of user-pays on clientele: 
I meet a very interesting cross section of people, you know, it’s very interesting 
and enlivening for my work. When I have done private sector work I have found 
it’s a much more homogeneous group of people that I work with, which is very 
pleasant, but I just find it more enlivening working with a wider cross section of 
people. … I think philosophically I find it much easier working in an agency that 
provides free therapy than I do charging individual people to talk about the 
suffering that they’re living with. 
In Jac’s experience, workplaces where therapy services are free of charge allow 
diverse groups of people access to therapy. Jac’s preference for public sector therapy 
work related to her desire for the “enlivening” work that comes as a result of this 
diversity, but also stemmed from a critique of privatization. She countered the self-
responsibility, user-pays discourse of neoliberalism, expressing discomfort with the 
idea of charging clients/patients “to talk about the suffering that they’re living with” – 
her summation invites incredulity for private therapy as a line of business. For many 
therapists in this study, entrepreneurialism and the competitive business ethos did not 
fit easily with their professional identities as postmodern, critical therapists, and made 
private practice a problematic refuge from the struggles experienced within the public 
sector: leaving public sector workplaces did not entirely free therapists from the 
constraints and tensions that neoliberalism has brought to the therapy field. 
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Like other therapists, Kerry found the user-pays culture of private practice difficult to 
adjust to after leaving the public sector. She explained how she attempted to navigate 
user-pays in her private therapy practice: 
So it took me a long time to grapple with the idea of people paying me. 
I found that very difficult to start with, um. So I sort of found some ways of 
making peace, I compromised with it really around having a sliding scale.  So at 
times being paid more by agencies to do supervision and subsidising people I 
might be seeing like for ten dollars. Or like with the disability allowance, making 
sure it was within what they [clients/patients] were actually being paid, so it was 
extra money coming in for counselling rather than eating into the money people 
had to live on.  And I’ve never charged a top up for ACC work for that reason 
either. So that’s the sort of compromises that I made really. 
Kerry’s compromises enabled her to moderate the impact of the user-pays model on 
her therapy work with clients/patients. Her concern for ensuring that her 
clients/patients did not use money needed to live on to pay for counselling meant she 
operated a sliding scale, where she lowered her charges for people for whom 
counselling would otherwise be unaffordable, and did not charge money on top of a 
WINZ disability allowance or ACC funding for sexual abuse counselling.34 By using 
these strategies, Kerry undermined the entrepreneurial discourse of privatization and 
the competitive, wealth-generating ethos of capitalist business. She combined social 
justice discourse with her private practice business enterprise. However, she also 
individually subsidised the shortcomings of the state, sacrificing her own income to 
ensure that therapy services were accessible for those who needed them, when there 
are few options in the stripped back, medicalised public sector. Van Heugten and 
Daniels made the observation in 2001 that “although the hourly rates paid under third 
party schemes seem attractive to some wage earners, these may be a cheap option for 
the provision of welfare services” (p. 748). They point out that private practice 
therapists do not have employers who pay for “accommodation and other overheads, 
sick leave, holiday pay, or maternity leave. The largely female private practice 
workforce absorbs fluctuations in demand, expanding and contracting as required” (p. 
748). Their comments highlight both the value for money that privatized therapy 
offers the state and the precariousness of this realm of employment for therapists. In 
                                                
34 See footnote 32 for a description of the WINZ disability allowance and ACC funded counselling. 
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refusing to top-up third-party payments – which may not adequately cover the full 
costs of counselling services – Kerry eased her own ethical concerns but at her 
personal expense. She assumed individual responsibility for the provision of 
affordable welfare services to clients/patients, a responsibility that once belonged to 
the state. 
As mentioned above, privatisation and the outsourcing of services have meant the 
dispersal and individualisation of responsibility for the social welfare of citizens. The 
privatisation of responsibility means that individual practitioners and community 
organisations tend to operate in greater isolation than practitioners within the public 
sector and are more removed from the workings of the welfare system. For Alex, this 
made both private practice and community sector work unappealing, despite his many 
frustrations with his public sector workplace. He explained his view of the limitations 
of non-public sector work in relation to his work with young people in educational 
settings: 
The only place to practise easily in the public system, across school, home, other 
agencies and other types of contacts is in this job. Which is really sad but it’s 
really hard to do this kind of work being positioned in any other place. … I mean 
I think I could work privately but again the contract that you have is very 
different. Well, I don’t think I have that much of a say now [in my job], but the 
way in which you are linked in to systems is very, very different, in fact [in 
private work] you’re quite removed.  And it’s interesting when a school will 
employ a counselling agency, counsellor comes in, does group work, child 
disengages, that’s it really. You know, they’re not involved with parents at all, not 
really involved in the school systems at all, not able to challenge the principal at 
all. 
In his role as an employee and representative of a public sector welfare service, Alex 
was given authority that extended across multiple institutions, including the family of 
the young person, the school, the systems surrounding the school, and other agencies. 
He observed that privatized responsibility for the welfare of specific young people in 
schools lessened the reach of practitioners: their agency and authority were limited, 
making it difficult for them to engage with the systems and the contexts that affect 
their clients’/patients’ lives. This lack of engagement implied that such practitioners 
were primarily only able to focus the responsibility for change on the individual 
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young person. As a practitioner influenced by postmodern therapy ideas, Alex took a 
contextual, systems view of the problems experienced by young people in schools. By 
being in the public sector – however restrictive his workplace was in other ways – he 
was authorised to engage with relevant systems when working with young people. He 
viewed the isolation and limited reach of private practice and community agencies – 
where they are unable to act beyond a child disengaging with counselling – as 
impediments to working effectively, making non-public sector work unappealing to 
him. 
As this discussion demonstrates, leaving the public sector is a double-edged strategy 
for resisting the hegemonic forces of the therapy field in Aotearoa New Zealand. 
Individual therapists were able to enter and participate in work environments that 
were much more comfortable than those many of them had experienced in the public 
sector. For therapists like Jo and Cal, and others who had struggled in the public 
sector, private practice and community organisations provided relief from and an 
alternative to the prescriptions, regulations and management agendas of the public 
sector. They enjoyed greater professional freedoms and autonomy, without medical 
surveillance. Away from the full force of the medical model of mental health, there 
was also greater potential to experience collegial support and community within 
agencies and for therapists to find encouragement in their work with clients/patients. 
The freedoms and autonomy experienced by therapists outside the public sector 
enabled them to practise critical and postmodern-inspired therapy with fewer 
restrictions, but were also consistent with neoliberal rationality: therapists and the 
community sector become more entrepreneurial and self-governing, while the state 
retreats from responsibility for the social welfare of its citizens. Private practice 
therapists and community sector organisations take up this responsibility, 
economically subsidising the state and enabling its retreat and the spread of the free-
market model for social services. The privatization of responsibility makes private 
practice therapists and community organisations – as well as clients/patients 
themselves – agents for self-responsibility, individualizing therapy work and isolating 
it from the official realms of the state. While isolation from the state, and its systems 
and authority, granted therapists more space to determine for themselves the nature of 
their therapy work, it also makes it difficult to engage with the wider systems 
affecting clients’/patients’ lives or to advocate for social change. 
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Conclusion 
This chapter has considered the strategies used by critical, postmodern therapists to 
resist the dominant forces at play within the therapy field in Aotearoa New Zealand 
and to win space for action. The therapists in this chapter are distinct from those in the 
previous chapter because their strategies were largely viable and sustainable, and they 
were largely satisfied in their working lives: they were not battling and did not “burn 
out” or “blow out”. Like the group one therapists, some group two therapists engaged 
in official politics, openly and publicly presenting critical therapy ideas and 
alternative approaches to colleagues and wider audiences within the field. In doing so, 
they consciously used and exploited their command of symbolic capital and their 
status within the medicalised, “scientised” therapy field. Similarly, those therapists 
who used infiltration of the mainstream of the therapy field as a resistance strategy 
made deliberate and calculated use of the dominant species of capital in order to 
engage in the flow of power. They also demonstrated how focusing on the pleasures 
of collegial relationships could generate power. The activities that accompanied 
infiltration – as opposed to “heckling” – won therapists access to legitimate discursive 
space for action and enabled them to influence the operations of their work 
environments. Numerous group one therapists – who frequently lacked symbolic 
capital or status within the medical hierarchy – refused to be further damaged by the 
cultural ideal of the “new economy” and left the public sector. They resisted the most 
regulatory and restrictive forces of the therapy field by exiting and instead joined 
community health or welfare organisations or embarked on their own private 
practices, where they were less encumbered by medical discourse or organisational 
restructuring.  
In using these particular resistance strategies, therapists both challenged the dominant 
norms and values of the therapy field, finding ways to practise critical and 
postmodern-influenced therapy, and experienced contentment and pleasure in their 
work. Engaging in official politics and infiltrating the mainstream of their work 
systems – making strategic use of accrued symbolic capital – enabled therapists to 
present and share alternative approaches to therapy work with authority and 
persuasiveness. In doing so, they successfully engaged in altering the terrain of the 
therapy field, but avoided conflict, discomfort or threats to their livelihoods. For 
others, who lacked the resources and authority to use official politics or to infiltrate, 
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leaving the public sector provided them with far greater space to do critical, 
postmodern-influenced therapy work and enjoy the pleasures and satisfaction of 
collegial relationships away from the medical hierarchy and managerial scrutiny. 
These acts of resistance and negotiation are important examples of how therapists can 
negotiate the conflicts and constraints of the therapy field and maintain their 
livelihoods and physical and mental health.  
Yet, as my discussion demonstrated repeatedly, these strategies were also double-
edged and not without compromise and tension. Successfully using official politics 
and infiltration to pose resistance also involved reproducing and demonstrating 
reverence for dominant discourses and forms of capital within the therapy field. These 
tactics relied on and affirmed the medical professional hierarchy, which grants greater 
license and autonomy to practitioners with medical and scientific qualifications and 
credentials. The systems and methods of power that structured these therapists’ 
workplaces remained strong and intact, even while they found ways to introduce some 
alternative and critical perspectives. Leaving the public sector allowed greater 
freedoms to therapists, but also made them actors in the neoliberal project of 
privatisation of health and welfare services. In their efforts to ameliorate the problems 
of the private practice and contracting-out models, therapists and community 
organisations took on the state’s responsibilities, including the subsidising of therapy 
costs. The gaps and tensions in these resistance strategies demonstrated both the 
strength and complexity of the forces at play within the therapy field in Aotearoa New 
Zealand and the inevitably intertwined relationship between power and resistance: 
therapists drew on, used, and engaged with disciplinary power in order to pose 
resistance. The critical, postmodern therapy movement within Aotearoa New 
Zealand’s therapy field takes shape in ways that are necessarily partial and without 
clear force or consistency.  
Addendum: Reflecting on tolerance for contradiction 
The final section of this chapter discusses a crucial feature of this group of therapists. 
It focuses on their professed ability to accept and tolerate the partial nature of 
resistance and the compromises they made in order to work with relative peace. The 
bulk of this chapter has examined the positions taken by therapists as they resisted 
and negotiated the structural imperatives of their work cultures: I have looked at the 
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strategies used to participate and intervene in the therapy field. This final section 
focuses on participants’ self-reports of their states of mind, rather than on their 
external positions within the structures of their workplaces. It is an important 
component of the chapter as a whole because it examines how these therapists 
presented themselves personally in relation to the tensions and conflicts of their work: 
it considers their personal philosophies and stances as aids to avoiding “burn out” or 
“blow out” and having sustainable, enjoyable working lives. It is also significant that 
their philosophies demonstrated a matching of personal and professional orientations. 
However, this discussion has been separated from the main text of the chapter 
because the focus throughout has been on the play of institutional forces, not on 
subjective states of mind. Nonetheless, the material in this section seems to me 
necessary to include here because it represents an integral factor in these group two 
therapists’ ability both to pose resistance in the ways that they do and to do this 
sustainably. 
As I have emphasised and discussed throughout this study, my theoretical orientation 
to my research is informed by postmodern/poststructuralist thinking. This means that 
as I examine the resistance strategies used by critical and postmodern therapists to 
navigate and negotiate the neoliberal, medicalised therapy field, I necessarily find and 
foreground tensions, inconsistencies and contradictions: I demonstrate the inevitable 
partialness and complexity of resistance, and question totalising or binary conceptions 
of human activity. Many of the therapists discussed in this chapter self-consciously 
took up similar positions in relation to their professional lives. They acknowledged 
and embraced incompleteness and the inevitability of contradictions as they talked 
about themselves, freeing themselves from pressure to achieve completeness or 
coherence in their acts of resistance. Many drew on the same theoretical orientation as 
I do. Their knowledge of and training in postmodern, critical therapy approaches also 
functioned as a resource for their own approach to their working lives, informing their 
wider systems of values and beliefs. Therapists drew on other discourses that likewise 
supported them to take up deliberate positions of tolerance for contradiction and 
ambiguity. These included a national discourse of biculturalism and the spiritual 
beliefs and orientation of Buddhism. At the same time, this tolerance for contradiction 
was most common among therapists with standing in the medical hierarchies of their 
workplaces or whose public sector workplaces were less hostile to them, and among 
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those who had left the public sector: enjoying professional esteem and regard among 
colleagues, or relative freedom from oppressive forces within the therapy field, 
presumably makes tolerating contradiction an easier project. This section examines 
key examples of therapists describing and discussing their tolerance for contradiction 
and ambiguity; it concludes with a critique of these positions, questioning their 
efficacy and discussing their potential reinscription of neoliberal values. 
Michel Foucault’s view on resistance has been referenced and discussed throughout 
this thesis. He emphasises the inextricable relationship between power and resistance, 
explaining that “where there is power, there is resistance, and yet, or rather 
consequently, this resistance is never in a position of exteriority in relation to power” 
(1990, p. 95). Power relationships depend 
on a multiplicity of points of resistance: these play the role of adversary, target, 
support, or handle in power relations. These points of resistance are present 
everywhere in the power network. Hence there is no single locus of great Refusal, 
no soul of revolt, source of all rebellions, or pure law of the revolutionary. Instead 
there is a plurality of resistances, each of them a special case. … Are there no 
great radical ruptures, massive binary divisions, then? Occasionally, yes. But 
more often one is dealing with mobile and transitory points of resistance, 
producing cleavages in a society that shift about, fracturing unities and effecting 
regroupings, furrowing across individuals themselves, cutting them up and 
remolding them, marking off irreducible regions in them, in their bodies and 
minds (ibid, pp. 95-96). 
The entanglement of power and resistance, from a Foucauldian perspective, means 
there is no “outside” to power relations; resistance is always engaged with power 
relations and is seldom absolute or consistent. Resistances occur at points and in 
moments in the power network, but fluctuate, serving multiple roles. They are mobile 
and transitory, and can both challenge and support power relations – often 
simultaneously. Foucault’s view on resistance coheres with the broader postmodern 
view that human reality “is messy and ambiguous” and that “moral decisions are 
ambivalent” (Bauman, 1993, as cited in Chan and Garrick, 2002, p. 692). For those 
with a postmodern sensibility, modernist assumptions of objectivity, truth and 
coherence hold little sway, and grand ideas about resistance and the “pure law of the 
revolutionary” are not possible. 
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Numerous therapists demonstrated this postmodern sensibility during my 
conversations with them. For instance, Ruth explained how 
postmodern/poststructuralist theories supported her within her hospital workplace:  
One of the Foucauldian analyses of power that I find very validating actually is 
the idea that to be a political agent of change you don’t need to be a 
revolutionary, you don’t need to overthrow big systems. You can actually be an 
effective agent of change in quite small, subtle ways. And I think that’s one of my 
primary motivations at an individual level to do psychology. 
Ruth was alert to and content with pursuing small, subtle acts of resistance as she 
worked as a psychologist. Foucault’s theories of power and resistance freed her from 
feeling compelled to seek or be part of a “single locus of great Refusal”, and enabled 
her to do psychology work with individuals in a relatively peaceful way, knowing that 
she could still be a political agent of change. For Ruth, being a “revolutionary”, or 
being discontent with small and subtle moments of resistance, were incompatible with 
surviving the system of her workplace: 
In the end you realise that if you’re going to survive here as a relatively mentally 
healthy person you actually need to realise that it’s a lot bigger than you and a lot 
bigger than a few individuals. In the end, I mean I suppose this is quite an 
interesting political observation, but you end up focusing on your own sphere of 
influence to the extent that you can. I’d say that’s how I survive in it.  
While poststructuralist ideas greatly influenced Ruth’s approach to working as a 
psychologist with clients/patients, they also proved integral to negotiating her own 
position within the system of her workplace. Foucault’s focus on resistance at the 
level of micropolitics, where cleavages and fractures can occur in the midst of 
regimes of power, supported Ruth to focus on her own “sphere of influence”. 
Poststructuralist discourse enabled her to refuse the binary of 
resistance/accommodation and to tolerate the inevitable compromises and 
contradictions of her working life – allowing her to survive the system as a “relatively 
mentally healthy person”. 
As discussed in chapter 3, postmodern, critical therapy practitioner-theorists have 
taken up the philosophical ideas of deconstruction, postmodernism and feminist 
poststructuralism and developed practices for doing therapy work: they have found 
ways to enact these philosophies within the therapy field. For example, Johnella Bird 
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extends poststructuralist criticism of binary oppositions into the realm of therapy. 
From Bird’s poststructuralist perspective, binaries represent experiences as static, and 
therefore trap people within them. She encourages therapists to use processes that 
“move past the polarities” (2000, p. 21): “In moving away from polarities 
(forgiveness or not) we create opportunities to generate language for the in-between. 
The language of the in-between generates an experience of movement” (p. 23). Bird’s 
text The Heart’s Narrative (2000) teaches therapists how to generate the language of 
the in-between in their work with clients/patients, and to thereby dismantle the binary 
oppositions that limit their lives. The subtitle to this text – Therapy and Navigating 
Life’s Contradictions – foregrounds the inevitability of contradictions and 
“messiness” in people’s lives. Bird stresses that “when we (therapists) are faced with 
contradictions, we must resist siding with one position over another” (p. 170). Her 
work encourages therapists to resist and move away from polarities and firm 
positions, and to embrace and practise in-between-ness in their therapy work.  
Numerous therapists discussed in this chapter invoked the concept of in-between-
ness, as an alternative to binary oppositions, when talking about how they positioned 
themselves within their work situations. In several interviews, therapists made 
reference to “both/and”, a catchphrase that represents an alternative to polarised ways 
of thinking and speaking. When Cal was interviewed he was working as a therapist in 
a primary health setting, alongside medical colleagues. He talked excitedly about 
connections and collaboration among his colleagues, describing growing harmony 
and complementarity at his workplace among medical, psychological and other 
therapy approaches – including his own postmodern orientation: 
Gradually they’re [medical colleagues] realising that psychology is not the only 
option, that there appear to be other alternative clinical approaches that aren’t 
medical, that aren’t psychological, that are not just available but actually 
sometimes preferred. There’s a kind of a “both/and” thing: you can have medical 
approaches that are profoundly and magnificently healing, especially for physical 
things, but when you get into the realm of emotion, spiritual experience, there just 
isn’t enough language in medicine, there isn’t enough medical science to help 
medicine or medics to kind of get into conversations like that. 
At the same time that Cal felt respect from medical colleagues for his therapy 
approach, he also expressed his regard for psychiatry: “I need people who know about 
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medications and how to kind of fit a medical prescription to a person, and 
psychiatrists, they’re it, they’re the people who know that best. So ‘both/and’, that’s 
how I keep answering these questions”. Implicit in Cal’s use of the term “both/and” 
was his rejection of a binary opposition between a medical model and postmodern, 
critical therapies: he embraced both his medical colleagues’ approaches and 
postmodern therapy.  
Cal contrasted his appreciation for “both/and” with his earlier life as a therapist when 
he had worked in DHB operated mental health services: “It was a bit evangelical for 
me for a while there. I wanted to trumpet kind of the ‘good news’ [about postmodern 
therapy ideas], but mostly it was about the folly of people in the medical system. I 
think I’ve got over that”. Within a work environment where there was respectful 
collegiality across professional disciplines, Cal used the discourse of “both/and” to 
justify and support his self-position as someone who is tolerant and open to difference 
and contradictions. He had “got over” his antipathy towards the medical model, but 
also tempered his fervour for postmodern, critical therapy ideas, restraining himself 
from proselytising to others. Cal’s stance drew on and invoked a postmodern therapy 
orientation to clients/patients – moving away from polarities and firm positions and 
cultivating in-between-ness. Stepping away from a binary of either postmodern 
therapies or the medical model, and employing the discourse of “both/and”, helped 
Cal to enjoy his work relationships: “I can have lunch with people who I know I don’t 
understand what they do fully, and I know they don’t understand what I do fully, but 
we know it’s working and we’re not too bloody worried about it (laughs)”. Cal used 
the discourse of “both/and” to explain his experience of peaceful, sustainable working 
conditions. He linked his retreat from “evangelism” and firm positions to his ability to 
accept compromise and difference among colleagues, while maintaining his identity 
as a postmodern practitioner. His example represents how therapists in this study 
applied postmodern therapy ideas to their thinking about their work situations. These 
ideas provided therapists like Cal with a rationale for freeing themselves from feeling 
stuck or torn between binary understandings of their work dynamics and accepting the 
messiness of human reality. 
Therapists drew on other discourses, often in combination with postmodern and 
poststructural ideas, to support them in taking up positions of tolerance for 
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contradiction and ambiguity in their workplaces. Peter spoke of how boundary-riding 
in his workplace had become more comfortable and easy for him over time. In 
particular, he had discovered the ability to hold and value academic, social 
constructionist critiques of the enterprise of therapy at the same time as being 
committed to and content with his role as a therapist: 
I’ve come to realise that’s where I sit. I used to want to be able to just sit in one of 
those two camps and feel at home in one of those two camps. And now I’ve given 
up the desire to do that. To sit in either place feels like I’d have to give up 
something which I really strongly believe in. And so what I do instead is to accept 
it’s a less common place, but just finding a way to hold my critical beliefs about 
the dominant ways of doing therapy and doing mental health, at the same time as 
doing it [therapy and mental health work].  
Like Cal, Peter’s talk showed the influence of the “both/and” discourse. Despite the 
comfort and seeming coherence promised by belonging to only one “camp”, Peter 
learned to tolerate and accept the ambiguity and tension involved in participating in 
and valuing these two camps. He depicted himself as moving in between outsider, 
social constructionist critiques of therapy and the mental health sector, on the one 
hand, and the inside workings of this sector, where he worked as a therapist, on the 
other. 
When I asked Peter about the process of becoming increasingly comfortable with in-
between-ness and his movements between these two camps, he invoked a national 
discourse of biculturalism: 
Well I think, I mean because I live in New Zealand the phrase that comes to mind 
is ‘bicultural’, because we know that people can cope with living between 
different worlds, and in fact if people are comfortable with or have enough of a 
meaningful attachment to whatever world they’re involved in that they can feel 
quite enriched by drawing on both. And I suppose that’s more how I see it now.  
Peter connected “biculturalism” to people who live in Aotearoa New Zealand, 
referring to its status as an official discourse within the realms of public and political 
life within this country.35   The numerous institutions that Peter represented in his role 
                                                
35 Peter’s comment alluded to the social and political context of Aotearoa New Zealand, where over the 
last thirty years biculturalism has taken shape as an official discourse referring to the relationship 
between the indigenous M!ori people and the settler population. In concert with constitutional changes 
that took place in the 1980s, including reference to the Treaty of Waitangi in legislation, the then 
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as a clinical psychologist – his psychology training programme, professional 
association, and public sector health service – were all undoubtedly active in 
reproducing the national discourse of biculturalism and concerned with demonstrating 
its implementation (see discussion of codes of ethics in chapter 8). Peter reproduced a 
psychologised version of the biculturalism discourse, emphasising what is “known” 
about the personal, intra-psychic experience of biculturalism: that, with “meaningful 
attachment”, “we know” that people can cope with moving between different worlds 
and cultures. Peter used this discourse as a means of further naturalising and 
supporting his own movements between different worlds: the public sector therapy 
world and the world of social constructionist critiques of therapy. It is a discourse that 
can emphasise hybridity, mobility and in-between-ness, and in this instance 
reinforced Peter’s therapist identity as someone who is able to tolerate contradiction 
and ambiguity in working life.  
For several of the group two therapists discussed in this chapter, whose experiences of 
working life involved reasonable comfort and contentment, Buddhist ideas and 
principles influenced how they positioned themselves. For instance, Jac explained her 
Buddhist-influenced philosophical position: “I think suffering is part of living, you 
know, that it’s not a psychological pathology to experience suffering at times in our 
lives and to be silenced about speaking about that”. While Buddhist and other Eastern 
philosophical principles – particularly the concept of “mindfulness” – have had 
significant bearing on the field of therapy in recent times,36 the acceptance of 
suffering as part of living can also personally aid therapists as they negotiate work 
environments. As discussed earlier, Ruth described how she took up a Foucauldian-
influenced position in her hospital workplace, which meant she would focus on her 
own sphere of influence to the extent that she could. I observed to her that it seemed 
like she was accepting of the inevitable tensions and conflicting forces at play within 
her workplace, and asked if she enjoyed her work there: 
                                                                                                                                      
Labour Government also implemented a policy of biculturalism, which related to social service 
delivery, M!ori language, and public rituals and practices (Spoonley, 2005, pp. 19-20). Spoonley 
observes that subsequent governments – even conservative ones – continued to adhere to bicultural 
policies, and that by “the 1990s, biculturalism had become part of the constitutional and policy 
environment of New Zealand” (p. 20). 
 
36 See, for instance: Acceptance and Commitment Therapy; Dialectical Behaviour Therapy; 
Mindfulness-based Cognitive Therapy; Mindfulness-based Stress Reduction. 
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Yes I do, I love working here.  And, yeah, that term ‘acceptance’ I think is one 
that is okay for me spiritually and politically. And it’s one that’s also coming into 
psychology a bit more these days too, with an awareness that’s coming in from 
eastern philosophies I suppose about what they call ‘radical acceptance’ in the 
face of overwhelming situational or life difficulties, which can actually be a valid 
and healthy coping ability.  And so, like I mentioned, for me personally it’s about 
long term survival in a system, or in any system actually, and I find it a really 
helpful way to remind myself about where I can be effective and where I can’t.  
And it’s perhaps philosophically guided by my understanding that life is not fair 
and the world is full of injustices and perhaps my agenda is not about striving for 
fairness and justice at the systemic level, it’s about keeping my focus to where I 
can be effective with individuals in smaller systems.  
From a Buddhist-influenced psychology perspective, “radical acceptance” “involves 
fully entering into and embracing whatever is in the present moment” (Robbins, 
Schmidt and Linehan, 2004, p. 40). It enables “true freedom”, which is being without 
anxiety about imperfection: “This means accepting our human existence and all of life 
as it is. Imperfection is not our personal problem – it is a natural part of existing” 
(Brach, 2003, p. 21). Ruth linked the concept of radical acceptance to her goal of 
“long term survival” within the hospital system: from her account, accepting and 
embracing the reality of the present moment, with the knowledge that imperfection is 
a natural part of existing, supported her to focus on where it was possible to be 
effective and to tolerate the obstacles and tensions of her workplace. Her view on the 
inescapability of injustices – the inevitability of suffering – meant she narrowed her 
focus to her own realm of influence. Ruth related the discourse and practice of radical 
acceptance to her love and enjoyment of her job, suggesting it as a philosophy for 
having a sustainable working life in imperfect conditions.  
Numerous group two therapists spoke and referenced discourses of tolerance for 
contradiction and ambiguity. I have examined several specific examples here, but 
more broadly most of the therapists in this chapter positioned themselves as accepting 
of compromise and imperfection, describing their efforts at enacting critical, 
postmodern therapy ideas as “a work in progress” and an imperfect project. Therapists 
used the discourses of tolerance for contradiction discussed in this section to explain 
and justify the personal comfort and contentment they experienced in their work 
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situations: it seems that these ideas can support individual critical, postmodern 
therapists to accept and live with the inevitable tensions involved in participating in 
the therapy field in Aotearoa New Zealand. Tolerance for contradiction and ambiguity 
was informed and shaped by therapists’ knowledge of postmodern/poststructuralist 
theories and by their therapy training and orientation. Understanding the world as 
inevitably “messy” and contradictory, and having suspicion of binary oppositions, 
reduced people’s expectations of grand acts of resistance and justified their tempering 
of opinions and avoidance of proselytising. Therapists also linked tolerance for 
contradiction and ambiguity to Aotearoa New Zealand’s cultural and political context 
of biculturalism, naturalising the experience of moving between “camps” and shifting 
positions. Likewise, Buddhist notions of the inevitability of suffering and the wisdom 
of “radical acceptance” also taught therapist-followers the necessity of tolerating and 
accepting contradictions and ambiguity. The examples of these therapists suggest that 
discourses of tolerance for contradiction and ambiguity can aid postmodern therapists 
in their negotiations of the therapy field – including medically oriented workplaces – 
and enable peaceful and sustainable working lives.  
Nonetheless, it is important to acknowledge that these discourses seem to coincide 
with positions of relative privilege, either in terms of institutional hierarchies or sector 
mobility: the therapists who invoked these discourses while working within public 
sector workplaces – Ruth and Peter – possessed clinical psychology qualifications; 
social worker/counsellor Cal found it possible to benefit from the “both/and” outlook 
having moved out of the public sector. The clear value of maintaining a tolerance for 
contradiction is complicated by contextual factors, meaning it is unclear the degree to 
which these positions of tolerance are the origin of peaceful and sustainable working 
lives, or whether they are contingent upon the presence of pre-existing conditions. 
It can also be said that while at a personal, individual level, discourses of tolerance 
seem helpful and sustaining, these discourses are also supportive of a neoliberal 
rationality. Although such a micro-political stance has been positively represented in 
this thesis, it will always involve questions of complicity with dominant power 
relations. In the context of the movement of forces structuring the therapy field of 
Aotearoa New Zealand – as it has been discussed in this thesis – it is worth noting 
how discourses of tolerance place upon individuals the responsibility for coping with 
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working conditions that are hostile to their therapeutic and political orientations. 
Again, as canvassed in the discussion of Ilcan (2009) above, the therapist is taking on 
an increasing burden of privatised responsibility, where autonomous professionals 
accept the necessity of having to be boundary riders, and to find ways to do this 
sustainably. It is perhaps unsurprising that an avowedly contradictory position itself 
suggests contradictions. At a personal level, it seems unquestionably positive to 
maintain mental, emotional and financial security through versions of “radical 
acceptance”. And as this chapter has demonstrated, these therapists have enjoyed 
certain successes in their work situations and have secured space to practise therapy in 
the ways that they wish to. At the same time, this has involved in a sense becoming 
reluctant agents of neoliberalism, while the structuring forces of the therapy field 
remain largely unchanged. 
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PART 5 
10. Conclusion 
This thesis brings to light a movement of therapy practitioners, across different 
professional disciplines, whose members are connected and motivated by postmodern 
therapy ideas; despite their differences and the isolation that some experienced in 
their work roles, as well as the individualised nature of the interview texts, this group 
of therapy practitioners was representative of a significant social movement within the 
field of therapy. Rather than concluding that the endeavour of therapy is untenable, or 
being reduced to paralysis in response to postmodern, poststructuralist and feminist 
critiques of the traditions of therapy, this movement has used these critiques to guide 
and formulate alternative theories and practices. My qualitative research project has 
revealed the presence of postmodern therapy practitioners across many spaces within 
the therapy field in Aotearoa New Zealand, including District Health Board mental 
health services, addiction services, tertiary and primary health services, schools and 
other education providers, community-based organisations, and privately operated 
therapy practices. These practitioners mobilised critical theories and assumptions of 
postmodernism, bridging the theory/practice divide by bringing these approaches into 
their work with clients/patients. While this thesis has not considered the experiences 
of clients/patients who encountered postmodern therapy practitioners, or appraised the 
actual work of practitioners, it has identified a distinct social group and phenomenon 
within the field of therapy in Aotearoa New Zealand, characterised by its members’ 
command of particular forms of therapeutic capital and knowledge and their shared 
objectives and purposes.  
In examining the working lives of postmodern therapy practitioners, and their efforts 
to actually do postmodern therapy work, I focused attention on the nature of the field 
of therapy in Aotearoa New Zealand over the 2000s. I have argued that neoliberal 
ideology has had considerable influence on the shape and character of therapy 
!((&!!
services in this country, especially within the public sector, but also extending to the 
community sector and private practice. I have described how therapists were required 
to work within and negotiate professional environments that are focused on fiscal 
austerity, the quantification and commodification of the activities of therapy, and a 
market model of operations, where those managing and directing public services are 
commonly chosen for their commercial business and management skills, rather than 
their knowledge and experiences as practitioners. At the same time, my research has 
discussed the hegemonic status of medicine and science within the contemporary 
therapy field in Aotearoa New Zealand, charting a shift across public sector therapy 
services in the 1990s to increasingly medicalised conceptions of therapy and mental 
health. The official recognition and reproduction of medical and scientific discourses 
in the therapy field aids the project of neoliberalism, enabling greater gate-keeping 
and restrictions on access to publicly provided services and, with the demand for 
evidence-based practice, reinforcing an image of a public sector that requires 
“efficient”, “proven”, value-for-money services. Therapy practitioners in this study, 
trained in anti-pathologising, politicised approaches to therapy work, found 
themselves required to engage with the diagnostic/illness model of the DSM and be 
subject to a medicalised professional hierarchy. The predominance of 
neoliberal/managerialist, medical and scientific discourses and forms of capital within 
the contemporary therapy field complicated and obstructed the aspirations and 
objectives of postmodern therapy practitioners. The work environments within the 
therapy field, particularly in the public sector, were inconsistent with, and frequently 
hostile to, the professional skills and knowledge of these practitioners. 
As explained in my methodology chapter, my research and the conclusions that I 
draw from it are inevitably limited. The knowledge produced in this thesis is shaped 
by my own authorship and interests and the context of its production. I identify with 
the participants of the research, both as a counsellor interested in postmodern 
approaches to therapy, and as a past worker within a therapy organisation under 
pressure from neoliberal and medical-scientific discourses who now operates a private 
practice. These identifications led the research in particular directions, as I pursued 
my dual research and professional interests in finding out how therapists resist and 
negotiate these dominant discourses: the participants’ talk and strategies have 
influenced my own therapy and workplace practices. My alliance with the participants 
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also provokes compassion for their struggles and inevitably steers my analysis and 
conclusions in particular directions. Similarly, the research is also influenced by the 
contexts, positions and interests of the particular research participants. The research is 
not transparent nor all-encompassing: another researcher examining this topic, or 
different participants, would unavoidably produce different kinds of knowledge – but 
perhaps also share similarities. Likewise, qualitative research projects, given the 
smallness and selectivity of their samples, and the relationship between the researcher 
and the forms of data employed, are not intended to produce authoritative 
generalisations. My research findings are tentative, stemming from the texts of these 
particular postmodern therapy practitioners and subject to my own interpretive 
analysis. That said, I can and do make interpretive claims about the texts of these 
therapists. From my immersion in, and analysis of, the data provided by my 
participants, below I will suggest conclusions and make recommendations relating to 
the interactions between postmodern therapy practitioners and the controlling 
authorities within the field of therapy in Aotearoa New Zealand. 
Parts 2 and 3 of the thesis revealed a schism between the postmodern therapy 
movement and the dominant forces of the therapy field. Part 4 focused on the methods 
and strategies employed by therapists to negotiate the therapy field and, where 
possible, resist the influence of its hegemonic forces and find ways to do postmodern 
therapy. From my analysis of the therapists’ “boundary-riding” strategies, I suggest 
some significant conclusions. First, and importantly, my research indicates that 
critical, postmodern therapy work is taking place within the neoliberalised, 
medicalised therapy field in Aotearoa New Zealand, even in public sector services. 
This supports the theoretical position that hegemony and its discourses are never total 
or complete. Despite the official (neoliberal/scientised) discourses and management 
agendas that work to structure and govern the field, some clients/patients are 
encountering therapists who operate from a postmodern orientation. Therapists are 
resisting and subverting these dominant discourses and agendas and finding ways to 
practise alternative postmodern therapy approaches. 
In itself, the evidence this thesis puts forward that resistance is taking place within 
public sector work organisations, despite their neoliberal-inspired policy directives 
and management structures, is significant. As discussed in chapter 7, neoliberalism 
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has been described as “colonising” economic and cultural life, becoming part of the 
collective “commonsense”. Its discourses are so entrenched and far-reaching that they 
appear inescapable. However, this research contributes to the growing body of 
organisation studies that challenge the suggestion that neoliberalism is a Master, total 
and inescapable discourse and identity project. It looks at the specific organisational 
spaces and relationships of the therapy field in Aotearoa New Zealand. In doing so, I 
have demonstrated how workers within neoliberal regimes draw on a range of 
different and potentially competing social discourses: in this instance, membership 
within the postmodern therapy movement functions as a resource for the assertion of 
an alternative professional identity and for the development of a range of resistance 
strategies. The therapists in this study are neither passive recipients of dominant 
discourses, nor completely constrained by the force of managerialist bureaucracy and 
its instructions for working life.  
While resistance to the dominant forces in the therapy field is taking place, within 
public sector services in particular, it seems that postmodern therapy is often a covert 
activity, especially when practitioners lack the legitimate capital and occupy lower 
positions within the hierarchy of professions. My research has revealed a hidden 
transcript of resistance within therapy workplaces, illuminating a range of subversive 
practices used by therapists to secure space for autonomous therapy activities and to 
protect themselves from scrutiny or sanction. The covert nature of postmodern 
therapy work within the public sector means, however, that the public, official 
transcript remains in place. As they keep silent, or translate their work into the 
dominant language of the therapy field, the ideas and ethical standpoints of 
postmodern therapy practitioners, and the successes or difficulties of their work, are 
excluded from official discussion and from the public image of their workplaces. The 
status quo appears to prevail. For many therapists, operating covertly and cultivating 
an appearance of conformity required extra work and energy, resulted in isolation, 
and was personally and professionally risky. My research suggests that the resistance 
strategies of postmodern therapy practitioners within public sector services – 
including covert activities, but also their (often thwarted) efforts to use official 
politics and to strategically “work” the contradictions and inconsistencies of the 
system – are frequently unsustainable. 
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At the same time, it seems that the kind of resistance that is most successful and 
personally tolerable for postmodern therapy practitioners in the public sector involves 
strategic acceptance of the arrangements of disciplinary power in workplaces and 
possession and use of the reigning forms of capital. This meant that therapists were 
most able to share openly aspects of their postmodern therapy perspectives and 
practices with colleagues when they possessed and displayed credentials and 
qualifications that wielded symbolic power. The therapists in this study who 
undertook such resistance gave evidence of its persuasiveness and of their consequent 
abilities to introduce new perspectives to seemingly conservative colleagues. Yet at 
the same time, the hierarchies and inequalities that structured their workplaces 
remained largely intact, with the therapists arguably reinforcing them. It seems no 
accident that the therapists most able to pursue these forms of resistance already 
possessed medical/scientific qualifications and/or were actively seeking to align 
themselves with medicine and science: no social workers in public sector services 
talked of successfully using official politics or infiltrating their work cultures. 
Publicly successful, sustainable resistance to the forces that dominate contemporary 
public sector therapy workplaces appears to be most possible for high-ranking 
therapists who are both prepared and best equipped to “play the game”.  
My thesis findings indicate that the public sector in Aotearoa New Zealand has lost, 
and is at risk of continuing to lose, politically-conscious, postmodern-inspired therapy 
practitioners from its workforce. This seems particularly apparent among the lower 
ranking professions of social work, nursing and general psychology, but also extends 
to clinical psychologists.37 Numerous therapists discussed in chapter 8 had left the 
public sector as a result of “burn-out” or “blow-out”, or because of a fundamental 
clash with their professional values; others were disillusioned and questioning their 
long-term desire to stay in their public sector workplaces. While private and 
community sector practice does not offer a complete escape from the pressures and 
influence of neoliberal and medico-scientific official discourses, these work spaces do 
promise greater autonomy and personal and professional comfort than many public 
                                                
37 It is also, of course, possible that other therapy professionals who do not align themselves with the 
postmodern therapy movement are also leaving public sector services and also citing “burn-out”, 
disillusionment and the unsustainability of their work as reasons for this. If this is the case, it should 
likewise be of critical concern to the directors and managers of these services and to the public service 
as a whole. 
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sector therapy services. The therapists in my study who have been lost to the public 
sector, or who are in danger of being so lost, brought a particular attitude to their 
work with clients/patients (as detailed mostly in chapters 3 and 4) that would seem to 
be of benefit to both clients/patients and to the sector as a whole. In their concerned 
approach to their roles as “social workers” for the “left hand” of the state, these 
therapists sought to mobilise in their work a postmodern ethical orientation that is 
avowedly alert to issues of power and social justice. It is concerning that the public 
sector in Aotearoa New Zealand should be losing therapists of this nature who 
arguably represent a progressive vanguard, offering significant alternatives in their 
field. 
Given that, as discussed, numerous counselling and social work programmes in 
Aotearoa New Zealand teach postmodern therapy approaches to students, this trend is 
especially concerning. In addition to this qualification-oriented training, short courses 
or workshops on narrative therapy and other similar approaches also take place 
regularly throughout the country, organised privately or by particular interest groups, 
and directed at practising therapists. Therefore, on the basis of my research, I would 
recommend that, as well as teaching skills for ideal therapy situations – where 
therapists are free from external constraints or prescriptions – teachers and presenters 
also recognise the likely constraints experienced by therapists in their workplaces and 
engage in a pedagogy that addresses these non-ideal situations. The pragmatic 
realities of working life under neoliberalism and in medically oriented environments 
need to be explicitly incorporated into therapists’ education and training. A critical 
feature of such teaching might be the cultivation among students of a personal 
tolerance for contradiction and compromise – applying postmodern theories to their 
personal and intra-psychic experiences – as I have suggested was helpful for some of 
the therapists in this study. This teaching would not be a simple remedy to the most 
hostile or oppressive work situations, nor is it likely to result in systemic, politicised 
changes within public sector workplaces. However, it may help therapists at a 
personal level to experience work as more sustainable and less damaging. 
In addition, and in combination with this focus on the personal, subjective lives and 
experiences of postmodern therapy practitioners, educators could also develop 
teachings that focus on pragmatic boundary-riding practices for therapists. This might 
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include discussion of some of the resistance strategies canvassed in this thesis – for 
instance, ways of using official politics, asserting professional selfhood and ethics, the 
strategic use of silence, the skills of double-talk and presenting an appearance of 
conformity, the identification of avenues for “working the system”, and methods of 
infiltration. It could also involve the formulation of other boundary-riding strategies. 
While such an approach may seem subversive, it would acknowledge and work with 
the very real conflicts that postmodern therapy practitioners seem to encounter in their 
actual work cultures: rather than perpetuating the silencing and “closeting” of 
therapists, which isolates and individualises their struggles, it would give greater 
cohesion to, and support within, the social movement that this thesis has described. 
The twin forces of neoliberalism and medicalised mental health and therapy show 
little sign of abating. Indeed, as the current climate both nationally and globally is 
characterised by economic recession, fiscal austerity and the rationing and retraction 
of public services are likely to increase in prominence and monopolise government 
agendas (as is currently the case in Aotearoa New Zealand). However, as this thesis 
demonstrates, these forces are not masterful in any absolute sense: critics and 
opponents are active within the therapy field, and gaps and inconsistencies in 
managerial logic are ever-present and able to be exploited. While that managerial 
logic is perhaps unlikely to change in the near future, it might be hoped that the 
burgeoning social movement explored in this thesis can become more self-conscious, 
cohesive and collectivised and thus more able to sustain and resource itself and its 
members in challenging work situations. 
Throughout this writing, I have at times brought my presence as the author to the fore 
and reflected on my relationship to the research. It seems appropriate and timely to do 
so again, as I bring the thesis to a close. At times I felt inspired while doing this 
research – both by the practices my participants described, and by their passion and 
tenacity. During interviews, and reflecting on transcripts, I also felt moved and 
concerned by some of their obvious struggles and hardships; and I hope that they are 
able to utilise strategies and/or find workplaces that enable them to work with ease 
and appreciation. At the same time, it has been gratifying and inspiring to hear their 
accounts and to learn of how these people have found ways to work – however 
fraught they may be – within the systems of the therapy field. At a personal level, the 
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work they do feels important, and I hope that they are able, despite inevitable 
contradictions and compromises, to continue doing it: in a culture increasingly 
dominated by narrow forms of valuation derived from the languages of science and 
economics, it is desirable that the “left hand” of the state is represented by individuals 
who are both critical and courageous, and who are able to work sustainably.  
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APPENDIX A 
Information sheet for research participants 
University of Canterbury 
American Studies Programme 
School of Culture, Literature and Society 
INFORMATION 
You are invited to participate in the research project – 
THERAPY AS RESISTANCE? 
The aim of my project is to examine how ‘resistant’ and self-consciously ‘alternative’ 
therapies/therapists negotiate dominant cultural structures and discourses. I am 
interested in examining the ways in which therapists/therapies have responded to 
critiques of psychology/therapy and how they work within, or try to get outside of, the 
terrain of therapeutic culture. In particular, I want to explore how such resistant and 
self-reflexive therapists conceptualise, enact and practice resistance, how they 
position themselves in relation to dominant understandings of therapy, and the 
challenges and negotiations involved in thinking about and doing therapy. 
I hope to gather data from a number of different sources over the next 12 months.  
The process of data collection will mainly involve semi-structured interviews with 
therapists, counsellors, psychologists, educators, students and other professionals 
working within therapeutic environments and services. They will predominantly take 
the form of individual interviews and discussions, but may involve group discussion.  
Your involvement in this project will entail at least one interview, ranging in length 
from 1-2 hours. It may also involve a follow-up interview if you are agreeable. These 
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interviews will be transcribed and analysed. You have the right to withdraw from the 
project at any time, including the withdrawal of any information provided.  
The results of the project will be used in my doctoral thesis and academic 
publications, but you may be assured of the complete confidentiality of data gathered 
in this investigation: the identity of participants will not be made public without 
your/their consent. To ensure anonymity and confidentiality tapes will be destroyed 
after their transcription. Pseudonyms will be used for all people. Typists will sign 
confidentiality clauses. Your transcript(s) will be available for you at your request. 
In the application of these procedures I do not foresee any risks to you. Conscious, 
concerted efforts will be made to avoid causing you mental stress or emotional 
distress, or moral or cultural offence. 
My project is being carried out under the supervision of Dr Annie Potts [contact 
information provided] and Dr Jessica Johnston [contact information provided] at the 
University of Canterbury. Please feel free to contact either or both of the above with 
any questions you may have. My supervisors and I would be happy to discuss any 
issues you may wish to raise, at any stage in the project. [My contact information 
provided.] 
The project has been reviewed and accepted by the University of Canterbury Human 
Ethics Committee. 
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APPENDIX B 
Interview questions 
Intro/background - Can you tell me about how you’ve come to be practising as a 
therapist/counsellor/social worker? What’s brought you to your job/role now? Can 
you tell me a story of your background? How did you start doing this work? - (note: take note of, inquire about if necessary age, gender, race/ethnicity, 
geography, sexuality, class background) 
Nature of your practice – general - Where do you work? - Who do you work for? - What sorts of other people do you work with? Interact with in your job/role? - Who are your clients? – gender, race/ethnicity, sexuality, age, class etc - How have they come to be your clients? Reasons for being your clients?  How do 
they access you? - What kind of therapy do you prefer/practise? What kind of training did you do, are 
you doing? 
Philosophy/“doing” therapy - What do you “do”? How do you work with people? Describe what you “do” – are 
you “doing therapy”? Would you call it something else? - Can you tell me about your philosophy on working with people? 
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- How do you do therapy critically, alternatively?  Is your practice “resistant”, 
“alternative”?  Political?  How?  How do you know? - Where do you position themselves in relation to mainstream institutions? – 
Outsiders?  Insiders? - What are the goals of therapy? Your work with people? What’s the purpose? - What’s your role as therapist? – describe your idea of your role. - Are you an “expert”? In what ways do you subvert the notion of a “knowing 
therapist/unknowing client”? - Are there any problems involved with working this way, working as a therapist? 
What pressures, tensions, problems do you encounter? Structures or organisations? 
How do you negotiate these? Can they be resolved? What would you like to do 
differently? - How have they come to work in these ways? What/who has informed, influenced 
them?  How have they formed their beliefs, ideas? - Feminist therapists: how does feminist politics inform your practise, your idea of 
resistance through therapy? - Diagnoses – do you use them? How? Can they be avoided? Negotiated? 
“Recovery”, transformation, change - Do you want anything for your clients? What? - What does change/recovery mean? Look like? - Can you tell me any stories of how people you’ve worked with have 
changed/“recovered”? 
Appraisal - Why do you do this work? What sustains you? - What do you enjoy, find satisfying? Dislike, feel frustrated by? 
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- Is it hard to maintain your position, enact your ideas? - Are you satisfied? - Any frustrations, dilemmas, problems that you encounter? - Do you pose resistance? Are you successful? What is “success”? What does it 
mean? Look like? How do they know? 
Is there anything else that you’d like to tell me? Anything you want to clarify? 
Would you be willing to possibly agree to a follow-up interview? 
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